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The objective of this thesis is to develop a new way of thinking about the theory and 
practice of human rights to accommodate the demands of vegans for basic moral 
rights for nonhuman animals. The work firstly outlines the ways in which the claims 
of vegans, under the right to freedom of thought and conscience, are largely 
unsupported by existing human rights because they are typically outweighed by the 
wider interests of the majority. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, the thesis 
considers arguments that ground the nature of vegan claims in the ethics of alterity. 
It specifically utilises the argument that the basis of human rights recognises ethical 
responsibility to the precarious, mortal other. 
 Upendra Baxi cautiously supports the application of Levinas’ philosophy to 
the ethics of law, and there is a slowly growing body of literature in this regard. This 
thesis is the first human rights work to show that Levinas’ ethics of alterity can also 
be applied to nonhuman others, and that human rights arguments can include claims 
that the avoidable suffering of nonhuman animals is a human rights wrong.  
 The argument developed within this thesis allows a reconceptualisation of 
the human rights demands of vegans as claims representing a well-established 
ethical regard for nonhumans. Looking to Levinas’ ethics of alterity not only 
illustrates a new approach to human rights litigation to accommodate vegans but 
also grounds the protection of other animals and allows for a reconceptualisation of 
the very idea of human rights. 
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‘So strong is man’s aversion to all killing …’ 
 
Leo Tolstoy, ‘Introduction’ in Howard Williams, The 
Ethics of Diet: An Anthology of Vegetarian Thought 
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The subject of this thesis 
The subject of this thesis is the relationship of veganism to human rights. 
Veganism is unique in that whilst other disadvantaged groups – for example, women, 
religious minorities or disabled people – make human rights claims for themselves, 
the claims of vegans represent, first and foremost, the moral standing of nonhuman 
animals.1 In the dominance of a culture that is based on the consumption of other 
animals, vegans experience unfair treatment and discrimination in personal, social 
and employment contexts. Some of these experiences motivate human rights claims 
under the right to freedom of conscience: for example, by a vegan in public authority 
employment who is required to wear uniform items that are made from the skin or 
hair of nonhuman animals. In such circumstances, vegans experience coercion and 
feel required to assimilate into a way of life that is not aligned with their ethical 
orientation.  
Veganism has no official definition for the purposes of law. The definition 
promoted by The Vegan Society2 states that it is: 
 
[a] philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as 
far as is possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, 
and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other 
                                                     
1
 In recognition of a well-established observation that prejudice against nonhuman animals is reinforced by 
language, this thesis will support expressions such as ‘nonhuman animal(s)’, ‘nonhuman(s)’ and ‘other-than-
human animal(s)’ but may sometimes use ‘animal(s)’ interchangeably with these terms. 
2
 There are many Vegan Societies around the world, but The Vegan Society established in the UK in 1944 is 
considered to be the leading vegan authority. See <https://www.vegansociety.com/take-action/ask-vegan-
trademark> accessed 28 June 2017. 
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purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and 
use of animal-free alternatives for the benefit of humans, 
animals and the environment. In dietary terms it denotes the 
practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or 
partly from animals.3  
 
This thesis asks whether there is an ethical theory that – when applied to the 
human rights system of the European Court of Human Rights (‘the Court’ or ‘the 
ECtHR’) – supports the claims of vegans. This focus on the ECtHR relates to the 
inadmissibility of a case brought by a vegan in 19914 and the statement of the 
ECtHR’s Commission (as it was prior to the 1998 ECtHR restructure) in that case 
which indicated that the vegan convictions regarding animal products are within the 
scope of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘the Convention’).5  
What is problematic about this case is the acknowledgement that nonhumans 
have sufficient moral standing to validate the human rights claims of vegans but that 
rights are exclusively human and deny that nonhumans have any basic rights. This 
thesis frames this problem in terms of a tension in human rights between the 
prioritisation of individual human reason and the mission of human rights to 
acknowledge and deal with suffering. In this regard, it foregrounds the ethics of 
human rights. 
The ECtHR is the judicial body that hears cases about alleged violations of the 
Convention. It builds upon the human rights work of the United Nations (UN) and 
                                                     
3
 The Vegan Society, ‘Definition of veganism’ <www.vegansociety.com/go-vegan/definition-veganism> accessed 5 
May 2016. 
4
 H v UK (1993) 16 EHRR. 
5
 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Article 9. 
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gives effect to some human rights provisions that are contained in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (‘the UDHR’ or ‘the Declaration’).6 This is a regional, 
international human rights treaty that is ratified by the member states of the Council 
of Europe.  
The Convention lists the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of every 
person. It is a ‘living instrument’ that evolves through the addition of new Protocols 
which extend and further clarify existing provisions. Its terms also evolve and are 
clarified through the judgments of the Court. Given this evolutionary potential, this 
thesis examines whether there is a way to reconceptualise the idea of basic rights to 
better accommodate veganism. 
1.1 The research questions 
The human rights claims of vegans are raised as a matter of freedom of 
conscience but are claims that represent the moral imperative to attend to 
nonhuman animal suffering. As such, the primary research question of this thesis 
concerns the ethical orientation of the human right to freedom of conscience. It 
seeks to ascertain if there is a way to accommodate veganism by thinking about this 
right differently. The thesis responds to the primary question through four subsidiary 
questions. Firstly, what is the essence of veganism and what are the human rights 
claims of vegans?  Secondly, what are the normative legal values and principles that 
determine the relationship between current human rights and veganism? Thirdly, is 
there an ethical theory that has utility for the claims of vegans? And finally, what is 
the essence of such a theory, how might it have utility for vegans and how might it 
be applied to human rights to support the claims of vegans? The argument 
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developed from an exploration of these questions will now be explained.  
1.2 The argument developed in this thesis 
The argument developed in the thesis is presented in four stages. The first 
stage argues that veganism is an ethical commitment to the moral standing of 
animals and that it represents a moral imperative to attend to their suffering. 
Observing that other animals suffer, vegans aim to live their lives without harming 
animals or consuming products derived from their living or dead bodies. Veganism 
can, thus, be regarded as an uncompromising response to suffering and a 
manifestation of ethical responsibility to the moral standing of nonhuman others 
that re-presents their authenticity. On this view, the human rights claims of vegans 
emerge from the inclusion of other animals in the moral community. The claims of 
vegans are grounded by responsibility and, first and foremost, present the suffering 
of other animals as a matter of justice. As such, the claims of vegans are uniquely 
claims for others rather than for themselves.  
The second stage argues that the claims of vegans are primarily claims for 
nonhuman others supported by certain animal welfare measures (such as the 
sentient status of nonhuman others in law and related regulations concerning their 
treatment), but that they are claims which are also limited by certain legal principles 
such as the current primacy of protection for personal and private beliefs of 
conscience under Article 9 of the Convention. Noting an existing widespread social, 
political and legal concern for nonhuman animals that supports veganism as the 
representation of an already existing profound moral regard for animals, the 
argument is made that the existing human rights approach to the claims of vegans is 
ineffective and inadequate. It is argued that their claims should be assessed 
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differently than as matters concerning disadvantage in relation to personal and 
private conscience. In this regard, the stage identifies the need to explore an 
inclusive philosophy that can ground the existence of fundamental rights for a 
community of individuals that suffer.  
The third stage explains that Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of alterity constitute a 
theory of asymmetrical ethical responsibility that supports the claims of vegans. It 
observes that asymmetrical ethical compassion is intrinsic to a humanity that is 
bound in community through an innate regard for suffering others. Developing 
existing discourse on the utility of Levinas’ philosophy for human rights, the stage 
applies the principles of Levinas’ philosophy to nonhuman animals on the basis that 
they are legitimate, suffering others who demand an ethical response and to whom 
the human subject responds. The stage identifies that Levinas’ ethics of alterity offer 
a stronger level of protection for nonhuman animals than is explicated in current 
animal rights literature.  
The fourth stage argues that Levinas’ ethics of alterity, when applied to 
animals and human rights, have utility for the claims of vegans. On this view, 
nonhumans have five basic rights which can be viewed in three groups: the right to 
life and liberty, the right to self-defined identity and the right to support and 
assistance. These basic rights of nonhumans ground the claims of vegans; claims 
judged not on the basis of the right to freedom of personal and private conscience 
but as the expression of a moral imperative to respond to nonhuman suffering as a 
matter of ethical justice.  
The conclusion of this thesis is that Levinas’ ethics of alterity constitute an 
ethical theory that has value for the human rights claims of vegans because it is 
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capable of explaining and underpinning the moral and legal standing of animals. This 
conclusion has significant implications for Article 9 jurisprudence. Rather than 
framing Article 9 as a provision that supports veganism as a matter of personal and 
private conscience, this conclusion allows a response to Article 9 that recognises the 
claims of vegans in the context of an existing empirical ethical regard for other 
animals and their suffering. It rejects the idea that the claims of vegans are matters 
that belong in the domain of personal and private conscience and allows Article 9 to 
become the vehicle through which the moral imperative to attend to the suffering of 
nonhumans is transported into human rights. It is a response to Article 9 that 
recognises nonhuman suffering to be a fundamental matter of ethical responsibility 
to a humanity that is first and foremost ethically responsive to the suffering of 
others. 
1.3 Personal motivation and audience for the research  
 The personal motivation for this research stems from a longstanding interest 
in the relationship between human society and the status of nonhuman animals. A 
specific interest in the human rights claims of vegans was fuelled in 2010 by the 
observation of a tension in the UK concerning the status of veganism as a qualifying 
belief under Article 9 of the Convention and the role of the UK Equality and Human 
Rights Commission.7  
 The Equality and Human Rights Commission has a statutory duty to oversee 
human rights and monitor equality initiatives and had made it clear in its Draft Code 
of Practice for Employers, that veganism comes within the scope of the protected 
                                                     
7
 Jamieson Alastair, ‘Vegans should be protected from discrimination, says equality watchdog: Vegans and 
atheists should have the same protection against discrimination as religious groups according to guidance on new 
equality laws proposed by Harriet Harman’ The Telegraph (2010) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/7392222/Vegans-should-be-protected-from-discrimination-says-
equality-watchdog.html> accessed 9 March 2010. 
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characteristic ‘Religion and Belief’.8 In the Draft Code of Practice it gave example 
scenarios featuring vegan employees. These examples sought to explain to 
employers the steps that could be taken to accommodate the needs of vegans. These 
useful examples were removed from its final published Code of Practice on the basis 
that they were not ‘realistic’ and that different examples would better ‘reflect the 
principles in relevant case law’.9 It was felt that the removal of the examples was 
contrary to the principle of inclusion, because it meant that the legal status of 
veganism was relegated in the dissemination of important information, and that 
vegans were denied a point of reference to support their requests for 
accommodation of needs. 
 The research is likely to be of interest to vegans and animal rights activists 
because it opens up new ways to debate the relationship between humans and other 
animals, to articulate claims and to develop political campaigns. It will also be of 
interest: to human rights scholars who are interested in the ontology or ethical 
orientation of human rights or the construction of a moral foundation for human 
rights; to those interested in exploring the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas; and to 
those interested in the debate on human/nonhuman rights.  
1.4 The context for the research: the situation for vegans  
There are varied responses to veganism in case law and by public authorities. 
In addition to being regarded as within the scope of the Convention, veganism has 
                                                     
8
 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Employment Statutory Code of Practice (Draft for Consultation)’ 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission 2009) 32, 252, accessed June 2010. The website of the Equality and 
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been referred to, in a UK court, as a component of a broader positive philosophy 
within which to raise children.10 In the UK, vegan children have nevertheless been 
required by law to receive vaccinations made using substances derived from 
nonhumans.11 In Rukavina v Croatia,12 the court heard that a multidisciplinary team 
of experts had been brought in to respond to the applicant’s allegations that his ex-
wife was putting the heath of his daughter at risk by ‘keeping her on a vegan diet’.13 
The specialist team was composed of a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a paediatrician 
and a social worker. It reported to the court that the child was healthy but that her 
mother’s insistence on a vegan diet put her at risk regarding her ‘normal 
psychophysical development’.14 There was no discussion about the ethical 
orientation of the specialists. Similarly, in Genna & Dennis, the Family Court of 
Australia was required to assist disputing parents and employed the services of a 
dietician as the final arbiter of what the child should eat when in the father’s care. 
Again, there was no discussion as to the dietician’s ethical orientation.15  
In France, the judiciary authorised the removal of a child from vegan parents 
on the grounds that the child was in danger.16 In other jurisdictions too, the word 
‘vegan’ is conflated with child abuse.17 Generally, in health care, veganism has been 
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problematised as an extreme diet or a manifestation of psychological disorder.18 In 
Switzerland, a soldier was not allowed to join the army on the grounds that his 
veganism was an unsuitable ethical orientation.19 A vegan in the United States of 
America (US) felt obliged to define her ethical orientation as Hindu in order to 
receive an alternative medical test in place of a standard type that used derivatives 
of cows’ blood.20  
A high-profile case in the UK was the case of Joe Hashman, whose 
employment was unlawfully terminated on the basis of his commitment, as a vegan, 
to actively oppose fox-hunting. Southampton Employment Tribunal Centre held that 
his belief in the sanctity of life and anti-fox-hunting was within the scope of 
protection.21 Similarly, a belief in vegetarianism as a manifestation of a perceived 
relationship with nonhumans has also been accepted as coming within the scope of 
equality law.22 
1.5 The current status of literature in the specific area 
In 2003, Sara Soifer identified that veganism created an ‘emerging and 
difficult dilemma’ for law. Since the outset, six years ago, of research for the present 
thesis, interest in the idea that veganism presents to law an intersection of human 
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and nonhuman moral standing has grown within the academy. In 2015, a request 
was received for written material – on the relationship of veganism to human rights 
– for a proposed edited collection of critical perspectives on veganism. This was 
published in 2016.23 Also in 2016, Ralph Müller-Amenitsch published Vegan im Recht 
(Vegan Rights) in Germany,24 and in 2017, Carlo Prisco published The Right to 
Vegetarianism, in which he makes a connection between the ways law is developing 
in response to a historical ethical regard for nonhumans and a growing demand to 
eat a vegan diet.25 Though Prisco’s approach is entirely different from the one taken 
in this thesis, in that he emphasises more comprehensively the historical human 
interest in animals’ wellbeing and the development of a moral imperative not to eat 
them, he independently observes the way in which positive law for vegans gives 
expression to the moral standing of other animals, their exclusion from basic moral 
rights and how these circumstances challenge the orthodoxy of human rights. These 
scholarly contributions indicate the development of new ways of articulating the 
moral and legal standing of other animals. Importantly, they bring new insights to 
debates about the legitimacy and validity of exclusive human rights in the context of 
a moral imperative to consider the suffering and exclusion of nonhuman animals. 
1.6 The context for the research: wider human and animal rights scholarship 
Some human rights scholars – for example, Costas Douzinas, Connor Gearty 
and Michael Hass – have recognised the importance of dealing with animals within 
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the context of human rights.26 Gearty argues that an ethically minded public requires 
the idea of human rights to be revisited because it identifies naturally with 
nonhuman animal suffering. For Gearty, ‘[t]he raw fact of an animal suffering should 
be enough in itself to engender strong feeling of solidarity and underpin joint 
campaigns…’.27 
The argument for an integrated debate concerning nonhuman and human 
rights issues resonates with some animal rights scholars, such as Kelly Oliver, Alasdair 
Cochrane and Anne Peters.28 Though there are a number of positions and 
approaches in this combined scholarship, it is fair to say that it is predominantly 
anthropocentric in nature and relies on nonhuman sentience as the ground for 
inclusion. None of the existing literature deals with the human rights claims of 
vegans or their presentation of suffering, and none of it considers potential 
implications. This thesis considers the human rights claims of vegans for the moral 
standing of nonhumans, in recognition of an ethical interface between human and 
animal rights debates. 
1.7 The context for the research: wider human rights scholarship 
Upendra Baxi has no doubt that the target of human rights is suffering. In 
assessing the ethics of human rights, Baxi, Costas Douzinas, William Paul Simmons 
and Joseph Indaimo express the utility of the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics 
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of alterity.29 Though these scholars believe that Levinas’ philosophy pertains to 
inclusion on the basis that human rights are first and foremost a recognition of 
others, none develop a discussion as to whether Levinas’ theory can be applied to 
nonhuman animals as legitimate others and what implications this may have for the 
human rights claims of vegans. This research goes beyond two current thresholds in 
existing literature: it challenges the anthropocentric assumptions of current human 
rights, and it offers a new way to speak of nonhuman animal rights. It also 
contributes to the debate on the validity of rights in general.  By examining the 
inclusive potential of Levinas’ philosophy, it first develops the existing idea that 
human rights theory recognises duty to the other. It then argues that nonhumans are 
legitimate others and that the claims of vegans present ethical claims for the other.  
1.8 The context for the research: animal rights scholarship 
 Given that this thesis identifies ethical responsibility to nonhumans as the 
grounds for the human rights claims of vegans, it is worth introducing the various 
strands of animal rights theory and explaining why it does not ground the argument 
for a reorientation of human rights on sentience.  
 An attempt to bridge the gap between human rights and animal rights was 
recently undertaken by Alasdair Cochrane.30 He argues for a reorientation from 
human rights to sentient rights on the basis that suffering is the universal principle to 
ground protective rights. This reliance on primacy of the sentiency of animals is 
historically relevant and typical of other literature that advocates for the moral and 
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legal standing of nonhumans.  
 This thesis does not ground its argument in the well-established idea that 
sentiency should ground protective rights. One reason for this is that the concept of 
sentiency is subject to the parameters of anthropocentric human reason that deny 
absolute moral standing for animals. For example, the supremacy of human reason in 
Peter Singer’s utilitarian and Tom Regan’s inherent value approach to animal rights 
ultimately fails nonhumans.31 Though both of these thinkers recognise the 
significance of animal suffering and the socio-political conditions that sully the moral 
standing of nonhumans, both ultimately retain the view that nonhumans can be 
considered less important than humans. They claim that since humans have 
observable complex cognitive abilities – for example, language abilities, memory, and 
a perception of desires, goals or the future – it is possible to identify and implement 
human superiority: Singer on utilitarian grounds and Regan on the grounds that it is 
not possible to give an explanation of the inherent value of nonhumans. For Singer, 
human interests will always outweigh those of nonhumans, and for Regan, inherent 
value is related to being a ‘subject of a life’, defined as any normally developing 
mammal aged one year or more.32 In the absence of an articulation of the 
philosophical grounds for the significance humans give to sentient others, both 
authors retain the notion of arbitrary human privilege.  
 Mark Rowlands and Alasdair Cochrane argue that animals have interests and 
consciousness but do not explain the ethical pre-conditions that confirm their 
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absolute moral standing.33 Consequently, the moral and legal standing of animals 
always succumbs to human privilege on the grounds that meeting the interests of 
humans will always be a priority. This discourse is problematic for establishing the 
rights of animals. Robert Garner, for example, has suggested that it may be 
permissible to experiment on animals.34 He puts forward the argument that as long 
as an animal’s interests are met and no pain or suffering is endured, it may be 
acceptable to conduct experiments or perform amputations on animals in the 
interests of human advantage and progress. As such, arguments put forward for 
animal rights on the basis that sentient animals are in possession of consciousness or 
interests do not guarantee their protection and are thus inadequate to ground the 
claims of vegans. 
 A similar problem arises when ascribing a moral status to animals using 
Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.35 This approach involves attributing a 
hierarchy of importance and significance to nonhuman life and the retention of the 
resource status of nonhumans. The idea that a normative code of conduct can be 
developed from the recognition of sentiency is thus subject to an anthropocentric 
categorisation of nonhumans that does them a disservice.  
 A different problem emerges in the recent ‘political turn’ in animal rights. This 
body of theory recognises the emphasis on nonhuman interests and sentiency in 
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traditional animal rights theory and promotes a notion of selfhood rather than 
personhood as the grounds for establishing inviolable basic rights. On these grounds, 
the uniqueness and subjectivity of others is acknowledged, but positive obligations 
and rights remain grounded in the idea that the self is paramount.  
 On the notion of respect for selfhood, Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka 
explain a model for practical justice based on a notion of animal citizenship in which 
nonhuman animals are co-opted into organised human society.36 Domestic animals 
become equal (to human) citizens, wild animals have their own territories over which 
they are sovereign and liminal animals (those who chose to live at the margins of 
human society without interaction) also have basic rights. Citizenship is built upon 
the basic premise of human moral sentiments and pro-social dispositions and intends 
to offer nonhumans an immediate and practical (rather than theoretical) solution to 
their oppression. But this political turn in animal rights thinking retains and promotes 
the primacy of an autonomous self as the basis for rights. In so doing, it cannot 
guarantee that self-seeking human beings will endeavour to extend ethical regard for 
all nonhuman others in all situations and circumstances. Hence what is needed is an 
explanation for why, in the first instance, this body of theory recognises the 
subjectivity of nonhuman others. Without this, there is every possibility that even 
this very well-thought-out approach to the inclusion of nonhumans in human justice 
will give way to anthropocentric hierarchy and prejudice. 
 Prioritisation and relegation of sentient beings is also a problem for the 
application of vulnerability theory to animals. This approach, built upon the ideas of 
Martha Fineman, grounds rights for animals in vulnerability and dependence but 
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does not specify the moral grounds for the basic rights of animals, apart from by 
expressing their vulnerability.37  
 These historical and contemporary accounts of animal rights seek to 
accommodate the moral standing of nonhumans in a human system of justice. They 
fail, however, to identify robust ethical grounds for basic rights that would generate 
absolute pre-conditions for the treatment of nonhumans. As such, current animal 
rights theories fail to provide a suitable philosophical basis to support the human 
rights claims of vegans. What these theories have in common is that they implicitly 
observe, but fail to explore, the fact that humanity is, first and foremost, responsive 
to nonhumans. It is this responsiveness that is paramount to this thesis. Its originality 
is that it explains a philosophical theory that both supports the moral standing of 
other animals and explains their basic rights and the absolute pre-conditions for their 
inclusion into a human system of justice. It then offers a reconceptualisation of 
human rights to support the claims of vegans. 
1.9 The claim to originality 
 This thesis makes an original contribution to human rights discourse by 
applying the ethics of alterity to nonhumans and considering their implications for 
animals, humans and human rights. Existing postmodern, realist, deconstructionist 
and posthuman human rights literature identifies the elimination of suffering as the 
mission of human rights. In this regard, it promotes the utility of Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity, but it does not consider the exclusion of nonhumans or the impact of 
veganism in human rights. The thesis applies the established principle insights of 
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Levinas’ ethics of alterity to nonhumans to explain that their precarious mortality, 
understood through a concept of ethical responsibility to suffering, grounds their 
moral and legal standing. The moral standing of nonhumans is then used, for the first 
time, to reconceptualise the claims of vegans as ethical responsibility under Article 9 
of the Convention.  
 Importantly, the thesis argues that ethical responsibility in the face of 
suffering is an inherent concern of humanity, that it is central to the claims of vegans, 
that their claims are limited in exclusionary human rights and that Levinas’ 
philosophy on the ethics of alterity has utility for the claims of vegans because it can 
be applied to nonhuman animals to promote their moral and legal standing.  
 Thus, to ground the moral and legal standing of nonhumans, the thesis looks 
beyond the sentiency of animals by applying the principles of Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity. In so doing, it resolves the struggle in animal rights theory by identifying the 
grounds on which nonhumans have moral standing: that they qualify as unique 
others who express their authentic presence to human subjects for a response. In 
this light, the thesis presents veganism as a non-reductive and non-oppressive 
response to their precarious existence and suffering. It argues that to accommodate 
the claims of vegans, the right to freedom of conscience can be reconceptualised as 
the presentation of an ethical response to the precarious existence of animals and 
their basic rights. The thesis concludes that Levinas’ ethics of alterity have 
transformative, inclusive potential for the evolution of human rights. 
1.10 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis addresses the question of whether there is an alternative ethical 
orientation for human rights that would better accommodate the claims of vegans. 
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In so doing, it explores the nature of veganism, the human rights claims of vegans, 
the normative principles and values intrinsic to the relationship of current human 
rights to veganism, whether there is an alternative philosophical model for human 
rights that can deal more favourably with the claims of vegans, what this philosophy 
entails, and what broad implications such a model may have. The thesis addresses 
these questions in a logical progression of chapters. Following this step-by-step 
approach, it culminates in the affirmative stance that Levinas’ ethical theory has 
utility for the claims of vegans. The thesis then outlines the implications for the moral 
standing of animals and vegans and for the existing orientation of human rights.  
Chapter 2 examines the nature of veganism, what vegans believe, and the 
human rights claims of vegans. From an examination of a broad range of literature, it 
explains that veganism is the practical, lived expression of indistinguishable human 
and nonhuman moral standing. It is observed as a culture that responds to ethical 
responsibility to nonhuman others. As such, veganism is a term that expresses the 
moral imperative to attend to nonhuman suffering. The chapter then conceptualises 
the human rights claims of vegans as claims that present the moral imperative to 
attend to suffering nonhuman animals. These claims are directed at state authorities 
and address a reviled requirement to assimilate into a dominant culture of animal 
consumption, to which veganism is opposed. From an assessment of existing case 
law, it concludes that the claims of vegans are assessed as matters of personal and 
private conscience, rather than on the presentation of ethical responsibility to 
suffering. 
Chapter 3 examines the extent to which individual conscience, community 
and suffering feature in human rights. It finds that though there is evidence that 
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human rights are a result of a concern with suffering, they have been built upon a 
branch of moral philosophy that explains human nature in terms of individual 
autonomous rational agency. The chapter observes that on these grounds, 
nonhumans are denied basic rights and that the vegan presentation of ethical 
responsibility is subject to an orthodoxy of individual human autonomy that does not 
recognise or promote the need to deal with suffering or the widely accepted moral 
standing of other animals. 
On the basis of the argument that the orthodoxy of autonomy is problematic 
for the claims of vegans, the chapter recommends consideration of an alternative 
philosophy. This philosophy is Levinas’ ethics of alterity. It defines human nature as 
essentially and universally compassionate and innately responsible to others in 
recognition of a universally shared perception of the negative forces of mortality. 
Chapter 4 explores the principles of Levinas’ ethics of alterity and its currency 
in contemporary human rights discourse. It explains that human rights scholars 
identify Levinas’ philosophy as an opposing emancipatory thesis. In this thesis, 
Levinas argues that a dominant, entrenched Western philosophy of human reason 
has created a constraining and unethical totality. Levinas argues that rather than the 
ability to reason, responsibility to the other is the primary characteristic of humanity. 
The recognition of responsibility rather than autonomy is observed in the human 
desire to welcome and live in community with others. For Levinas, the pre-social 
connection between others is evidence of ethics. Humanity is ethical through non-
abstract face-to-face encounters that facilitate responsibility. The chapter explains 
that ethical responsibility is the acknowledgment of the unique other combined with 
a desire to extend compassion. It involves respecting individual experience of life in 
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the world and obligates a subject to support another.  
Chapter 4 goes on to explain that the fundamental ideas in the ethics of 
alterity are critical because the Levinasian other has moral standing as the other to 
whom the subject is obliged to respond. The other presents themselves in a ‘saying’ 
without a ‘said’: ‘It is me in my world. Here I am, how will you respond?’. It is in this 
context that the human rights claims of vegans can be reconceptualised as ethical 
claims of conscience that cannot be subject to speciesist notions of human 
supremacy that permit and validate legal concepts that moderate duty. These 
concepts – such as the primacy of individual conscience concerning duties to 
nonhumans, priority of human personal disadvantage, and legitimate aim and 
proportionality – when considered through the lens of the ethics of alterity only 
serve an oppressive totality that subjugates nonhuman others.  
Levinas’ ethics of alterity do not explicitly concern other animals. Despite 
emphasising that one cannot know the inner world of the other who is totally 
different from oneself, and that, in an encounter, the other must not be subject to 
oppressive themes and categories of convenience that would be constructed by the 
reason of the subject, Levinas did not develop a robust discussion of nonhuman 
otherness. Accordingly, the next chapter, Chapter 5, asks whether nonhumans are 
legitimate Levinasian others: others who generate ethics and to whom the subject is 
ethically responsible. Chapter 5 goes on to examine philosophical contributions from 
authors in the field of critical animal studies. It interrogates the exclusivity of Levinas’ 
ethics of alterity and concludes that nonhumans are in possession of moral standing 
and should be considered in matters of justice. As such, nonhumans are brought to 
the moral community as those who are owed asymmetrical, direct duties of ethical 
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responsibility. Such a responsibility requires the acknowledgment and recognition of 
nonhuman uniqueness, a prohibition on killing and intentional harm, the recognition 
of a duty to permit individual experience of life, and the acknowledgement that 
responsibility espouses a duty to assist nonhuman others in face-to-face 
relationships. The chapter concludes that the extension of moral community to 
nonhumans has specific advantages for the claims of vegans. 
Chapter 6 discusses the implications emerging from the argument that the 
ethics of alterity concern asymmetrical ethical duties to nonhumans. With a 
particular focus on the European system of human rights, it firstly outlines, in 
abstract, how a reoriented framework for human rights might be conceptualised. It 
then explains the basic moral and legal entitlements of nonhumans. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, explaining that the basic rights of nonhumans 
constitute ethical pre-conditions on which the claims of vegans can be 
accommodated through a reconceptualisation of Article 9 of the Convention. It 
considers the implications of this conclusion and the challenges and merits of further 
developing a vegan jurisprudence of human rights. 
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Chapter 2  
What is veganism and what is the existing jurisprudence on veganism? 
Introduction 
 The primary objective of this chapter is to define veganism, identify the 
claims vegans make and explain existing jurisprudence on veganism. It examines 
what veganism is, what vegans believe, how veganism is represented in literature, 
how vegans frame their arguments in terms of human rights and how vegan claims 
have been dealt with in court. The purpose of addressing these questions is to 
understand vegans, their concerns and the grounds for their human rights claims. To 
provide responses to the questions raised, a range of secondary literature is 
reviewed and assessed.  
The structure of this chapter firstly gives a definition of veganism and 
examines veganism in the academy. It then explains the evolution of veganism, 
identifies the characteristics of vegans and explores their convictions regarding 
nonhuman animal suffering, before examining the human rights claims of vegans in 
the context of their concerns for suffering nonhuman animals.  
 The chapter concludes that veganism is a response to the suffering of other 
animals, that it represents the indistinction of moral standing between human and 
nonhuman animals, and that the human rights claims of vegans are motivated by 
ethical responsibility to others rather than by personal benefit. It also concludes that 
the claims of vegans for nonhuman others are resisted by an orthodoxy of autonomy 




2.1 The definition of veganism 
 Veganism has no deity and no official definition for the purposes of law.38 The 
definition promoted by The Vegan Society emphasises that veganism is a response to 
the exploitation and cruelty inflicted on other animals.39 It builds on the original 
ideas about what veganism meant to early advocates. In the 1940s, veganism was 
defined more specifically as ‘[t]he principle of the emancipation of animals from 
exploitation by man’, which meant ‘to seek an end to the use of animals by man for 
food, commodities, work, hunting, vivisection, and by all other uses involving 
exploitation of animal life by man’.40 The current broad definition of veganism 
suggests that it is a philosophy that deals with intersecting issues. Suggesting a 
relationship between these broad issues locates veganism as a critical perspective on 
the status of nonhuman animals and social justice. The definition denounces the 
exploitation of nonhumans and, at the same time, relates exploitation to human 
wellbeing and the health of the natural environment. That the exploitation of 
animals is related to human health and issues concerning the environment is given 
credence in wider literature. In these critiques on ethics and social justice, veganism 
is promoted as conceptually and strategically important. 
2.2 How veganism is represented in literature 
 In recent years, academic interest in the culture of veganism has become 
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more visible and is gaining traction.41 This academic interest in veganism is related to 
the expansion of topics under the umbrella term ‘Animal Ethics’ and developments in 
Animal and Critical Animal Studies.42 In 2016, vegan scholars at Oxford University 
held the first ‘Towards a Vegan Theory’ conference, which posed questions about 
vegan identity, culture, politics and coherence, the way veganism challenges the 
animal/human binary and how veganism challenges current theoretical practices.43 
The Oxford conference description illustrates the contemporary self-reflexive 
evaluation of veganism and neatly summarises the trajectory of the academic 
production of knowledge emerging from the broad topics being addressed by a 
growing vegan community. 
  The dietary element of veganism is supported by a range of sources. 
The British Dietetic Association and the American Dietetic Association show support 
for the diet of vegans and also refer, in their literature, to the serious disadvantages 
of eating meat.44 In addition, the many problems resulting from farming other 
animals and the cost to the environment and human health are noted by many 
authors and incorporated into official reports published by the UN. They are, 
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therefore, well-established.45 Some authors conclude that veganism is the only 
sensible, viable option for human health and for the preservation of human 
societies.46  
This growth of interest in veganism has motivated a body of critical discourse 
that includes the idea that veganism is a form of ethical, human identity that 
challenges current anthropocentric dominance. Philosopher Matthew Calarco has 
described veganism as moral indistinction because, in his view, veganism is a way of 
life through which moral responsibility to both human and nonhuman animals is 
enacted in practice.47  Sociologist Bob Torres describes veganism as the ‘daily lived 
expression of ethical commitment and of protest’ because it responds to intersecting 
oppressions that are maintained in the interests of a capitalist economy that exploits 
entrenched prejudice against nonhumans.48 Adopting a cultural movement 
perspective, Breeze Harper argues that ‘[v]eganism is not just about the abstinence 
of animal consumption; it is about the ongoing struggle to produce socio-spatial 
epistemologies of consumption that lead to cultural and spatial change’.49 These 
views conceptualise veganism as educational and a matter concerning social 
justice.50 
2.2.1 Veganism as social justice 
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Veganism remains grounded in the moral standing of nonhumans but has also 
evolved to become conceptually and strategically important in the expression of 
broader social injustice. The sentient status of nonhumans is registered as relevant to 
the foundations of justice, and progress is argued to rely on exposing the relationship 
between animal suffering and the imposition of arbitrary power and oppression – 
and on recognising the broad social ramifications of this relationship. Veganism is 
cited in the disciplines of ethics, philosophy, health, feminism, environmental 
studies, intersectional theory and queer studies as having social and political 
significance.51 It is argued by human rights Professor Gary Francione as being the 
‘moral baseline’52 of the movement for animal rights because it ‘represents a 
rejection of the commodity status of nonhumans and recognition of their inherent 
value’.53 It has been cited, since at least the mid-1970s, as a positive response to 
intersecting oppressions of capitalism,54 and is relevant in longstanding philosophical 
comment on the wrong of eating other beings.55 
 Veganism is also represented in feminist thinking on social justice.56 The 
ground-breaking work of Carol J Adams in 1990 analysed the relationship between 
meat-eating and patriarchy,57 and in her thesis, five years later, Adams comments 
that ‘the vegan diet is becoming increasingly popular because of the intersection of 
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health and ethics…’.58 Marti Kheel also argued during this time that the oppressive 
pressure to comply with the norm of meat-eating is managed and maintained by 
force in patriarchal society.59 By 2008, the ecofeminist branch of feminist discourse 
had established that veganism was most relevant to an examination of the root 
causes of social problems. In the context of theory on the patriarchal marginalisation 
of veganism, Kheel queries the tendency within our culture to ask: ‘Why are you 
vegan?’ rather than: ‘Why do you eat other animals?’.60 
 The historical ecofeminist search for an explanation of female oppression in 
patriarchy includes the idea that a naturally compassionate human identity is 
subjugated under patriarchal rationalism and its creation of dualisms. For at least 
three decades, feminists have argued that care and compassion for others is intrinsic 
to human nature but is denied in a patriarchal distinction between reason and 
emotion. The feminist objection to rationalism inspired Val Plumwood’s attempt to 
articulate a notion of human identity that was on a continuum with nature. It led her 
to suggest the naturalness of compassion as a manifestation of identifying with 
others at the level of responsibility.61 This idea remains significant in current 
ecofeminist theory. Recently, Deane Curtin has argued that compassion grows out of 
insight into the connectedness of self and others, including nonhuman animals.62 She 
argues that we could not be human, social or moral, without the basic ability to 
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identify others and develop a sense of shared, meaningful experience. For Curtin, 
compassion is intrinsic to being social and demands nothing less than a paradigm 
shift in dominant food practice norms in the interests of liberating humans and 
animals from intersecting oppression. For Richard Twine, this ecofeminist discourse 
challenges anthropocentric thought.63  
Veganism is, thus, presented in literature as an important culture in 
opposition to the dominant and normative consumption of nonhumans. It recognises 
the moral standing of nonhuman animals and is argued to express an 
interconnection with nature and as presenting a challenge to patriarchy and 
anthropocentrism. Its dietary norms are regarded to be healthy and environmentally 
friendly and are explained as the lived response to ethical responsibility. These ideas 
are utilised in discourse to argue that veganism is an anti-oppressive, ethical practice 
for social justice. In 2016, the ideas were central to the first pro-intersectional vegan 
conference that explored the intersectionality of abuse of power and the politics and 
utility of veganism.64 Topics included the relationship of speciesism65 to feminism, 
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racism, ageism, classism and the issues of the LGBTQI+? community.66  
What these strands of discourse have in common is that they all recognise 
the oppression of nonhumans and a disregard for their suffering as the cause of 
wider social injustices. They recognise that veganism is resistance against oppression 
and that it speaks to duty and responsibility most notably in the face of suffering. 
This observation resonates with the impetus for the growth of the vegan 
movement.67 
2.3 The evolution of veganism 
In 1944, The Vegan Society was founded in Leicestershire by Donald Watson 
and 25 members.68 It emerged from a small group of non-dairy vegetarians whose 
aim was to ‘state a case for a reform that … is moral, safe and logical’.69 The term 
‘vegan’ was a contraction of the word ‘vegetarian’.70 It was suggested by Donald 
Watson, as an interim description of the beliefs of a non-dairy-eating vegetarian. This 
short word has been described as meaningful, purposeful and steadfast.71   
The evolution of veganism, as distinct from vegetarianism, stems from a rift in 
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ethical values concerning the use of other animals for human consumption.72 In the 
1940s, it appears that some pure vegetarians were open to the use of nonhumans 
for food if they were not killed. This rift was the impetus for Donald Watson and 
likeminded strict vegetarians to establish The Vegan Society in the UK.73  
This break-away group of strict vegetarians adopted an uncompromising 
approach to practising moral responsibility to nonhumans. The Vegan Society 
emphasised the suffering of living animals as important in dietary ethics. For Watson 
and the 25 founding members, there existed ‘very strong evidence’ that the 
production of dairy products involved ‘much cruel exploitation and slaughter of 
highly sentient life’.74 Whilst vegetarianism remained concerned with the immorality 
of killing only, veganism identified the injurious practices associated with producing 
food from living animals and promoted an enhanced concept of ethical responsibility 
to them. To subject nonhuman animals to a life of confinement in which they would 
endure constant suffering was regarded to be unethical and abhorrent to humanity. 
This rationale, which this thesis refers to as the ‘suffering’ narrative of veganism, is 
supported by the 1965 Brambell Report, which observes the sentiency of animals 
used in the dairy industry.75 This report documents that the process of producing and 
taking milk from cows for humans requires the separation of the mother and baby 
cow, which is likely to be traumatic due to their close bond.76  
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 Maintaining that ‘our present civilisation is built on the exploitation of 
animals just as pre-civilisations were built on the exploitation of slaves’,77 Watson 
believed that ‘the spiritual destiny of man is such that in time he will view with 
abhorrence the idea that men once fed on the products of animals’ bodies’.78 
Vegetarianism was regarded as a ‘half-way house’ and was distinguished from what 
was perceived to be the ‘truly human, civilised diet’ of veganism.79  
Veganism thus emerges as a lifestyle adopted by those who believe that the 
essence of human identity involves a compassionate, responsible duty in the face of 
suffering, and that this duty concerns nonhuman animals. On this view, the ethical 
orientation of humanity necessarily recognises ethical responsibility to nonhumans. 
By articulating this notion of ethics, the 25 founding members of The Vegan Society 
were making a profound statement that resonated widely. Its non-reductive, 
uncompromising philosophy inspired a global movement.  
The growing culture of veganism has coordinators, groups and societies in 49 
countries.80 Following the formation of The Vegan Society in the UK in 1944, the first 
overseas vegan society was formed in California in 1948. Four years later, in 1960, 
the American Vegan Society was established.81 Though accurate statistics are difficult 
to ascertain, it is estimated that in 2007 there were around 180,000 vegans living in 
the UK.82 In 2016, a Mori Poll commissioned by The Vegan Society indicated that 
542,000 people in the UK are now vegan, and half of these are in the age range 15-
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34.83 In the US, available statistics indicate that around 1% of the population could be 
following a vegan diet.84 A speculative estimate in 2013 suggests that 55% of the UK 
population could be vegan by 2020.85 
2.4 The characteristics of vegans  
Research studies about veganism or the vegan lifestyle are few in number.86 
Available literature suggests that veganism promotes an ‘extended code of ethics’ 
that transcends what would ordinarily be conferred by human beings upon other 
human beings and selected species of other animals.87 The vegan code of ethics 
revolves around reverence and respect for all life. It recognises the interconnected 
nature of life on Earth and that living beings have instincts, abilities and desires to 
fulfil and have purpose in the context of interconnected oneness.88 Vegans share a 
worldview in which other animals are not regarded as sources of food. This world 
view is ‘represented by a belief in the equality of human and nonhuman animals’.89 
Veganism has been described as a culture in the context of an ‘ethos of enlightened 
morality’, through which the vegan lives a life of ‘ethics in practice’.90 It is said to be a 
philosophy of life, rather than a religion, in which ‘vegan principles influence every 
                                                     
83
 The Vegan Society, ‘There are three and [a] half times as many vegans as there were in 2006, making it the 
fastest growing lifestyle movement’ (The Vegan Society, 17 May 2016) <https://www.vegansociety.com/whats-
new/news/find-out-how-many-vegans-are-great-britain> accessed 1 June 2016. 
84
 Imaner Consultants (b), ‘Vegan Statistics’ <www.imaner.net/panel/statistics.htm#reveal> accessed 5 May 2016. 
85
 Rushprnews, ‘Statistics: 55% of Population on Mainly Vegan Diet by 2020 Predict Vegfest UK’ (rushprnews 25 
April 2013) <rushprnews.com/2013/04/25/statistics-55-of-population-on-mainly-vegan-diet-by-2020-predict-
vegfest-uk> accessed 12 May 2016. 
86
 This is also noted by: Barbara McDonald, ‘Once You Know Something, You Can’t Not Know It: An Empirical Look 
At Becoming Vegan’ (2000) 8 (1), 1 Society & Animals; Matthew Cole and Karen Morgan, ‘Vegaphobia: Derogatory 
Discourse of Veganism and the Reproduction of Speciesism in UK National Newspapers’ (2011) 62 (1), 134 The 
British Journal of Sociology; and Rachel MacNair, ‘McDonald’s ‘Empirical Look At Becoming Vegan’’ (2001) 9 (1), 
63 Society & Animals. A specific ‘Vegan Theory’ is now emerging and has been formally introduced to the 
Academy by the ‘Towards a Vegan Theory’ Conference held at Oxford University in May 2016 
<https://vegantheory.org/> accessed 1 June 2016. 
87
 Victoria Moran, Compassion, The Ultimate Ethic: An Exploration of Veganism (3
rd
 edn, The American Vegan 
Society 1991) 13. 
88
 Stanley M Sapon, ‘Vegan values: a philosophy of vegan values’ (2007-2009) <www.veganvalues.org/> accessed 
4 December 2011. 
89
 McDonald (2000) 7. 
90
 Moran (1991) 14. 
 43 
 
aspect of daily living in very constructive and pragmatic ways’.91  
Research suggests that a vegan lifestyle is adopted following conscious and 
purposeful, logical, rational thought.92 Larsson, Ronnlund, Johansson and Dahlgren 
state that the conscientious and reflexive decision to become vegan is seriously 
evaluated and constitutes a crucial part of what Giddens labels a ‘life project’. 93 
Living a vegan lifestyle is believed by vegans to enhance health, contentment 
and productivity.94 Vegans are ‘self-directed, goal-directed learners’95 and are said to 
share an inner knowledge of the rightness of veganism, despite sharing no other 
common characteristics in their background or life circumstances.96 Vegans are also 
‘convinced of the moral rightness of their direction’.97 Rather than being 
oversentimental and emotional about other animals, vegans have been found to be 
moralistically oriented and opposed to all forms of exploitation of other animals, and 
to embody genuine philosophical concern for all sentient life; a concern unrelated to 
the more common humanistic affection for other animals.98 This view of veganism is 
said to explain what separates vegans from ‘animal lovers’.99   
Available research regarding the characteristics of vegans supports the idea 
of a human identity predisposed to an asymmetrical, compassionate consideration 
for the suffering of other-than-human life. It suggests a human identity capable of 
perceiving a cross-species ethics of compassion, which is extended to nonhumans 
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beyond typical and normative behaviours (such as those concerning ‘owning’ and 
loving pets). On this view, vegan ethics appear to operate at a posthuman level of 
moral indistinction. 
2.5 Veganism as the moral baseline of animal rights 
 Veganism gives expression to the moral imperative to attend to the suffering 
of nonhuman animals. A primary concern of vegans is that sentient, nonhuman 
animals should be liberated from human abuse.100 This paramount principle grounds 
Gary Francione’s view that ethical veganism is the moral baseline for animal rights.101 
Francione’s abolitionist perspective has global appeal for ethical vegans, who agree 
that veganism is a moral imperative.102 On this view, there are no justifiable grounds 
for the commodification and exploitation of nonhuman animals. It grounds the moral 
standing of animals in their sentiency and rejects the idea that the rights of animals 
are dependent on observable, humanlike, cognitive abilities.103 Abolitionist vegans 
are opposed to killing and suffering for human gains and to the property status of 
animals and do not believe in welfare reforms to justify their continued exploitation. 
They demand total emancipation and believe that sentiency alone is sufficient for 
moral and legal standing.104  
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2.6 What vegans believe 
 There are four beliefs of vegans that emerge from the above survey of 
relevant literature. Firstly, they believe in respect for life and in interconnection. 
Vegans believe that human life is connected to other life and that all life has moral 
standing and should receive compassionate, asymmetrical, ethical consideration. 
This belief can be summarised as a belief in the moral rights of animals. Secondly, 
they believe that a wide variety of other animals experience pleasure and pain and 
that their sentiency is of particular ethical significance. Thirdly, vegans believe that 
the appropriation of life for human gain is immoral. They reject the established idea 
of a hierarchy of life that justifies the resource status of other animals. They believe 
in equality of moral standing and advocate the abolition of the resource and property 
status of animals. Finally, vegans believe that their conscious, daily, practical 
manifestation of principled values is ethics in practice that, for some, includes an 
awareness of intersecting issues.  
 Veganism can, thus, be explained as a culture that is concerned with ethical 
justice. It centres on respect for mortal life but is a culture that is sensitive to 
conceptualising additional unethical practices within a framework of intersection. At 
root, veganism demands the recognition of nonhuman animals as sentient beings 
with moral standing, the abolition of harmful practices that cause their suffering and 
that they become beneficiaries of basic rights.  
 In addition, and importantly for human rights claims, veganism is a culture of 
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ethics in practice in response to a moral imperative to attend to suffering and 
accommodate nonhuman others as a matter of ethical justice.  
 This view of veganism pertains to the statement that the suffering of 
nonhuman animal remains a primary reason for the adoption of veganism.105 It 
reflects the historical significance of concern for suffering as a significant 
motivational factor in the evolution and growth of veganism. This will now be 
explored further in a suffering narrative of veganism. 
2.7 The suffering narrative of veganism 
 From the outset, veganism has been associated with the suffering of 
nonhuman animals. A primary concern of The Vegan Society was animal suffering 
and dietary ethics, which already had a long-established history. Literature indicates, 
for example, that the Ancient Greeks were aware that a vegetarian diet could sustain 
healthy human life.106 Medical professionals in the nineteenth century were aware of 
the benefits of avoiding foods derived from nonhumans,107 and it was well-known 
that a longstanding issue of importance for social reformers was the suffering of 
animals raised and slaughtered for food. In this regard, Howard Williams notes that 
Ghandi, Tolstoy and Henry Salt were among those who supported dietary reform.108 
It is also documented that Percy Bysshe Shelley advocated veganism on the basis 
that ‘[t]he advantage of a reform diet is obviously greater than any. It strikes at the 
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root of evil’.109 John Davis also notes that Shelley had joined a vegan commune in 
1813.110 While a significant body of historical literature on dietary ethics concerns 
the promotion of a more humane society in response to the visual experience of 
suffering, philosopher Gary Francione sums up his view of veganism in the twenty-
first century: ‘Being vegan provides us with the peace of knowing that we are no 
longer participants in the hideous violence that is animal exploitation’.111 
2.8 Animal suffering and the production of food 
In the introduction to Williams’ The Ethics of Diet, Leo Tolstoy recounts the 
sickening witness accounts of the treatment and slaughter of nonhumans for food.112 
He argues that we cannot pretend not to know the ‘horribly revolting’ details of the 
suffering of those mercilessly butchered, nor the greed, social conditioning and 
justification by religion or by simple habit that accompanies it.113 For Tolstoy and 
many other reform thinkers, killing nonhumans for food involves an act that is 
contrary to the moral feeling114 and is a practice that will be regarded by ‘an age 
more enlightened and more refined’ with ‘astonishment and horror’.115  
For these early thinkers, the daily visibility of nonhuman suffering caused by 
the butchering hands of humans inspired debates about the essence of humanity. 
Leo Tolstoy remarks that the immorality of eating nonhuman animals was known 
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long ago and that it survives simply because ‘we refuse to look at what we do not 
wish to see’.116 Dietary reform, Williams argues, is deeply founded upon (inter alia) 
‘[h]umaneness, in the two-fold meaning of Refinement of Living and of what is 
commonly called ‘Humanity’’.117  
Williams argues that attempts to ‘reclaim humanity’ from the diet of 
‘slaughter and foul living’ dates back as far as the eighth century BC.118 For Williams, 
abstinence was a selfless act of revolt in the interests of the ‘irrefragable principles of 
Justice and Compassion – universal Justice and universal Compassion – the two 
principles most essential in any system of ethics worthy of the name’.119 
During the many decades since these early accounts of the brutal treatment 
and suffering of animals, human sentiment towards nonhumans has encouraged a 
plethora of welfare measures, at least within Europe.120 The sight of suffering 
experienced from animals being killed has also become obscured from public view in 
contemporary society. Slaughterhouses are predominantly built in remote locations 
and, similarly, butchery is no longer primarily carried out in public view. 121 
Despite these developments and the prevalence of sentiment for other 
animals, there remain many accounts of hidden suffering. In October 2011, in the UK, 
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Animal Aid reported that their ninth undercover slaughterhouse investigation found 
continuing, brutal, deliberate cruelty. Images recorded on CCTV cameras include: 
slaughterhouse workers stubbing cigarettes into the faces of pigs, pigs being beaten, 
kicked and punched, pigs being dragged along by their ears, and stunning tongs used 
in a callous and incompetent manner so that the pigs suffered painful electric shock 
and fell to the ground screaming.122 In 2017, further Animal Aid video footage 
highlights the suffering nonhuman animals are forced to endure immediately prior to 
their death. 
 
A slaughterman is shown in one clip picking up a frightened 
sheep by her fleece and physically throwing her over a gate. 
The animal was so terrified that she attempted to escape 
through a blood gully, only to be discovered cowering behind 
the bleeding-out bodies of her strung-up peers. The 
slaughterman also attempted to subdue a frantic sheep by 
deliberately placing electrical stunning tongs around the 
animal’s abdomen. Other incidents caught on camera include 
a lamb, who was hiding behind a mechanical arm, being 
dragged out by the hind legs. One animal was pushed with 
such force that they were overturned and left in this situation 
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for some time.123 
2.8.1 The extent of suffering 
The scale of suffering in modern industrialised farming is documented by Gail 
Eisnitz. Eisnitz explains how, in 1997, 420,000 hogs died on one Oklahoma farm. 
Eisnitz calculates that, during this year, 48 hogs died every hour from stressful 
industry conditions. In the context of expressing a suffering narrative of veganism, 
the following extract is unedited. As such, the reader is cautioned to expect graphic 
details: 
 
These and millions of other hogs on corporate factory farms 
didn't die naturally. They died as a result of the hostile, 
stressful, disease-promoting conditions inside these massive 
factories. Or they died because, in a business where product 
uniformity is more important than anything else, they didn't 
make weight. Or they died because after permanent 
immobilization inside tiny crates for years, they could no 
longer stand. Unable to reach their food troughs, they starved 
to death. And many died violently. Thousands of piglets that 
were sick or didn’t grow fast enough were beaten to death. 
The industry calls this thumping or PACing: the industry 
acronym for ‘Pound Against Concrete’. Others were flushed 
alive from waste pits into manure lagoons. Pregnant sows 
were beaten with gate rods, wrenches, and hammers; others 
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had their throats cut while they were still alive, some had 
cesarians performed on them while they were still alive and 
fully conscious. And thousands, unable to walk, were dragged 
by their ears and feet and deposited in piles, where they were 
simply left to die slowly of starvation or dehydration. 
‘We've thumped as many as 120 pigs in one day. We just 
swing them, thump them, then toss them aside. Then, after 
you've thumped ten, twelve, fourteen of them, you take them 
to the chute room and stack them up for the dead truck. And 
if you go in the chute room and some are still alive, then you 
have to do this whole procedure all over again. There’ve been 
times I've walked in that room and pigs would be running 
around with an eyeball hanging down the side of their face, 
just bleeding like crazy, or their jaw would be broken. I've 
seen them with broken backs, where they've been knocked 
unconscious for a few minutes, but then they’re trying to get 
up again’. 
‘Some of those guys thump them, then they just stand on top 
of their throats. Whether it's to keep them from moving or to 
suffocate them, they stand on top of their throats and wait til 
they die. They break their jaws and everything while they're 
doing it.’ 
‘You can't really swing the bigger pigs. One time I walked in 
and the guys were using two by fours and hammers and gate 
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rods and everything else to kill them pigs.’ 
‘We had a total of 138 one day’, said a woman at another 
farm. ‘And the guys who were supposed to thump them 
didn't kill them all. I went back in that room after they'd left, 
because I was supposed to pick up all the dead bodies, and 
there were pigs with blood just running down their heads. 
And they were up walking around. Here these animals had 
the courage to make it through the first thumping, and here I 
have to go and thump them again’.124  
2.9 The rationale for suffering 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, Jim Mason explained that the 
methods used in the processing of nonhumans for food vary from species to species, 
but that the principles were the same. The objective, he maintained, was to keep 
costs to a minimum and maximise profit.  
Maximum profit was achieved, in part, by using innovative techniques to 
ensure optimum productivity. This meant that the reality for nonhumans used for 
the production of food was that they existed in crowded, barren, restricted and 
unnatural environments, that they were stressed and frustrated and that they were 
fed additive-laced, unnatural diets. Mason cites the condition for veal calves as an 
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example of the harsh conditions newborn babies had to endure. These newborn 
calves, born surplus to the dairy industry, were taken from their mothers and ‘turned 
into anaemic neurotic animals to provide the luxury-grade ‘milk-fed veal’’.125 In fact, 
the calves suffered intense distress caused by separation from their mothers, were 
tied in small confined spaces to restrict movement and were fed a replacement diet 
of dried milk, starch, fats, sugar, antibiotic and other additives. This replacement diet 
was deficient in iron to facilitate the necessary white flesh that is caused by anaemia. 
White flesh was most profitable.  
Peter Singer also argues that in the late twentieth century, it was not possible 
to rear animals for food without inflicting suffering. He observes that at the time of 
writing in the later part of the twentieth century, food production methods meant 
that nonhuman animals suffered from being castrated, from having their herds 
broken, from being branded, and from being transported to slaughterhouses. He 
explains, in one example, the more sinister details of the conditions for chickens. 
Chickens, who are highly sociable creatures with a need for a specific social order, 
suffered light and space deprivation, causing them to attack and kill each other. In an 
attempt to limit the impact of their confined conditions, the birds underwent a 
process of ‘debeaking’. In this procedure, Singer explains that the chick’s head was 
inserted into a machine that slices off a portion of the beak. According to Professor 
Brambell, this process causes severe pain because it cuts through bone and sensitive 
tissue resembling the ‘quick’ of a human nail.126 In these conditions, the birds also 
suffer sores and abscesses. In addition, being naturally timid and nervous, they also 
suffocate in ‘piling’ caused by crowding in fear, on top of one another in a corner of 
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their housing. Singer argues that food producers were aware that the conditions in 
which the birds were kept was responsible for causing their suffering but that market 
forces prevented them from offering the birds better living environments.  
There is overwhelming evidence that Mason’s and Singer’s historical 
observations remain prevalent in food production. Current farming practices show 
that animals continue to suffer cramped, confined conditions and suffer physical and 
psychological harm in the high-yield, low-cost food production business.127 The 
harms cited, including de-beaking and many more brutal procedures, remain norms 
in the industrial production of nonhumans whose fate is to exist as marketplace 
commodities.128  
Bill Winders and David Nibert confirm these conditions in which nonhumans 
exist as commodified resources in a capitalist economy that is driven by efficiency 
and profit. They speak of exceedingly painful, brutal and gruesome deaths, factory 
farm horrors, miserable deprivations, grotesque deformities and rough handling. 
They explain that it is not uncommon for nonhumans to arrive at the slaughterhouse 
in pitiful conditions: for example, thirty to forty percent of chickens that reach the 
slaughterhouse already suffer with broken bones. They explain that in the profit-
driven economic system in which they exist, the life-span of other animals is of no 
significance: in the case of chickens, one seventh of their natural life expectancy is 
not unusual. They explain that the feelings of other animals and their urges and 
instincts to care for their young are disregarded. They report that birth mothers are 
traumatised from being removed from their offspring, which often occurs within 
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hours of giving birth, and that generally, in the modern food-processing industry, a 
wide range of nonhumans suffer violence on an unprecedented scale.129 
Suffering is thus cited as a natural consequence of the forces of production – 
but literature argues that permitted cruel and painful practices do not relate to any 
notion of human need. Bill Winders, David Nibert and Bob Torres, for example, argue 
that the conditions nonhumans endure are directly related to their subjugated status 
and their commodification in a capitalist economy that has encouraged the 
consumption of them as resources through progressive advances in mechanised, 
industrial modes of production. Rather than being a necessity for human survival, the 
suffering of other animals is related to capitalist commodification that has exploited 
entrenched prejudice. For these authors, it is these social conditions that ground the 
normative, violent practices that inflict immense suffering.130 For Hooley and Nobis, 
harming is standard practice despite suffering being clearly obvious, its identification 
being a matter of common sense and it being unequivocally evidenced by 
overwhelming scientific research on the cognitive, emotional and social lives of other 
animals.131 David Thomas, Solicitor and Director of The Association of Lawyers for 
Animal Welfare, argues that the outlook for nonhumans caught up in this system is 
bleak. He also observes a deeply entrenched, institutional, oppressive force in his 
claim that governments are more concerned to protect commercial interests than 
animals.132 Nibert concurs: nonhuman animals suffer because ‘it is not in the nature 
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of capitalism’133 to reduce oppressive gaps; capitalism depends on a false 
naturalisation and rationalisation that protects the invisibility of oppression and 
nonhuman pain and suffering.134 
2.10 Suffering and the scope of commodification 
Sociologist Bob Torres describes how an oppressive social hierarchy, built 
upon domination of and prejudice against other animals, is responsible for the 
suffering inflicted upon them, and he notes that their suffering is on a massive scale. 
He argues that prejudice towards nonhumans has ruthlessly commoditised, in 
capitalist enterprise, numerous species of other animals.135 Using the term 
speciesism, first explained by Richard Ryder,136 as a way of drawing attention to 
prejudicial attitudes towards animals, Torres explains that it grounds a particularly 
offensive and rapacious oppressive practice that supports a broad-based capitalist 
economy. For Torres, it is not only food production that causes suffering. Torres 
argues that the prejudice against nonhuman animals is directly responsible for 
society being suffused with other animals as marketable, non-food products and by-
products. This observation also has historical roots. In 1980, John Berger in Why Look 
at Animals remarked ‘in the so-called post-industrial societies, they [animals] are 
treated as raw material’.137  
Products derived from other animals, for humans to either eat, wear or use, 
are certainly well-known and widely available for purchase. Some, such as those 
bearing the labels ‘veal’, ‘genuine leather’, ‘pure silk’ or ‘fine bone china’, are 
regarded as ‘luxuries’. The extent of uses found for derivatives of dead or living 
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animals is not well-known, but – as documented by The Vegan Society – various 
commodified extracts of animal bodies find their way into artists’ materials, tattoo 
dyes, glue, hairspray, photographic paper, tableware, soap and an endless range of 
cosmetics, household products and medications.138 These range from the obvious, 
such as furniture wax made from beeswax, to the bizarre: for example, a Starbucks 
Frappuccino contains thousands of dead insects which have been commodified as a 
food colouring.139 The particular product produced in this case is a red liquid that can 
be used as a dye. It is made by crushing to death and liquidising cochineal insects. It 
is a commonplace produce, prevalent and used in a wide range of consumables from 
yoghurts to lipsticks, but it appears with different names and no explanation of its 
origin.140 
On the views presented above, nonhuman animals exist as superexploited 
living commodities, yielding extremely high levels of revenue in capitalist culture.141 
Nibert, Winders and Torres argue that a significant implication of this system of 
social relations between species is that it is not only nonhumans that suffer. They 
explain how prejudice towards nonhumans and their commodification has direct 
implications for human wellbeing. For these authors, the commodification of other-
than-human animals is also directly responsible for human suffering. 
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2.11 Intersecting human and nonhuman suffering 
Nibert and Winders note that as technological advances speeded up the 
processing of the bodies of nonhumans, the conditions for workers worsened. From 
an examination of a variety sources, they highlight how factory workers came under 
pressure to perform manual and machine-operated slaughter and processing 
methods much more quickly. This literature reveals that the health and safety of 
slaughterhouse and processing plant employees was put in danger.142 
Bob Torres is particularly concerned with capitalist commodification and the 
processes of production of other animals. He argues that the process of production 
in capitalist enterprise is not simply about human food needs.143 Rather, 
commodification and the process of production is ‘tied into politics, gender, 
technology, and environmental quality’ and depends on oppressive layers inherent in 
social relationships.144 
 The observations of Winders, Nibert and Torres regarding interlinked 
suffering are confirmed in practice. For example, Schlosser explains how, in the US, a 
workforce of mostly unregistered migrant workers involved in killing and processing 
the bodies of other animals endured inadequate health and safety provisions.145 
Conditions were recognised as so terrible that in 2005, Human Rights Watch singled 
out the US meat industry for working conditions that violated basic human rights.146 
Observations such as these are not new. Noting the connection between female and 
animal oppression in 1995, Carol Adams reports that thousands of non-unionised 
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black women of different ethnic origins suffered ‘filthy working conditions, sexual 
harassment and ignored or poorly treated employee injuries’ in meat-packing 
industry employment.147 Adams goes on to report that ninety-five per cent of all 
poultry workers in the US were, at that time, black women whose job role was to 
scrape the insides and pull the lungs out of five thousand recently slaughtered 
chickens per hour.  
Interlinked oppression and suffering are a particular feature of the meat-
processing industry. In addition to there being a disregard for nonhumans, there is 
evidence that it is a culture with a widespread lack of emphasis on the care, health 
and safety of human employees. In the profit-driven context for the efficient, 
continuous processing of the bodies of nonhumans, the meat-processing industry in 
the US is regarded as the nation's most dangerous occupation. Currently, the US 
Department of Labor cites the meat-processing industry to be 2.5 to 3 times more 
hazardous than any other employment sector.148 These circumstances also appear to 
be historically significant, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). For 
example, in 1999, the BLS reported that meat-packing plants have the highest rate of 
repeated-trauma disorders. At this time, Personick and Shirley produced evidence 
that those working in the meat-packing industry suffered above-average figures for 
injuries and illnesses – two or three times higher than figures for the total 
economy.149 Schlosser documents the titles of reports submitted by the Occupational 
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Safety and Health Administration. They include: 
 
Employee Severely Burned after Fuel from His Saw Is Ignited. 
Employee Hospitalized for Neck Laceration From Flying Blade. 
Employee’s Finger Amputated in Sausage Extruder. 
Employee’s Finger Amputated in Chitlin Machine. Employee’s 
Eye Injured When Struck by Hanging Hook. Employee’s Arm 
Amputated in Meat Auger. Employee’s Arm Amputated When 
Caught in Meat Tenderizer. Employee Burned in Tallow Fire. 
Employee Burned by Hot Solution in Tank. One Employee 
Killed, Eight Injured by Ammonia Spill. Employee Killed When 
Arm Caught in Meat Grinder. Employee Decapitated by Chain 
of Hide Puller Machine. Employee Killed When Head Crushed 
by Conveyor. Employee Killed When Head Crushed in Hide 
Fleshing Machine. Employee Killed by Stun Gun. Caught and 
Killed by Gut-Cooker Machine.150  
 
The US Department of Labor provides lists of similar cases.151 Despite the 
reputation of the sector and the enduring low safety record, Schlosser comments 
that ‘nothing stands in the way of production’. Workers have accidents and ‘lie 
unconscious on the floor as dripping carcasses sway past them, and the chain never 
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2.12 The scope of mutual suffering 
Hooley and Nobis argue that the suffering imposed on nonhumans has direct 
consequences for humans. They argue that animal agriculture can cause asthma and 
depression in humans and that the conditions in which nonhumans are raised cause 
bacteria and superbugs that ultimately cause harm to humans.153 These sorts of 
problems were also well-known in the 1970s, as Jon Wynne-Tyson observes.  
The UN also reports on the negative environmental impact of animal 
agriculture and the problems created for human society. Livestock’s Long Shadow – 
Environmental Issues and Options made it clear that the situation has become 
desperate. This report, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
UN, concludes that the livestock sector is at the top of the list for causing the most 
serious environmental problems the world is facing. The report highlights that the 
farming of nonhuman animals causes: deforestation, land degradation, climate 
change, air pollution (to a degree higher than combined global transport), water 
shortage, water pollution, and loss of biodiversity to such an extent that ‘[l]ivestock’s 
contribution to environmental problems is on a massive scale…  The impact is so 
significant that it needs to be addressed with urgency’.154  
The oppressive socio-political conditions in which nonhumans suffer at the 
hands of humans are also believed to create a relationship between the abuse of 
other animals and violent crime. Based on interviews with slaughterhouse workers in 
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her capacity as agricultural investigator, Eisnitz155 reports that workers can develop 
an uncaring attitude to the extent that inflicting violence upon the animals when 
they are frustrated or feel pressure comes easily. Eisnitz quotes one of her 
interviewees: ‘…I took a three-foot chunk of pipe and I literally beat that hog to 
death. Couldn’t have been a two-inch piece of solid bone left in his head...’.156 A 
further statement was: ‘…you develop an attitude that lets you kill things but doesn’t 
let you care…’.157  
Fitzgerald, Kalof and Dietz support the research of Eisnitz and suggest that the 
very presence of a slaughterhouse in a community exacerbates crime rates.158  Their 
research suggests that the physical and psychological impact of slaughterhouse work 
results in workers having an increased propensity to violent behaviour. In addition, 
they are more likely to be victims of drug and alcohol abuse and suffer increased 
levels of anxiety. 
Theologian Professor Andrew Linzey of the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics 
explains that philosophers and social thinkers have long stated the connection 
between cruelty to other animals and that inflicted upon humans.159 Linzey notes a 
range of historical sources as evidence representing the logic that people who are 
cruel to nonhumans will also be cruel to humans. In his 2009 collection of authored 
contributions, subjects under consideration include: the relationship between animal 
abuse and serial killers, the relationship of animal abuse to domestic violence, and 
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the importance the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) attaches to the issue of 
animal cruelty in relation to the propensity for other immoral and criminal acts.160 
Linzey argues that evidence for a connection between human and nonhuman animal 
abuse prevails and that the links are stronger than ever.  
 There is support, then, for the view that entangled oppressive forces have not 
only created a lived ontology of servitude and suffering for other animals, but have 
had far-reaching consequences for wider social wellbeing. Nibert maintains that ‘the 
oppression of other animals has been devastating for the cultural, spiritual, and 
economic well-being of the vast majority of humans. What is more, the oppression of 
devalued groups of humans has been, and remains, disastrous for other animals’.161  
It is of great significance that entrenched prejudice towards nonhuman 
animals is cited as responsible for their off-the-scale suffering, but it is also significant 
that it accounts for a great deal of human suffering too. To address this mutual 
suffering, Nibert and Winders argue that those interested in securing a better status 
for other animals need to understand the wider capitalist framework in which the 
oppression of others operates and to rationalise and promote an alternative ethical 
system of social organisation.162   
Nibert thus concludes that the emancipation of nonhuman others depends 
upon the development of a more egalitarian system that includes nonhumans. In this 
regard, Nibert cites the utility of veganism in his theory of social justice. He agrees 
with longstanding abolitionist Gary Francione, who advocates that the property 
status and exploitative use of nonhuman beings ought to be made progressively 
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Nibert and Francione believe that a paradigm shift in social justice is possible 
‘through prohibitions that recognise that animals have non-tradable interests and 
where those prohibitions do not substitute alternative forms of exploitation’.163 For 
Nibert, justice requires that the ‘social positions humans occupy neither compel 
violence, nor encourage passive complicity in oppressive practices and 
arrangements’.164 In this endeavour, these theorists promote veganism as a starting 
point on the grounds that it counters the power of the oppressive, structural forces 
of social hierarchy, domination and prejudice. As a culture of indistinction and of 
protest, veganism materially and symbolically highlights the invisibility of a blind 
acceptance of an oppressive ontology of human and nonhuman being. In this regard, 
veganism is not only educational but is also a culture in opposition, with strategic 
value to deal with mutual vulnerability and suffering. There is evidence that such 
endeavours are characteristic of human nature and have proven historical social 
value. 
2.13 The human desire to address mutual suffering 
Discourse claims that problematic social arrangements are caused by 
prejudice towards nonhuman beings and argues that veganism has symbolic and 
strategic utility. This critical view raises questions about the essence of human 
identity and the possibility that it is subjugated by socio-political arrangements. What 
is implicit in the use of veganism in this discourse is the idea that human nature is, 
essentially, compassionate and caring, that justice concerns compassionate respect 
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and regard for both humans and nonhumans, and that the utility of veganism is its 
selfless restorative value. The idea of an extension of asymmetrical compassion to 
vulnerable humans and nonhumans has historical relevance in philosophical 
discourse and in the evolution of social justice.165 
Tonutti confirms that there is a long history of selfless compassion, in 
recognition of responsibility and provision for need, for both humans and 
nonhumans.166 She notes that many important philanthropic and humane societies 
of the nineteenth century aimed to protect both children and animals from 
cruelty.167 For example, Lewis Gompertz, secretary to the Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA), was involved in campaigning for the rights of women, 
the poor and nonhumans, and published his Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man 
and of Brutes in 1824. Similarly, slavery abolitionist William Wilberforce MP was 
instrumental in developing the SPCA, which became the Royal Society for the 
Protection of Animals (RSPCA) in the UK.168   
The utility of veganism to discourse that seeks to address suffering is 
supported by philosopher Stanley M Sapon.169 His words appeal to ethical 
responsibility and compassion expressed in the idea of moral indistinction: 
 
[v]eganism acknowledges the intrinsic legitimacy of all life. It 
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rejects any hierarchy of acceptable suffering among sentient 
creatures … Vegan ideals encompass much more than 
advocacy of a diet free of animal products, or a fervent 
defense of animal rights. Veganism excludes no sentient 
being – animal or human – from its commitment to 
compassionate, gentle benevolence.170  
 
Nonetheless, veganism exists in the context of an overarching paradigm of a 
widespread consumption of nonhuman animals that causes immense suffering.  In 
this context, nonhumans exist as property and commodified human resource, and 
veganism is misunderstood and difficult to accommodate, coming up against 
resistant, dominant normative and prevalent prejudicial opinions and practices. In 
these conditions, vegans claim the right to endeavour to practise a non-reductive, 
uncompromising ethical commitment to nonhumans. For example, vegans are 
represented in a small body of case law on unfair treatment and discrimination in 
health care, in employment and in family law. In health care, vegans request suitable 
food and non-animal-derived medications. In employment, vegans request suitable 
food and synthetic uniform items and safety footwear. In detention, vegans request 
suitable clothing, bathroom products and food. In education, vegans request suitable 
food and to be exempt from conducting dissections. As consumers, vegans request 
suitable food, clothing and accessories.  
In cases concerning veganism, such as those listed above, nonhuman 
suffering is invisible; it is never discussed on its own terms. If it is mentioned at all, it 
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is framed in terms of the sentimental characteristics of the applicant. In adverse and 
oppressive social conditions, it is not unheard of for vegans to protest to their own 
detriment and even to their own death.171 
2.14 The context for the claims of vegans 
 The claims of vegans are primarily for the moral standing of nonhumans set 
against a backdrop of entrenched prejudice. The claims of vegans also arise in the 
context of a widespread general societal feeling of responsibility and compassionate 
regard for the moral standing and suffering of nonhumans. In this regard, there are 
cases that strongly express the immorality of cruelty to nonhumans.172 The ECtHR 
has protected the right to freedom of expression concerning the expression of 
compassionate responsibility to animals.173 It has rejected an application for a right 
to hunt foxes with hounds under the human right to freedom of conscience.174 In 
wider society and in law, animals are not regarded as objects, and many regional 
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constitutions provide general protection for animals.175 Protection for animals exists 
at the level of the UN and the European Union;176 animals are regarded as individual 
living beings capable of experiencing pain and fear and, as such, are regarded to be 
sapient as well as sentient.177 These circumstances reflect the uncontested empirical 
human concern for nonhuman animals. They also correlate to the development of 
positive law that facilitates living with ethical regard for the lives of nonhuman 
others: for example, proposed developments regarding food labelling law.  
There are also other areas of everyday social life that reflect the human 
concern with nonhuman animals. For example, the RSPCA reports that in 2015, it 
received 1,118,495 phone calls about animal welfare. On average, this amounts to 
one telephone call every 30 seconds. In the same year, the RSPCA investigated 
143,004 complaints of cruelty and secured 1,781 convictions by private 
prosecution.178 It is also estimated that in Europe, humans spend 15 billion Euros on 
purchasing products and services for companion animals.179 In 2016, hundreds of 
well-wishers with their dogs in Cornwall accompanied a dog named ‘Walnut’ and his 
carer on a final outing prior to his passing by compassionately motivated euthanasia 
on medical grounds. As they did, thousands more around the globe walked their 
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companion dogs at the same time in a gesture of compassionate support.180  
 In this context of widespread care and regard for nonhumans, activists have 
secured legal rights for a chimpanzee,181 city councils have banned the sale of fur,182 
the dietary element of veganism has been validated as beneficial by dietetic and 
health care organisations,183  legislation now exists on the right to be provided with 
vegan food in public institutions,184 schools are providing completely plant-based 
food,185 and sports personalities are speaking out against the use of animal 
derivatives in equipment.186  
 The confused social and political conditions in which other animals feature in 
intertwined human societal arrangements affect legal responses to veganism.187 
Carlo Prisco notes that, generally, vegans can expect prejudice in the courtroom and 
that where a vegan diet requires a defence, this is unlikely to be provided by 
attorneys. He generalises that attorney are scared to defend (and first to condemn) 
the dietary element of veganism.188  
The concerns of vegans that lead them to make human rights claims 
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represent the moral imperative to respond positively to nonhuman suffering. Vegans 
do not wish to be associated with killing or be compelled to assimilate into the 
dominant culture of prejudice towards other animals by being required to participate 
in speciesist practices. Of significance is that vegans present a moral imperative that 
requires practical manifestation. Their claims under the heading ‘human rights’ are 
made in the context of relationships with government authorities. They are claims 
that are not well understood and that are predominantly dismissed and 
inconsistently accommodated.189 
2.15 Veganism at the European Court of Human Rights: H v UK 
The case heard at the ECtHR, H v UK,190 concerned a vegan prisoner who 
brought a complaint against the UK Government under the human right to freedom 
of conscience.191 H objected (inter alia) to a requirement to work in the prison 
printing facility because he believed that he would come into contact with dyes that 
had been tested for safety on the bodies of nonhuman animals.192 As a vegan with an 
ethical orientation that opposes the resource status and commodification of 
nonhumans, the requirement to undertake duties in the print shop was not 
conducive to H’s ethical orientation.  
The Commission of the Court found that vegan convictions, with regard to 
animal products, come within the scope of Article 9 right to freedom of conscience 
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under the Convention. Noting relevant case law,193 it observed that this provision 
protects ‘private and personal beliefs, and the acts which are intimately linked with 
these attitudes’. On this basis (as noted earlier), the Commission found that vegan 
convictions with regard to animal products fell within the scope of Article 9 para 1 
(Art. 9-1) of the Convention.  
The Commission noted that the UK had not contested that veganism is a 
matter of conscience and belief within the scope of Article 9, but decided against H’s 
claim and in favour of the UK Government on two grounds. One was that the dyes 
were probably not tested on nonhuman animals and, therefore, were uncontentious 
to ethical vegans. The second ground was that even if under 9(2) there was 
interference in H’s freedom, it was legitimate on the grounds that the prison rules 
existed for good order and were applied to all prisoners. Interference with H’s ethical 
convictions was, therefore, legitimate and was considered proportional.  
This case confirms that the moral standing of nonhumans and their suffering 
are relevant to the claims of vegans only insofar as they represent a credible, private 
and personal perspective. The European system of human rights accepted the 
credibility of such convictions, but it did not recognise the wider social and ethical 
regard for nonhuman animals or the moral imperative to respond to suffering, and it 
did not allow H the right to live with a non-reductive, uncompromising, ethical 
commitment to suffering animals. Instead, H’s claim for the moral standing of 
suffering nonhuman animals suffered in the context of the centrality of the human 
individual in human rights and was (partially) qualified on the grounds that there was 
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an overriding interest. 
This case expresses a primary function of the human right to freedom of 
conscience to protect only the autonomous agency of individuals to live, without 
unlawful interference, according to individual convictions. With regard to the claims 
of vegans, it is, thus, considered that an uncompromising, ethical commitment to 
suffering nonhumans is a matter for the private and personal conscience of 
individuals, and that the practical manifestation of any such commitment can be 
lawfully limited.  
A consequence of the above finding is, therefore, that an uncompromising 
vegan commitment to recognising and presenting the suffering of nonhumans and 
their moral standing can be lawfully constrained. This conclusion raises questions 
about the nature of a human rights enterprise that recognises the significance of 
nonhuman suffering in its acknowledgment that veganism comes within the scope of 
human rights protection. Of particular interest is the tension between the 
recognition of suffering others as an ethical value in human rights and the primacy of 
qualified human rights protection for individual autonomous conscience. This tension 
will be explored in the next chapter. 
2.16 Conclusion  
 This chapter has explained that veganism is a culture embracing an ethical 
commitment to the moral standing of nonhuman animals. It has explained that 
vegans feel compelled to live their lives avoiding harming animals or participating in 
their commodification. What is clear in the growing culture of veganism and literary 
comment is that veganism is a culture of selfless respect, compassion, duty and 
benevolence to other life and is a response to the suffering of nonhuman others. The 
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suffering of nonhumans was cited as particularly significant to the existence and 
evolution of veganism and to the idea that attending to their suffering is a moral 
imperative. 
 The chapter has identified that as veganism has evolved so too has critical 
comment on the manifestations of prejudice towards nonhumans. In this regard, 
current literature highlights the broad range of critiques that assess the implications 
of the dominant, normative practice of consumption of nonhumans. These critiques 
emerge from the idea that humans are ethically responsible to nonhumans and that 
the falsely assumed, ontological human-animal binary is responsible for a plethora of 
intersecting societal problems that can be addressed, in part at least, through a non-
anthropocentric reorientation of the way humans respond to nonhuman suffering.  
 The chapter has observed that veganism is defined as indistinction in practice, 
a daily lived expression of ethical commitment and the embodiment of a response to 
ethical responsibility that can alleviate social ills. The chapter has identified that this 
discourse is built upon the belief that nonhuman suffering is caused by prejudice and 
the imposition of arbitrary power. In this regard, the chapter has identified a 
suffering narrative in the history and evolution of veganism.  
 The chapter has noted the range of contexts in which the claims of vegans 
arise. It has been observed that the arguments of vegans are ethically motivated and 
that their claims for accommodation are grounded in ethical consideration for 
nonhumans and their suffering. It was noted that their claims are numerous and not 
well understood or accommodated in a dominant culture of nonhuman animal 
consumption. This context for the claims of vegans renders nonhuman suffering 
invisible, it being rarely mentioned in cases concerning veganism and, if so, only in 
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the context of an applicant’s personal sentiments. Nonetheless, the ECtHR recognises 
vegan convictions as significant in its finding that veganism comes within the scope 
of (qualified) human rights protection.  
 The chapter has highlighted that a consequence of qualified protection is that 
the vegan desire to extend an uncompromising, non-reductive, ethical commitment 
to nonhumans is compromised by lawful interference. These circumstances 
represent a tension in human rights between the recognition of the importance of 
suffering and the primacy of protection for human individuals on the basis of 
autonomous agency. The next chapter, therefore, assesses the observation that the 
moral imperative to attend to the suffering of nonhumans is constrained by the 




Chapter 3  
To what extent does the existing human rights jurisprudence on veganism confirm 
the centrality of individual (human) self-determination in the idea of human rights? 
Introduction  
 The previous chapter explained that veganism is a response to suffering and 
that vegans aim to live with an uncompromising ethical commitment to the moral 
standing of nonhuman animals. It was identified that vegans argue, in various areas 
of their lives, against a requirement to assimilate into the mainstream system of 
prejudice against animals and have presented nonhuman animal suffering under the 
human right to freedom of conscience. It was found that though the vegan concern 
with nonhuman animal suffering is recognised by the ECtHR, the ethical convictions 
of vegans can, nevertheless, be lawfully compromised on the grounds that they are 
deemed private and personal beliefs of conscience that must be balanced against 
competing aims in a democracy. The objective of this chapter is to identify the extent 
to which this way of dealing with veganism confirms the centrality of human 
individuality in the idea of human rights. 
3.1 Background 
 The subjugated status of nonhumans is not explicitly written into human 
rights law. There is no explicit right to kill nonhuman animals or to disregard their 
suffering. Their subjugated status is, however, the context for exclusive human 
rights.194 The human/nonhuman binary in the idea of human rights is supported by 
the exclusionary jurisdiction of the ECtHR, which has confirmed that it cannot 
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consider complaints put forward for animal rights because the Convention has no 
provisions for the rights of animals for it to protect.195  
 Human rights provisions also reflect the resource status of nonhuman 
animals. For example, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights requires states to ensure that minorities are not denied enjoyment of their 
culture.196 Under this provision, the Human Rights Committee, in General Comment 
23, communicates the status of nonhumans as land resources and explicates that 
granting cultural rights may also include protecting, by law, rights (inter alia) to 
hunting and fishing.197 This bias of human rights allows herding, trapping, hunting 
and killing other animals as human entitlements under the protection of culture.198 
 When considering the oppositional culture of veganism, this legal opinion is 
an example of what Heiner Bielefeldt, a former UN special Rapporteur for freedom of 
religion and belief, describes as a ‘prima facie contradiction’ between the principle of 
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non-discrimination and the privileging of a particular belief system.199 If killing, 
trapping and hunting are granted as manifestations of human rights that are to be 
protected by law, questions are raised regarding how veganism is to be protected 
when its manifestation requires the moral standing of nonhumans to be recognised. 
In a dominant culture of animal consumption, the neutrality of a rule of law and its 
application is, thus, called into question.  
H v UK200 confirmed that vegan, ethical convictions for nonhuman animal 
suffering were within the scope of human rights protection. This finding was not in 
recognition that suffering itself was the mission of a rights enterprise, but on the 
basis that human autonomy of conscience was a paramount concern of human rights 
to be qualified only in the interests of competing aims within a democracy. This 
finding illustrates a tension in human rights between the recognition of a moral 
imperative to deal with suffering and the orientation of human rights in its 
prioritisation of individual human conscience. These circumstances warrant an 
examination of the extent to which human rights concern duty in a community of 
suffering others or primarily recognise individual human autonomy. 
3.2 The problem of human rights 
Confusion surrounds the idea of human rights.201 Michael J Perry describes 
the focus on global human rights as the ‘dominant morality of our time’ and suggests 
that there is no clear theory of human rights, that the morality of human rights is not 
well understood and that the morality of human rights gives expression to an 
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assumed ontology of the essence of human beings.202 Connor Gearty concurs, 
arguing that ‘the moral obligation apparently inherent in the term ‘human rights’ is 
not a moral truth as such; rather it is a kind of mask we assume to help keep us on 
the right long term path for our species’.203  
Gearty argues that historical philosophical reasoning concerning human rights 
is merely reformist in nature rather than existing to create a human/nonhuman 
boundary. Citing the intellectual rejection of the Church and objective reality 
submitting to human subjectivity and responsibility, Gearty asserts that the main 
reason why humans became the creator of their own moral superiority in 
philosophical rights discourse was simply because the idea of a religious soul gave 
way to the plausibility of a conscious, autonomous mind.  
Gearty puts forward the idea that human rights emerged as an ‘emancipatory 
force against the abuse of power’,204 and that there was never an explicit intention 
to exclude the moral standing of nonhumans. He maintains that the creation of a 
species boundary is an inadvertent human construct in the story of a rights discourse 
initiated by human beings for their own purposes. To support his views, Gearty also 
notes that the primacy of individual autonomy is insufficient grounds for rights to be 
afforded to the human species as, logically, this would preclude babies and other 
humans who are unable to assert their autonomy or make conscious, rational, 
autonomous choices. These and other similar observations concerning the logic of 
perceptions upon which distinctions are drawn between species are longstanding in 
the history of philosophical thought regarding the status of other animals in human 
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social organisation. They are documented by Primatt205 in the mid-1700s and given 
support by contemporary theorists such as Cavalieri,206 Regan,207 Ryder,208 Singer209 
and Cochrane.210 
This tension between the competing ideas of rights for autonomous 
individuals or rights as a means to deal with suffering is clear in the history of human 
rights discourse. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), ardent campaigner against the idea 
of natural human rights, proclaimed that ‘[o]ther animals, which, on account of their 
interests having been neglected by the insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand 
degraded into the class of things’.211 Further: 
 
… The day has been, I grieve to say in many places it is not yet 
past, in which the greater part of the species, under the 
denomination of slaves, have been treated by the law exactly 
upon the same footing as, in England for example, the inferior 
races of animals are still. The day may come, when the rest of 
the animal creation may acquire those rights which never 
could have been withholden from them but by the hand of 
tyranny. The French have already discovered that the 
blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should 
be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a 
tormentor.* It may come one day to be recognized, that the 
number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the 
termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient 
for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else 
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is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of 
reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown 
horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as 
a more conversable, animal than an infant of a day, or a 
week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were 
otherwise, what would it avail? the question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?212  
 
3.3 The idea of human autonomy in the groundwork of rights 
 A survey of human rights literature reveals that the search for the origins of 
and justifications for the modern notion of universal human rights is extensive. What 
is most prominent in this discourse is the development of a notion of human rights as 
the natural rights of self-determining individuals. This notion of human identity is 
associated with the existence of natural law and has been heavily influenced by a 
Western liberal view of human nature that became most prominent during the 
Enlightenment.  
 The idea that human rights represent liberty and the natural rights of self-
determining individuals is historical. Michael Hass briefly notes that a relationship 
between a conception of natural law and the existence of human law can be traced 
back at least to the Ancient Greeks.213 Aristotle (384-322 BCE), for example, argued 
that the good governance of a nation would be one that protected human liberty by 
ensuring the conditions under which individuals could flourish and achieve according 
to their capabilities.214 Moving forward in time, the philosophy of the Stoics of the 
third century AD was that nature revealed a universal truth which would emerge 
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through rational beings respecting each other as equals. Bertrand Russell explains 
that for the Stoics, human life was inextricably intertwined with nature and God, and 
each person was thought to be directed by a Divine presence. On this view, reason is 
supreme and facilitates the process by which the universal moral law will become 
known and established. The Stoics believed that an individual has total autonomy of 
mind and ‘perfect freedom’ to exercise the Divine virtue he personifies.215  
 Into the Middle Ages, this historical narrative of human law is entirely within 
an understanding of a pre-existing, natural order that concerns a God-given 
knowledge of Divine natural law. Since God was observed as the creator, awareness 
of how to live in community with regard to others would be instinctive and universal 
knowledge. On this view, the freedom of individuals in community ought not be 
limited by the state. Natural law was universal and discoverable through reason, and 
individuals had natural liberty and self-determination to do good and avoid evil.216  
 Contemporary theorist James Griffin notes the historical significance of a 
perception of a natural law of the universe in the development of human law, but he 
observes the way in which the established perception of natural law gave way to a 
new, modern idea of human rights in the Enlightenment period of the eighteenth 
century.217 Before this era, as Costas Douzinas explains, there was no concept of 
enforceable, natural, individual human rights.218 At this point in history, the social 
contract philosophy of Rousseau (1712-1778), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John 
Locke (1632-1704) was significant in the development of a discourse on the 
relationship between natural rights and freedom from state interference. Rousseau 
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argued that ‘MAN is born free; and everywhere he is in chains’.219 Hobbes argued 
that individual freedom is relinquished to government in favour of safety, social 
order, peace and harmony in the otherwise brutal world of unrestrained man in 
competition with others.220  
 This type of social contract theory seeks to justify the extent of state 
authority over individuals in the interests of social order in the wider community. In 
his development of a theory of natural rights, John Locke partially agreed with 
Hobbes but qualified the extent of individual submission to authority, arguing that 
men have ‘a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights 
and privileges of the law of Nature, equally with any other man’ and basic natural 
rights to ‘property, life, liberty, and estate’.221  
 These Enlightenment ideas continued the natural rights tradition; they 
observed humanity to be composed of equal rational individuals in community but 
argued that state authority was necessary to protect individuals from the power of 
the competitive other.  
3.4 The emergence of individualised human rights  
 Historian Lynn Hunt describes the Enlightenment period as a time 
preoccupied with the idea of individuals as autonomous agents. She argues that this 
had significant implications for the socio-political landscape and the development of 
modern human rights. 
 The influencing factors cited by Hunt include the demise of God and the 
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emergence of secular ideas but also the prior American and French revolutions and 
subsequent declarations that referred to the rights of man. Hunt suggests that the 
Enlightenment saw the introduction and development of a different notion of human 
identity and a corresponding notion of ‘self-evident’ human rights.222 These were 
inspired by new ideas about man being ‘born free’, rights being ‘natural’ and people 
being ‘equal’, and about the universal application of these concepts. Hunt argues 
that during the Enlightenment, the notion of individual human rights emerged.  
 Hunt notes that English jurist William Blackstone defined the rights of man as 
‘the natural liberty of mankind, that is, the absolute rights of man, considered as a 
free agent endowed with discernment, to know good from evil’.223  This definition 
reflected the established, historical notion of the essence of human identity but also 
reoriented the reason for the assumed free agency. Hunt argues that, during the 
Enlightenment, liberty and rights came to be justified on the basis of ‘a set of 
assumptions about individual autonomy’.224 This was an assumption thought to 
guarantee the moral evolution of humanity on the grounds that each individual had 
within them the ability to know how to conduct themselves in community, according 
to a universal moral law that respected and acknowledged the natural rights of 
others. These ideas were greatly influenced by the philosophy of the time, not least 
the work of Immanuel Kant.225  
 For Kant, individual human reason is an a priori characteristic and must not 
be restrained, since its function is to observe and express universal moral law. 
Through reason, the moral law would be observed through hypothetical and 
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categorical imperatives. The hypothetical imperative is characterised as advisory 
thinking about how to achieve a desired end, and the categorical imperative is an 
obligatory, objective course of action that is required regardless of any end. These 
innate commands would guide human conduct to facilitate universal human 
morality. Bertrand Russell explains that Kant believed the categorical imperative to 
be a priori all subsequent reasoning, and that it was derived from Kant’s concept of 
universal law.226  
 On the basis of objective categorical imperatives, Kant envisaged humanity’s 
moral progress to be designed by universal principles that were accessible through 
individual human reason. The significance of human beings as independent rational 
agents was, thus, established. Lynn Hunt observes the importance Kant gave to 
individual reason. It was the means by which each person would realise their own 
understanding and think independent moral thoughts to guide the moral will. Hunt 
also notes that autonomy and moral conduct remained tied up with community 
values. 
 Lynn Hunt speculates that the new notion of personal autonomy did not 
displace the centrality of community and each person’s awareness of and feelings for 
each other. The recognition of self-evident human rights was bound up with a 
common ‘interior feeling’ of something universal that made social life possible and 
human rights universal. This feeling was a ‘social gravitational force’ that brought 
‘people outside themselves’ to manifest a natural disposition to care about others.227 
The assumed a priori nature of human reason was considered only a posteriori to 
unifying affectivity. Hunt describes this as a learned or imagined capacity for 
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sympathy or empathy with suffering others. Hunt concludes that the development of 
universal human rights recognises individual autonomy but only insofar as it 
represents a prior existing, natural concern for the freedom of the other and a 
shared awareness of the undesirability of suffering.  
 Hunt’s understanding of the way a common universal feeling informed the 
development of a human rights of the individual is not widely recognised as being 
explicitly entrenched or reflected in human rights practice.228 This is perhaps because 
Kant’s philosophy focuses much more on the absolute self-governance of the 
individual in relation to moral conduct. A major consideration for Kant was the 
concept of self-legislation that emerged from his concept of human dignity.  
 In The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains that 
individual autonomy is supreme because it reflects the intrinsic dignity in the 
command of the obligatory, categorical imperative that facilitates and gives 
expression to duty.229 Autonomy, Kant argues, is ‘the ground of the dignity of 
humanity… ’.230 It represents the ‘inward worth’231 of the ethical imperatives that are 
naturally accessible to the rational mind.  
  On Kant’s thesis, individual reason represents dignity on the basis that it 
gives access to self-legislated morality. Further, humanity is composed of individuals 
who are ends in themselves because the will of rational beings is always legislative. 
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3.5 The implications of autonomy for human rights 
 Costas Douzinas argues that the importance of human reason in Kant’s 
thinking does not implicitly deny the otherness of human rights and that ‘[t]he quest 
for a rational justification of rights starts here’. He identifies, though, a fundamental 
problem generated by Kantian autonomy and the idea of innate, categorical 
imperatives argued to be accessible through individual rationality. Douzinas argues 
that the philosophy of rights came to promote self-government and the creation of 
legal rules that entitled the bearer to seek various personal benefits ‘in pursuit of his 
interests’. Right-holders were entitled to personalise and privatise their claims and 
individuals were enfranchised ‘to initiate their public enforcement; by organising 
their content in accordance with the desires and needs of their holders’. As such, the 
development of a profound dignity principle for human rights emphasised the 
importance of individuality and eroded the notion of natural rights as espousing 
respect for the autonomy and human condition of others. Human rights became 
derived ‘of a law given by the self to itself and for itself’.232  
 For Douzinas, the centrality of Kantian rationality in the ethics of human 
rights has been instrumental in a counter-intuitive social construction of human 
identity as espousing self-seeking autonomy. This, he argues, has created an 
impoverished version of rights and law.233 Lynn Hunt is of the same opinion. She 
suggests that the prevalence of a notion of human autonomy meant that individuals 
moved further and further away from community and became increasingly 
independent agents, both legally and psychologically. 
 The primacy of autonomy prevails and is a common feature of much rights 
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discourse.234 It is so entrenched that it grounds the legal claims of the Nonhuman 
Rights Project (NhRP) for the liberty and equality of a number of chimpanzees.235 But 
the special consideration given to human dignity and autonomy as ‘self-governance – 
the ability to determine one’s own actions and beliefs’236 has given further 
expression to an extensive range of important human characteristics that, according 
to James Griffin, help to give a clearer idea of what human rights are and how they 
are justified.  
 For James Griffin, a substantive account of current human rights retains 
strong elements of the Kantian tradition. He argues that human life differs from the 
lives of other animals. Human individuals are free agents who have a conception of 
themselves, perceive of a past and a future, aim to achieve goals; deliberate, assess, 
choose, experience desires and aim for a good life. Griffin argues that human 
individuals value their moral and legal standing as autonomous agents and rely on 
human rights to protect this status. On this view, current human rights protect 
normative agency by respecting autonomy, welfare and liberty. They confer, for 
example, the right to life, to security and to freedom of expression,237 and the liberty 
to pursue what Griffin argues to be the most appropriate defence of human rights: 
freedom and protection in the pursuit of a worthwhile life.238 A consequence of this 
understanding of human rights, as one that speaks to the dignity of human beings 
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and individual autonomy, is the demise of a concept of ethical duty in the context of 
arbitrary abuse of power, suffering, otherness and community. It also supports the 
exclusion of nonhuman animals. 
3.6 Human rights, dignity and personhood 
 For Griffin, an interpretation of ‘dignity’ for the purpose of understanding 
exclusive human rights is personhood. Griffin retains rights for human individuals 
who are in pursuit of a worthwhile life. He argues that they are the only beings who 
can perceive of what is valuable and what is not valuable to achieve such an end. He 
argues that the notion of autonomy that supports the idea of human rights requires 
complex language and human beings are the only species that comply with this 
requirement. He also argues that it is not the uniqueness of each individual that is 
important to justify human rights, but the fact that the human species alone has the 
dignity that grounds current human rights. Individual capability is of little significance 
to Griffin. It does not impact on intrinsic dignity or worth. The specific kind of 
autonomy Griffin elaborates as a justification for current human rights only depends 
on the acknowledgement that human beings ‘have a capacity to recognize good-
making features of human life, both prudential and moral, which can lead to the 
appropriate motivation and action’.239 In his account of the ethics of human rights, 
Griffin retains the dignity principle, grounding it in the autonomous pursuit and 
realisation of a subjectively valued, worthwhile life to justify the existence of current 
human rights. His account of current human rights has been well-received by other 
scholars and is considered to be critical to further discussion. 
 The dignity principle and the notions of autonomy and personhood are, then, 
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the most notable concepts for the centrality of the human individual in the idea of 
human rights. Support for this conclusion can also be found in case law. For example, 
chief justice Aharon Barak of the Israeli Supreme Court promotes human rights on 
the grounds of dignity and autonomy.240 In Academic Center of Law and Business v 
Minister of Finance, he argues that ‘human dignity is  based  on  the autonomy  of  
the  individual  will,  the  freedom  of  choice  and  the freedom  of  action  of  a  
human  being  as  a free  agent’.241 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court 
declared that the state has a duty to protect human dignity and that it represents the 
highest legal value. It is a value ‘founded on the conception of man as a spiritual-
moral being, that has the potential to determine himself in freedom and develop 
from within’.242 But the concepts of dignity, autonomy and personhood do not 
secure the centrality of the human individual in the idea of rights without 
controversy. Arguing for the personhood of chimpanzees on the basis of their 
complex cognitive and emotional characteristics, Michael Mountain of the 
Nonhuman Rights Project states that ‘[o]ur goal is, very simply, to breach the legal 
wall that separates all humans from all nonhuman animals’.243 The concept of dignity 
is also contested. 
 Dictionary definitions of dignity refer to the concepts ‘worth’ and ‘value’ and 
it is common to find dignity referred to as ‘[t]he state or quality of being worthy of 
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honour or respect’.244 The term ‘dignity’ is used in many contexts to describe status 
or value. For example, a person can be a dignitary, and a person can behave in an 
undignified manner. For Professor Kass, ‘the dignity of human being and the dignity 
of being human’ is absolute.245  A human being has ‘special dignity because he shares 
in the godlike powers of reason, freedom, judgment, and moral concern, and, as a 
result, lives a life freighted with moral self-consciousness – a life above and beyond 
what other animals are capable of’.246  
 Martha Nussbaum has a different view. She starts from a notion of human 
dignity to develop a model of justice that gives precision to the language of rights.247 
She refers to this as the ‘capabilities’ approach. In this model, both humans and 
nonhumans have moral standing because they have needs and abilities that are 
essential to living a life with dignity. Case law also promotes the dignity of nonhuman 
animals. In Let the Animals Live v Hamat Gader,248 the Israeli Supreme Court referred 
to nonhuman animals as knowing how to safeguard their dignity249 and also said ‘[a]n 
animal, like a child, is a defenceless creature. Neither are able to defend themselves, 
nor can either stand up for their rights, honor and dignity’.250  
 These ideas have, thus far, not created nonhuman beneficiaries of rights, nor 
have they affected the centrality of human beings in the idea of moral rights. 
Roberto Adorno notes that human rights instruments and the decisions of national 
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and international courts show that the term ‘dignity’ plays several different roles and 
has different functions. Its primary meaning, though ‘refers to the intrinsic value of 
human beings’ and its function is to ‘provide the deepest justification for human 
rights’.251  
 Notwithstanding the challenges presented, the concepts that ground human 
personhood – dignity and autonomy – are also concepts that ground further specific, 
philosophical and socio-political reasoning that justifies the centrality of the human 
individual autonomy in the idea of human rights. This is most evident in the specific 
right to freedom of conscience. 
3.7 How autonomy grounds the paramount right to freedom of individual 
conscience 
 Following the Enlightenment ‘age of reason’ and the growth of secularism, 
the nineteenth century saw the development of further liberal philosophy that 
emphasised the primacy of autonomy in the context of a perceived historical struggle 
between individual liberty and state authority. Discussing the legitimacy of power 
exercised over the individual, John Stuart Mill argues that ‘the inward domain of 
consciousness’ demands nothing more that absolute freedom.252 This domain, Mill 
asserts, is that of ‘the dignity of thinking beings’.253 As such, any attempt to deny an 
individual the development of their own opinions, beliefs and views was absolutely 
wrong, primarily because no one could claim knowledge of infallible, objective 
truth.254 On Mill’s view, the liberty of the individual includes a social right to be free 
to think and be heard, and anything less would constitute a social tyranny whereby a 
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majority view would infuse society and permeate law and legal process. Mill’s thesis 
is widely cited as critical to the importance and development of a right to freedom to 
express personal views on religious convictions. It remains an important contribution 
to discourse on individual freedom of expression in the context of the recognition of 
plurality and diversity. 
 This modern development of a principle of absolute, individual freedom of 
conscience remains central to questions about legitimate state interference. In his 
Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that freedom of conscience is fundamental to 
justice because it constitutes a primary aspect of human life and denotes personal 
identity. In Rawls’ theory, when individuals contemplate the grounds for justice from, 
what he refers to as, the ‘original position’, ‘equal liberty of conscience’ is an 
overriding principle that all will agree on because, he argues, freedom of conscience 
is critical to each.255 Rawls argues that the argument for a constitutional equality of 
conscience is strong. It requires ‘a regime guaranteeing moral liberty and freedom of 
thought and belief, and of religious practice … regulated only on the necessary 
grounds of public order and security’.256 
 Equality of individuality is also central to Ronald Dworkin’s foundational legal 
justice. In a comprehensive analysis of Rawls’ theory, Dworkin argues that it is legal 
equality that must be established prior to a Rawlsian concept of justice. Starting from 
a principle of legal equality, rather than freedom of conscience, Dworkin’s concern, 
nonetheless, is to promote and support the view that there must be no constraint on 
individual liberty to decide what constitutes a good life.257 For Dworkin, this 
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prohibition is strict. Individual rights are political ‘trumps’ against collective views 
and state interference. Any such interference must be justified by very special 
reasons.  
 The socio-political philosophy of Mill, Rawls and Dworkin supports the 
general principles of Enlightenment philosophy on autonomy and individual liberty. 
On their views, the free thinking of rational individuals grounds a requirement for 
positive law and a great degree of individual autonomy and freedom over which the 
state has extremely limited authority. In these views, Enlightenment ideas regarding 
self-governance, autonomy and human dignity are represented in arguments for 
strong individual rights to reign supreme against state interference with any chosen 
way of life or chosen religious outlook. In addition, this discourse has been 
developed to include an argument for social plurality as a necessary component of a 
value for autonomy. For Joseph Raz, autonomy is a concept that expresses the way 
people shape their destiny by ‘fashioning it through successive decisions throughout 
their lives’.258 But, ‘[a]utonomy is exercised through choice, and choice requires a 
variety of options to choose from’.259 Raz argues, therefore, that ‘valuing autonomy 
leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism’.260 On this basis, Raz suggests that 
moral pluralism is the political ideal and justification for the right to individual 
freedom because it supports and promotes a tolerant society. 
 Discourse on autonomy, liberty and individual freedom is vast, and the views 
above represent but a small fraction. The brief overview presented above cannot do 
justice to the respective theses, nor can it include a critical appraisal of additional 
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critical discourse on their content and scope. Nevertheless, it sketches out a linear 
view of the historical justifications given for the existence of rights for individuals, of 
why they are important and of their utility for wider society.261  
 On the discourse presented, the overarching context for the presentation of 
the human rights claims of vegans is clear. Individual autonomy is perceived to be a 
fundamental value to humanity. It is grounded on the dignity principle that is 
expressed through the rational and normative agency of each and every person. It 
ought not be limited by the state except for very important reasons, and it gives 
expression to the morality of pluralism in human society. The idea of individual 
autonomy does not itself necessarily preclude the existence of compassion for others 
in community, but the extent to which this historical context for human rights has 
shaped positive human rights law, at the expense of moral responsibility to others, 
needs to be assessed.  
3.8 The scope of community and autonomy in human rights: the development of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
Michael Hass notes the influence of previous eras in the incremental 
developments that led to the modern notion of human rights and the UDHR, which 
was drafted following World War atrocities.262 In her discussion of the creation of the 
Declaration, Mary Ann Glendon observes the divergent philosophical and ethical 
traditions that were brought together to inform a notion of universal human 
rights.263 She argues that the Declaration recognises the ‘common convictions’ of 
humanity and predominantly emphasises that human rights should not be perceived 
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as the rights of individual sole agents but as entitlements that are grounded in the 
fact that individuals are constituted by and through relationships with others. 
Though there are references to the free development of individuality and references 
to basic individual freedoms, she argues that the historical documents that record 
the development of the Declaration make it clear that community and duties to each 
other were to be recognised. These documents are very explicit on the point that 
everyone is mutually dependent.264  
On Glendon’s view, the final Declaration makes it clear that the individual is 
not a lone bearer of rights. There is some support for this view: the first sentence of 
the Preamble to the Declaration speaks of equal rights for all members of the human 
family. The second sentence says that disregard and contempt have led to barbarous 
acts against the conscience of mankind. The Preamble goes on to say that human 
rights aim to deal with tyranny and oppression on the basis of the dignity and worth 
of the human person. Article 1 confirms that ‘[a]ll human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood’.265 
Glendon’s views challenge the idea that a Kantian notion of a total autonomy 
of the individual as the author and legislator of her own life should ground human 
rights. Evidence suggests, though, that the drafting of the Declaration was fraught 
with conceptual difficulties regarding individual autonomy and the need to speak of 
rights in terms of a human family. For example, the Syrian delegation were keen to 
suggest that human rights were to be defined in terms of the individual because 
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rights and freedoms for individuals gave all an equal chance to develop their 
capacities and live as men wished to live. This would ensure that men would live in 
friendship with each other: it would facilitate social justice and a sense of 
brotherhood.266  
On the other hand, at a meeting on the day of its proclamation, the 
Yugoslavian representative commented that the current text of the Declaration was 
objectionable. He argued that human rights should not focus on individualism but 
should recognise the interdependence of the individual and his community. He 
remarked that ‘[t]he text before the assembly was based on individualistic concepts 
which considered man to be an isolated individual ...’, and that ‘[t]he Declaration 
was, in certain respects, not based on reality, because it described man as an isolated 
individual and overlooked the fact that he was also a member of a community’.267 
The records of the drafting committee reveal that absolute individual 
autonomy was never accepted as appropriate and complete grounds for the basic 
human rights it was developing. What is certain is that there was widespread 
agreement that the rights being articulated were:  
 
… based on the most ancient ideas of the great philosophers 
and on the concept that the power of the State must rest on 
the respect for the human person. [the draft] was a concrete 
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expression of that trend of thought which now shaped the 
conscience of nations.268 
 
Human rights were, thus, conceptualised as ethically grounded in some 
concept of human individualism, and promoted as necessary to prevent arbitrary 
state power. They were devised in the absence of discussion regarding the criteria 
for moral standing and took human dignity, as grounds for respect, for granted.  The 
Declaration, thus, made no reference to nonhuman moral standing and did not 
explicate non-abstract grounds for the prioritising of human beings. Though there is 
some evidence to suggest that the Declaration was grounded on the view that 
individuals constitute the community of humanity – and, importantly, one that is 
vulnerable to arbitrary abuse of power – there is no consideration of nonhumans 
constituting an extension to this community, of their vulnerability, or of the 
possibility that they suffered from the infliction of arbitrary power exercised over 
them. In addition, the Declaration orients strongly in the direction of rights for 
individuals and makes little reference to duties to suffering others in community.269 
3.9 The Articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
From the outset, the Articles of the UDHR emphasise the primacy of the 
individual rather than duty to others. Article 1 emphasises the nature of human 
identity as being born free, with the capacity to reason. It states that: 
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All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and 
should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.270  
 
Article 2 recognises a significance of individual characteristics. It provides that:  
 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion …  
 
Article 7 recognises the equality of individual characteristics and reads: 
 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled 
to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of 
this Declaration and against any incitement to such 
discrimination. 
 
Article 18 deals with the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It 
emphasises the rational character of human individuals and states:  
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or 
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belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance. 
 
Article 19 explains how the primacy of rational human beings must be 
allowed to manifest through the right to freedom of expression. It reads: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. 
 
 The focus of the Declaration clearly entrenches the idea that the ethics of 
human rights is related to human individuals as rational subjects. Individual human 
beings are declared free and equal in all respects – including in respect of equality of 
conscience. Individuals will be equal before the law and will benefit from the 
principle of non-discrimination. These values are to be upheld through teaching and 
education, some of which will be compulsory.271 
 The paramount value for freedom of conscience is, then, clear, supported by 
other Articles and made unequivocal in Article 18. These provisions of the UDHR that 
benefit individuals, are to be restricted only if there is a law that is required for good 
reasons in a democracy. Article 29(2) states that: 
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In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law 
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights of others and of meeting the just requirements 
of morality, public order and the general welfare in a 
democratic society. 
 
The notion of ethics emerging from this primary modern human rights 
document is one that speaks to individual freedom and autonomy. The primacy of 
reason and conscience and its manifestations are regarded as being so fundamental 
to humanity that the idea occupies a special and central place in the Declaration. 
Explicit and implicit in the beginning of the Declaration, and confirmed in Article 18, 
is a conception of human identity that is built upon the orthodoxy of autonomy272 
and the assumed primacy of human reason. It is presented as the principle defining 
characteristic of human nature. 
From the outset of the modern notion of human rights, the entrenched 
ethical orientation concerned the individual on the basis of the capacity for reason. It 
is apparent that the ethical orientation of human rights did not explicitly emphasise 
overriding duty to others or an orientation towards protection from suffering. It is in 
this context that the Council of Europe developed the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The UN, however, enunciated further the meaning of provisions 
contained in the Declaration. These elaborations are worth noting for two reasons: 
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firstly, because they show the way international human rights emphasises autonomy 
as a central value and, secondly, because the European system of human rights aims 
to be consistent with accepted principles of international law and developments on 
common matters.273 
3.9.1 The centrality of autonomy in international human rights 
The UDHR is one of three legal instruments that make up the International 
Bill of Rights. It does not itself have the force of law and legal effect is given to its 
provision in two later Covenants. These are the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).274  
The ICCPR makes it very clear that human rights are derived from the 
inherent dignity of the human person.275 Moreover, it explicitly states in Article 1 
that ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development’. The centrality of individuality is confirmed in Article 18, which 
gives legal effect to the right to freedom of conscience. Its development is clearly 
associated with a prior existing orthodoxy of autonomy that has become bound up 
with the requirement for a right to freedom to live according to deep convictions, 
normatively expressed as freedom of religion. Article 18 reads: 
 
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, 
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conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and 
freedom, either individually or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
worship, observance, practice and teaching.  
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.  
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
  
 Regarding the scope of autonomy protected, the UN Committee on Human 
Rights has provided some guidance in General Comment No. 22 of 1993, which 
states that:  
 
the terms ‘belief’ and ‘religion’ are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not 
limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with 
institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional 
religions.276 
 
In addition, the freedom to have a belief necessarily requires the freedom to choose 
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one.277 Outlawed in this context are the use of threat, physical force or penal 
sanctions to force conversion from one belief to another and, importantly, any 
policies or practices that have the same effect.278 Under the terms of the ICCPR, this 
protection is applied to all beliefs – even those which are non-religious in nature.279 
Regarding interference, the UN sets out general legal obligations in General 
Comment No. 31. In this document, the Human Rights Committee makes it clear that 
states must demonstrate the necessity of interference and only take such measures 
as are proportionate to the pursuance of legitimate aims.280  
 From these measures, it is clear that the ethical orientation of human rights 
rests very firmly on the primacy of individual autonomy. This is confirmed further in 
the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,281 which is more explicit regarding the 
scope of autonomy and its manifestation. Referring to the importance of the UDHR, 
this Declaration states in its introductory Preamble that: 
religion or belief, for anyone who professes either, is one of 
the fundamental elements in his conception of life and that 
freedom of religion or belief should be fully respected and 
guaranteed. 
  
 The 1981 Declaration is explicit on the breadth of the meaning of ‘belief’, 
stating, in Article 1, that a person is free to believe ‘whatever belief’ (he chooses). 
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The Declaration states that the concept of freedom of conscience is vital to eliminate 
ideologies or practices of colonialism and racial discrimination and to ensure that 
there is no coercion that would impair the freedom to adopt and hold a belief of 
choice. These developments on the Universal Declaration highlight the centrality of 
individual autonomy in the human rights enterprise. Individuals have inherent dignity 
because they have autonomy of mind, are free thinking and must be allowed to 
retain absolute control over their inner realm of consciousness.  
 There is additional evidence that the notion of individual autonomy is deeply 
entrenched in human rights discourse. This is expressed as the primacy of the inner 
realm of consciousness, known as the ‘forum internum’.282 It is argued that it ‘cannot 
be interfered with in any way’283 and that ‘there are no permissible limitations to this 
right’.284 Paul Taylor suggests that the absolute element of the right to freedom of 
conscience is unproblematic. Although interference is declared illegitimate, he 
suggests that it would actually be impossible to try to attempt to control one’s inner 
realm.285 Others too assume that this freedom is an ‘easy case’286 because ‘states 
have not considered it difficult to allow their citizens the freedom to think’.287  
Morsink maintains that the result of the right to freedom of conscience is total 
freedom from a state-sponsored doctrinal position.288 Former Special Rapporteur 
Arcot Krishnaswami supports these views, maintaining that freedom of mind is 
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within the inner ‘conscience of an individual’ and noting that ‘Viewed from this 
angle, one would assume that any intervention from outside is not only illegitimate 
but impossible’.289  
 It is clear that the idea of an autonomous forum internum and the subsequent 
primacy of the individual are central to the idea of human rights. They are values that 
ground the validity of rights and inform a paramount right to freedom of conscience. 
How these ideas feature in the European system of human rights will now be 
considered. 
3.10 The European Convention on Human Rights 
The Convention is a regional human rights treaty that came into force four 
years after the adoption of the UDHR. It has developed independently of the UN 
treaties. It states from the outset that it is drafted in direct relation to the UDHR in 
the interests of the universal recognition of the rights it declares. It aims to promote 
a common understanding of human rights and observes that the fundamental 
freedoms outlined are the basis for justice and peace in the world. As such, it lists the 
basic rights and fundamental freedoms of every person. As a living instrument, its 
principles and provisions evolve over time through the addition of new Protocols and 
through Court judgments that develop and clarify the meaning of its Articles.  
Unlike the UDHR, the Convention does not refer to the human family, the 
conscience of mankind or the spirit of brotherhood required in dealings with each 
other. Its provisions recognise the inherent dignity of human beings and are 
explicated, almost exclusively, in terms of the rights of individuals.  
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It is clear from the Travaux Préparatoires290 that the drafters of the 
Convention considered the centrality of individual, autonomous reason a critical 
component of European compliance with the principles of the UDHR. The president 
of the Council of Europe’s Consultative Assembly announced that the aim of the 
Council was to recognise the fundamental principle of individual freedom.291 
Speakers emphasised the need to draw up a list of individual freedoms292 in respect 
of the fundamental rights of the human individual.293 They advised that the Council 
of Europe should ensure that Europe became a guardian of the individual human 
being,294 in recognition of the prize of individual liberty.295 The Council would ensure 
a principle of non-interference with individual liberties296 and commit to the 
development of individuals.297 It would comply with a duty to affirm the rights of the 
human individual298 and, most significantly, would declare ‘without hesitation that 
we stand for a concept of human rights in which the individual is supreme …’. Against 
the primacy of individual freedom, everything else was considered subordinate.299 
On behalf of the drafting committee, M. Teitgen conceptualised autonomous 
reason as a right required by citizens to protect from state authorities that could 
‘rob’ a person of ‘control over his intellectual faculties and of his conscience’.300 It 
was described by many speakers as a fundamental right of humanity, a ‘fundamental 
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undisputed freedom’ and a most ‘sacred right’ which must not be suppressed.301  
The centrality of human, individual self-determination in the developing 
European system of human rights was clearly expressed as the mission of the 
Convention. Though one or two drafters referred to the history of struggle and 
suffering in the evolution of human rights, dealing with the eradication of suffering 
was not a focus, nor was it emphasised as the mission and target of their enterprise.  
The overriding centrality of individual autonomy was declared essential, particularly 
for individuals to discover their ethical orientation and live according to their 
individually worked out convictions. This was expressed in terms of a fundamental 
right to religious freedom. 
The importance of autonomy is represented in the Convention in the areas of 
free speech, freedom of association and other rights that facilitate individual self-
direction. Autonomy of reason is more specifically expressed in Article 9. It 
corresponds to Article 18 of the UDHR and, in principle, was unanimously accepted 
by the drafters of the Convention. It entrenches the orthodoxy of autonomy and 
explains the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as a right with very 
limited grounds for interference:302 
 
Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion 
or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or 
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belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public 
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Article 9, thus, emphasises the primacy given to human reason as a 
manifestation of autonomy. It recognises autonomy as a defining characteristic of 
humanity, observes it as paramount and responds with a declaration of an absolute 
right to freedom of thought that can only be limited in very special circumstances.  
The intention is to recognise and permit absolute freedom of thought on 
matters of conscience but, in the interests of justice for a wider community, limit the 
practical manifestation of likely competing ethical convictions. It is on these grounds 
that the European Court of Human Rights heard the case of H v UK303 as a matter 
concerning the human right to freely determine one’s ethical orientation.  
3.11 The definition of freedom of conscience 
 The Convention gives general support to the entrenched orthodoxy of 
autonomy and recognises, specifically, the importance of establishing a protective 
right to freedom of conscience. Neither the Convention nor its Travaux Préparatoires 
define the terms ‘thought’, ‘conscience’ ‘religion’ or ‘belief’. Martin Scheinin quotes 
the views of Karl Josef Partsch, who sums up the expression as one that covers:  
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all possible attitudes of the individual toward the world, toward society, 
and toward that which determines his fate and the destiny of the world, be 
it a divinity, some superior being or just reason and rationalism, or 
chance.304  
 
Liskofsky concurs that the use of the expression indicates its broad, inclusive 
scope.305  
In the absence of an explicit definition, the interpretation of the meaning of 
these terms has been left to the ECtHR, which, in line with scholarly opinion, has 
taken a very broad approach to Article 9(1).306 Literature notes that the Court is not 
always consistent in its application of Article 9(2), but that it should be grounded in 
the orthodoxy of autonomy.307 The broad approach taken and the principle of no 
interference have resulted in the idea that a European right to freedom of 
conscience allows individuals to believe in anything they want to believe in.308 
Further, as long as there is no harm to society, individuals are able to manifest self-
direction as they wish and do not have to apply for protection to do so.309 These 
circumstances reflect the principle of non-interference with individual self-
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determination. In the event of any interference with the practical manifestation of 
autonomy, applicants can apply to the ECtHR to assess the lawfulness of such 
interference. 
3.12 Protection for freedom of conscience 
Human rights protection for the practical manifestation of matters of 
conscience depends on whether the self-direction presented is judged to be within 
the scope of Article 9(1). In the absence of a clear definition of terms, the Court uses 
a set of criteria that has developed from case law to determine whether the belief in 
question has sufficient gravity to come within the scope of protection offered by the 
Convention. Important considerations are if the belief is ‘important’, ‘serious’, 
‘cogent’ and ‘cohesive’. In particular, there is likely to be a requirement that 
qualifying ‘philosophical’, rather than religious, beliefs must espouse convictions that 
are worthy of respect in a democracy, that are not incompatible with human dignity, 
that relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour and that 
reflect the integrity of the person. To qualify for protection under Article 9, a non-
religious ‘philosophical belief’ does not need to prove that it is ‘a fully-fledged system 
of thought’ but, conversely, it cannot be a ‘matter of insufficient weight or 
substance’.310  
Following confirmation that a belief is recognised as being within the scope of 
Article 9(1), a defence of lawful interference will turn on whether it is within the 
scope of the stated restrictions, as outlined in Article 9(2). Under this sub-section, 
interference is permissible only if it is on the basis of a necessary, existing law that is 
required in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, or for the protection 
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of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.  
Article 9, thus, provides an absolute right to think and a qualified right to 
practise that takes into account the interests of the wider needs of community. It is a 
right that is adjudicated on the principle that any lawful interference must be 
grounded by a legitimate aim and that lawful interference will only cause the 
applicant a personal disadvantage that is proportional to the legitimate aim 
sought.311 This doctrine of proportionality is particularly important – as an inherent 
element of the Convention – in the ‘search for a fair balance between the demands 
of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of 
the individual’s fundamental rights’.312 This process aims to facilitate a fair and 
neutral application of the rule of law. The neutrality of principles applied is expressed 
in C v UK. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion: 
 
primarily protects the sphere of private, personal beliefs, and 
not every act in the public sphere which is dictated by such 
convictions. It does not authorise the right to refuse to abide 
by legislation … the operation of which is provided for by the 
Convention, and which applies neutrally and generally in 
terms of freedom of conscience.313 
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3.13 Compassionate responsibility, personal disadvantage and the limits of the 
right to freedom of conscience 
Article 9 is primarily a provision that reflects the orthodoxy of autonomy. It 
exists to protect individual, personal and private conscience and associated practical 
manifestation. The application of an assumed fair and neutral rule of law and 
principles, such as legitimate aim and proportionality, did not support H’s 
presentation of ethical responsibility to nonhuman suffering beyond a mere 
recognition that convictions for the welfare of nonhumans come within the scope of 
human rights protection. This is because the emphasis, in claims of conscience that 
present ethical responsibility to the suffering of nonhuman animals, is on the 
disadvantage experienced by the human applicant in the context of the wider 
interest that excludes the relevance of nonhuman suffering. This is also emphasised 
in the later cases of Jakóbski v Poland314 and Vartic v Romania,315 which concern 
responsibility to nonhuman suffering and the provision of suitable food for the 
applicant prisoners. In both of these cases, responsibility to nonhuman animals was 
not discussed in terms of a moral imperative to attend to suffering but concerned 
whether the applicants were disadvantaged by the prison regimes.  
This principle of adjudicating claims concerning a moral imperative to attend 
to suffering on the basis of individual human conscience is also made clear in 
Herrmann v Germany.316 This was a case also brought (partly) under Article 9 by an 
applicant opposed to an official requirement to support the local fox hunt as a means 
                                                     
314
 Jakóbski v Poland App No 18429/06 (ECtHR, 7 December 2010).  
315
 Vartic v Romania (no 2) App no 14150/08 (ECtHR, 17 March 2014). At the communication stage, Vartic’s claim 
referred to veganism. This explicit ground for the claim seems to have disappeared in later case reports. 
Vartic considered a higher threshold of ‘significant disadvantage’ under an admissibility practice criterion that 
was introduced by Protocol No. 14. The new criterion entered into force on 1 June 2010 and is incorporated in 
Article 35 paragraph 3(b) of the Convention. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Protocol 14 
<http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Library_Collection_P14_ETS194E_ENG.pdf> accessed 14 July 2016. 
316
 Herrmann v Germany App No 9300/07 (ECtHR, 26
th




of land maintenance. It was decided by a majority, under a Protocol 1 right to 
enjoyment of property.317  
In these types of Article 9 claims, the current tools of litigation are, thus, 
inadequate to accommodate the actual claim presented by the applicants: that 
human beings are ethically responsible to nonhumans beyond the perception that 
moral responsibility is a matter of personal and private conscience. The assessment 
of lawful interference on the grounds of personal disadvantage makes no reference 
to the moral imperative to attend to suffering presented, and it overlooks the 
empirically evident practice of responsibility and compassionate regard for 
nonhumans that is well-established in the socio-political and public domain. 
These cases illustrate that a manifestation of the orthodoxy of autonomy is 
that it gives primacy to the human individual, even in ethical matters that are 
registered in the domain of public conscience. They show that the primacy of human 
individuality is granted at the expense of a community of suffering others and 
illustrate how nonhuman suffering bears heavily on the exclusivity of rights. In this 
regard, the dissenting statement of Judge Pinto of Albuquerque in Herrmann is 
revealing. Pinto’s partially dissenting judgment supported Article 9 as a provision to 
protect personal convictions. He remarked that dismissing the importance of a claim 
for nonhuman suffering under Article 9 by prioritising property rights constitutes 
circumstances that result in a capitus diminuitio318 of the person who is opposed on 
the basis of conscience, and that this is a situation not tolerable in a democracy. 
Though his view pertains to the established orthodoxy of autonomy, he also made an 
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additional, important point. He explained that the presentation of animals under 
Article 9 is an important constituent part of a clear and uncontested broad trend 
towards the acceptance of the moral standing of nonhumans. In this regard, he 
observed that the Convention and the Court offer them some form of protection. 
Such a statement clearly highlights a paradox and the problem of litigating cases that 
present nonhuman suffering on the grounds of the personal and private convictions 
of applicants. Pinto’s statement questions the validity of the orthodoxy of autonomy 
and the centrality of the human individual in a protective rights enterprise. 
3.14 Conclusion 
 This chapter has considered the extent to which the existing jurisprudence on 
veganism confirms the centrality of individual, human self-determination in the idea 
of human rights. It has identified the longstanding focus on human, individual 
autonomy that appears to have influenced the development of human rights, most 
predominantly from the writings of prominent philosophers around the time of the 
Enlightenment. It also observes that identification with others in community may 
have been inadvertently overridden by the idea of a self-legislating individual.  
 The chapter noted that the exclusivity of concepts such as dignity that ground 
the centrality of the human individual in human rights are contested in literature and 
case law, but that the human individual remains a central concern of both 
international and European human rights provisions. In particular, the chapter has 
drawn attention to the importance of human autonomy in the creation of a very 
broad, paramount human right to free conscience, under which cases representing 
the moral imperative to attend to nonhuman animal suffering are presented. 
 On the above observations, the Article 9 claims of vegans that present the 
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moral standing and suffering of nonhumans cannot be litigated or adjudicated in 
terms of nonhuman suffering or socially valued compassion. The longstanding history 
of a theory of human autonomy and its foundational justifications are deeply 
entrenched, as evidenced in literature and case law. But the observation of an 
interface of human and nonhuman moral standing, as acknowledged in H v UK319 and 
the other cases discussed, demands an analysis of law and legal process so far not 
undertaken. In this regard, the following chapter will examine the utility of 
Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of alterity as a new approach to thinking about ethical 
responsibility to nonhuman animals and their suffering in relation to human rights.  
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Chapter 4  
Can human rights be grounded by ethical responsibility to suffering? 
Introduction 
The thesis has so far observed that the idea of autonomy grounds the human 
rights claims of vegans, and that veganism re-presents the moral standing of 
nonhumans and their suffering. This chapter examines Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity and his argument that ethical responsibility in the face of vulnerability is an 
inescapable, innate characteristic of humanity. It explains the essential elements of 
Levinas’ thesis, his thoughts on the existence of human rights, and how his 
philosophical theory inspires a branch of critical human rights theory that promotes 
the amelioration of suffering as the mission of a protective rights enterprise.  
This critical discourse, categorised as ‘protest scholarship’,320 develops an 
ethics of alterity for human rights. It argues that the essence of humanity is a desire 
to consider others in community and that this idea of human nature should orient 
the ethics of human rights. The chapter explains that Levinas’ philosophy grounds a 
reorientation of the ethics of human rights because it promotes a human identity of 
innate responsibility, compassion and kindness to others in opposition to the 
orthodoxy of autonomy and its focus on rights for individual subjects.  
The purposes of assessing this philosophy and critical human rights literature 
are: to ascertain the principles upon which human identity is argued to be inherently 
compassionate to others, to identify how this philosophy is utilised to explain the 
ethics of human rights, and to discover the extent to which it includes or considers 
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the suffering of nonhumans (thus determining its utility for the claims of vegans).  
The chapter observes that critical human rights scholars identify, in Levinas’ 
thesis, a non-abstract, relational ethical event that can ground a concept of human 
rights. It explains how this is applied in current scholarship to reorient the idea of 
human rights away from the rights of individuals and towards a system which 
honours an a priori natural right of the other. The chapter finds that Levinas’ ethics 
of alterity successfully ground responsibility and duty to others, but that current 
discourse excludes consideration of nonhuman others. As such, a further finding is 
that current discourse has significant developmental potential to accommodate the 
claims of vegans for the moral standing of nonhuman others. These findings inspire 
an alternative understanding of claims of conscience arising from the moral 
imperative to provide for suffering animals.  
4.1 Argument so far 
 So far, the argument presented cites veganism as expressing a moral 
imperative of ethical responsibility to nonhumans. The suffering of nonhumans that 
is presented by vegans cannot be accommodated within the current formulation of 
human rights due to three factors. Firstly, exclusive human rights manifest prejudice 
towards nonhumans. Secondly, protection for the right to live according to 
conscience concerns the primacy of individual moral orientation. Thirdly, some 
principles of human rights – such as the orthodoxy of autonomy and the false 
assumption of neutrality in the application of legitimate aim and proportionality – 
will always function to disadvantage vegans in their presentation of suffering 
animals. On the basis of these obstacles, the previous chapter concluded that it is 
necessary to ascertain if there is another way to think about the foundation of 
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human rights in order to better accommodate the claims of vegans and the moral 
imperative to attend to suffering nonhuman animals. 
This chapter firstly gives some background information on protest scholarship 
before examining Levinas’ ethics of alterity, his justification for natural rights, and the 
way his theory has been utilised and developed by critical human rights scholars.  
4.2 Background  
The body of critical human rights scholarship that centres on duty and the 
suffering of others has been categorised and defined by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour 
as the ‘protest school’ of human rights.321 Dembour observes that in this school of 
thought, human rights are ‘first and foremost a language of protest’.322 She notes 
that protest scholars are motivated by Emmanuel Levinas because they identify with 
feeling ‘summoned by the suffering of the other’.323  
Protest scholars believe that humans desire to live in community and that 
there is a social bond that is created by an acknowledgment of universal mutual 
suffering. On this basis, they firmly believe that ‘human rights (a) are moral, (b) must 
be raised when they are not socially recognised, and (c) should concern every human 
being, especially those who are ‘forgotten’’.324 The importance of the work of Levinas 
to human rights scholars is that the ethics of alterity is not an abstract theory. 
Levinas claims that since ethics arise in encounters with others, they arise in concrete 
situations. As such, critical human rights scholars believe in the utility of otherness as 
a practical principle for enhanced social justice.325 
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Dembour cites Upendra Baxi and Costas Douzinas as two human rights 
activists whose work can be described as protest scholarship. In addition, the later 
work of William Paul Simmons can also be situated within the protest school of 
human rights on the basis that it emphasises that human rights should pertain to the 
amelioration of suffering.326 His work also looks to Levinas’ ethics of alterity to 
ground fundamental rights for the specific purpose of giving a voice to those most 
forgotten. 
The critique of human rights presented by these authors is based on the 
observation that human rights abuses are prevalent across the globe, and that 
despite many decades of the existence of the UDHR, suffering is widespread and 
immense. Their analytical approach is holistic, involving an assessment of human 
rights which encompasses practical utility, ontological assumptions, and congruence 
with emancipation. They conclude that the idea of human rights is a powerful and 
necessary concept to alleviate suffering, but that current thinking and practice are 
misguided because they focus on individuality rather than duty to others.  
Protest scholarship demands that the suffering of others be addressed as a 
paramount concern of human rights, that otherness becomes implemented as a 
transcendental ethical principle for justice, and that human rights education should 
be reformed in line with Levinas’ ethics of alterity and his notion of ethical humanity.  
The remainder of this chapter explores Levinas’ philosophy before reviewing 
in more detail how his work is applied by the specified human rights scholars. 
4.3 Levinas’ philosophy on the ethics of alterity 
The branch of philosophy known as the ethics of alterity is principally 
                                                     
326
 Simmons (2014). 
 120 
 
associated with Lithuanian philosopher and theologian Emmanuel Levinas.327 
Levinas’ thesis on the ethics of alterity is a philosophy that rejects immanent, 
autonomous reason as the essence of ethical human identity.328 Levinas’ 
contribution to philosophical enquiry can be considered Continental or modern 
European, in that it considers ethical responsibility and socio-political issues.329 The 
work of Levinas was developed following his thoughts on and analysis of the works of 
Husserl and Heidegger.330 Levinas’ work has been categorised as phenomenology, a 
branch of philosophical enquiry which predominantly concerns the way in which a 
subject experiences and makes sense of their surrounding world.331  Levinas is said to 
be one of ‘the most profound, exacting and original thinkers of twentieth-century 
Europe’,332 who has ‘changed the course of contemporary philosophy’,333 with a 
philosophy that ‘enjoys unprecedented popularity’.334  
Levinas considers the essence of human identity and humanity, and the 
extent to which individuals are free, autonomous, atomistic subjects. Advocating the 
possibility of human identity being constructed by external events of relationality, 
Levinas departs from mainstream phenomenological theory that explains human 
identity in terms of the autonomous, self-made meaning of individuals who exist in 
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constant conflict with each other. Levinas argues that rather than interpreting events 
and making meaning for oneself, meaning is made through relational encounters 
with ‘the other’.335 For Levinas, it is relational encounters that produce ethics. He 
argues that the other dissolves the autonomous spontaneity of the subject. Levinas 
explains that ‘[w]e name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence 
of the Other ethics’.336  
As a philosophy of the ‘humanism of the other’,337 Levinas explains how the 
moral priority of the other takes precedence over an individual ego being-for-itself. 
This is the foundation of Levinas’ theory on the ethics of alterity: ethics arise through 
relational encounters with different others who disrupt the will of the subject’s ego. 
This is Levinas’ entire philosophy.338 
Levinas blames the history of Western philosophy for the creation of an 
oppressive totality of reason. He believes that the assumed supremacy of human 
reason has denied individuals their uniqueness and suppressed the innate human 
desire for dutiful relationships. He argues that this philosophical tradition and its 
focus on human reason have constructed an unethical totality of oppressive 
sameness rather than giving expression to innate otherness.339 What Levinas means 
is that, in the orthodoxy of autonomy, others are assumed to be the same as the 
observer and assumed to experience the world in the same way. In this totality of 
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reason, Levinas also highlights that the uniqueness and individuality of others are 
also reduced by oppressive themes and categories created by reason. For Levinas, 
this system of social relations, as organised on the basis of the primacy of reason, 
only encourages disharmonious relations.340 
The theory of an ethics of alterity challenges this dominant Western 
philosophical tradition of the primacy of human reason. It replaces the idea of reason 
being the basis for a homogeneous human identity with a vision of a heterogeneous 
community of unique individuals who experience, first and foremost, responsibility 
to others. In this theory, reason is important, but a posteriori to a naturally occurring 
event that creates humans as ethical. Thus, human Becoming, as explained by the 
principle of autonomous reason, is challenged by an alternative idea that explains 
Becoming in the context of relational responsibility. This idea can be described as a 
theory about an external phenomenological341 process of ethical subjectivity that is 
facilitated by interconnected, social beings.  
4.4 A brief note about reading Levinas 
Reading Levinas presents certain difficulties for understanding. For example, 
in translation from French to English, word substitutions justified by translators may 
not represent the true and accurate meaning of the writer.342 In addition, Levinas 
uses a profoundly complex style of writing. There are also problems associated with a 
reader’s unfamiliarity with Levinas’ use of concepts and with his ideas, which 
originate from intensely deep philosophical thinking combined with creativity – and 
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from his fusion of philosophy with theology.343 Levinas aims to develop an 
eschatological344 philosophy of human ‘being’ or human identity. His aim is to explain 
the positive destiny of humankind in order to find a way to give hope following the 
atrocities of two world wars and the barbaric and pessimistic acts of humankind.  
A significant difficulty is grasping Levinas’ notion of responsibility. Though the 
subject is responsible to the other, responsibility is infinite because it is a 
responsibility owed to all others. As such, it cannot be fulfilled because there are 
many others. Richard Kearny observes that ‘[w]e are all responsible for everyone else 
– but I am more responsible than all the others’.345 He notes that ‘not only am I more 
responsible than the other but I am even more responsible for everyone else’s 
responsibility!’.346 Colin Davis suggests that although readers may think they 
understand the written text, there may still be a problem with getting the point, that 
Levinas leaves too many questions unanswered and that his ideas are unclear.347 Baxi 
has suggested that reading Levinas ‘requires enormous exegetical labours; the dense 
intertexuality of his corpus remains forbidding, even for the cognoscenti…’.348 This 
reputation for complexity is largely responsible for scholarly avoidance, but Levinas’ 
philosophy is as thought-provoking as it is demanding. Though it has a limited 
presence in critical human rights discourse, it certainly deserves much more 
consideration.  
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4.5 The essence of the ethics of alterity 
For Levinas, the ethics of alterity are the first philosophy; the unique other is 
always and already present and acknowledged before being assessed and articulated 
through the reason of the subject. The other emits a non-semantic ‘saying’ that 
signifies and expresses their presence.349 The other metaphorically speaks to the 
subject with questions that demand a response. The other says ‘you have entered 
my world. Here I am. It is me in my world. I am subject to the forces of mortality. I 
am vulnerable and precarious’, and asks ‘how will you respond?’.350 As such, 
apprehension of the unique other precedes reason. In the totality of reason, this 
‘saying’ is reduced by ‘said’ oppressive themes and categories that create 
subservience, imperialism, domination, hierarchy and discrimination. In this system, 
the unique other is apprehended but reduced by the oppressive categorisation of the 
self on its own terms through reason. To address this problem, Levinas promotes the 
ethics of alterity as requiring ‘[a]n openness of the self to the other, which is not a 
conditioning or a foundation of oneself in some principle…’.351 This openness will 
create a more dutiful, compassionate and ethical humanity that honours innate 
responsibility. 
Levinas explains that innate responsibility is experienced in encounters with 
others, who demand a response from the subject. The subject is, thus, made 
responsible and is forced to respond to this responsibility. Responsibility to the other 
precedes all else. It is ethics itself because it is the force and the experience that 
creates ethical humanity and defines human identity. Levinas states: ‘The fact that in 
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existing for another I exist otherwise than in existing for me is morality itself’.352 
What Levinas means by this is that the self is primarily constructed by the existence 
of others who always require a response prior to reasoning. This idea is in stark 
contrast to that which explains that the essence of human identity is the ability to 
reason and that immanence is the source of ethics. 
Levinas’ thesis is grounded by the idea that human ethics are produced in the 
context of relational encounters within a community rather than in the context of 
individuality. To understand this idea, the following section will explain in some 
detail the essential elements of Levinas’ ethics of alterity. These elements are 
Levinas’ views on the essence of humanity and the innate characteristics of human 
identity. 
4.6 The ethics of alterity and the essence of humanity 
For Levinas, humanity manifests an important pre-social condition of human 
existence. This is the natural human tendency to live in community. Levinas observes 
that humans have an innate sociability and need to exist with each other 
cooperatively. He observes that humanity is composed of intertwined, interacting 
others who have a strong sense of duty towards each other.353 In addition, each 
individual is ‘absolutely dissimilar’, possessing an identity that is ‘non-
interchangeable, incomparable and unique’.354  
Levinas argues that humanity is the result of a break with the bare, biological 
being of nonhuman animals in the natural world. The social system of humanity is a 
natural formation that stems from subjects apprehending and responding ethically to 
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multiple others. For Levinas, this is evidence that humanity is not grounded in 
autonomous existence. Only nonhuman animals of the natural world need autonomy 
to fight in a world of struggle and fear, where the self exists for the self.355 Instead, 
humanity is grounded in a compassionate a priori responsibility to others. The break 
with the natural order is caused by the subject recognising and acknowledging the 
existence, suffering and needs of different others, to whom they are obligated and 
have no choice but to respond. This encounter constitutes the moment of ethical 
transformation from what is considered basic, instinctive animality into humanity. It 
is in the ‘breaking with this biological order of being that ethics and ‘the human’ 
arise. Thus, the human and ethics are something like miracles…’.356 These conditions 
of humanity arise from Levinas’ notion of individual human identity. 
4.7 The ethics of alterity and human identity  
 Levinas argues that individuals are unique. In his view, the ‘inner world’ of 
others cannot be known by the subject. Being composed of absolutely dissimilar 
beings that are incomparable and non-interchangeable, humanity represents much 
more than a ‘common species’.357  
 Human beings are mortal subjects at the mercy of the life process and are, 
essentially, vulnerable and weak.  This universally shared characteristic is recognised 
and is the reason for innate kindness and compassion offered for suffering others. 
The subject recognises suffering in others and, at the same time, cannot know how 
that suffering is experienced. Identifying shared mortality, but not understanding or 
knowing how the other experiences their world, the subject instinctively shows 
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compassion and regard. 
 In Levinas’ theory, then, human beings have four essential characteristics that 
are denied in the totality of reason. Firstly, they are unique individuals. Secondly, 
they are conjoined by a pre-social sociability. This means that they are born with a 
predisposition to desire community. Thirdly, they have an innate ability to create 
responsibility and generate compassionate from them. Finally, they possess an 
innate capacity to respond compassionately.  
 In Levinas’ ethics of alterity, the pre-social interconnection of individuals is 
ipso facto ethical association. It manifests what Levinas calls ‘responsi-bility’.358 It is 
evidenced by the way a subject responds to the other. This responsibility elicits 
compassion, sentiment and duty, and is the essence of ethics. Though the encounter 
in which ethics is produced concerns a subject and another, the ethical event is an 
asymmetrical responsibility to the other. Levinas describes this event as an event of 
transcendence in ‘[l]e visage d'autrui’: transcendence in ‘the face of the other’.359 
 That ethics emerge in the face of the other is a paramount element of 
Levinas’ ethics of alterity. Levinas explains that ‘le visage’ – ’the face’ – is the 
expressive presence of the other that elicits a response from the subject. The face, as 
the facilitating mechanism in the production of ethics, will now be explored in more 
detail. 
4.8 The face and the production of ethics 
 Levinas describes the concrete experience that is the basis for ethical 
humanity. It is an event in which the subject becomes ethically engaged in an 
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encounter with the face of the other. The face is encountered in a transcendence of 
the self. It halts the spontaneous ego of the subject’s self. Levinas explains that ‘[t]he 
way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we 
here name face’.360 It is in the face-to-face encounter that an individual becomes 
aware of the infinite nature of the other, their mutual vulnerability and the 
obligation to respond to infinite responsibility.  
Levinas refers to the face not merely as a physical object, but as the most 
significant representation of the other’s presence and expression. The other is not 
reducible to the physical face, its features or expressions. The face does not 
represent the other in its entirety because one can never grasp the other through 
exposure to the face. The other is individual and cannot be conceptualised. The other 
is infinite, but the face represents the first encounter with the living presence. It is an 
epiphany: ‘[t]here is a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master 
spoke to me’.361 ‘The face is a living presence; it is expression…’. It ‘speaks’ and ‘is 
already discourse’.362  
The encounter with the face is, thus, much more than a vision of the physical 
features of another.363 It does not appear to the subject, and the face cannot be 
seen. The face – that is, the Levinasian face – is not to be confused with the 
observation of the object that is a physical face. Levinas instructs: ‘[t]he best way of 
encountering the Other is not even to notice the colour of his eyes! When one 
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observes the colour of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other’.364 He 
explains that ‘the whole body – a hand or a curve of the shoulder – can express as 
the face’.365  
Through the face, the other signifies ‘exceptional presence’366 that transcends 
autonomy, themes, categories and all ontology. It is this presence that ‘speaks to 
me’. 367 ‘[I]n its mortality… the face before me summons me, calls me, begs for me… 
and calls me into question’.368 The face signifies the presence of the other, 
commands responsibility and expresses the first word and the commandment ‘thou 
shalt not kill’.369  
The face-to-face encounter is, thus, an event in which the subject experiences 
an infinite, unknowable presence; the signification of a mortal, vulnerable other; and 
a profound responsibility for the other that ‘pre-exists any self-consciousness’.370  
Levinas defines the other as a mortal subject at the mercy of the life process, 
capable of metaphorically ‘speaking’ of vulnerability and weakness. He presents the 
other’s ‘extreme precariousness’:371 an expression that communicates the 
vulnerability and mortality of another, who automatically, without effort or 
intention, takes a subject hostage and asks for a response. In reply (recognising 
universally shared mortality, shared suffering and vulnerability), the subject (being 
naturally predisposed to care and compassion), welcomes the unique other. This 
welcome is ethics itself. The presence of the mortal, vulnerable other overrides the 
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ego of the subject with what Judith Butler refers to as ‘the wordless vocalization of 
suffering…’.372 The encounter is, and induces, ethics because it disrupts the selfish 
ego, creating responsi-bility.  
In the face of the other, the individual, thus, undergoes a transformation 
from animal to ethical and from autonomous to heteronomous. Experiencing the 
face of the other is a concrete ethical experience and constitutes an ethical relation 
which dissolves the ego and from which one cannot be released. ‘The other concerns 
me in all his material misery’, Levinas wrote.373 ‘[I]t is impossible for me to free 
myself by saying, “It’s not my concern”. There is no choice, for it is always and 
inescapably my concern. This is a unique “no choice”, one that is not slavery’.374 
Levinas makes it clear that sentiment and compassion for others are paramount in 
ethics and evident in the original encounter. On this basis, Levinas regards suffering, 
vulnerability, caring and compassion as essential human attributes, inherent to 
ethics. Human identity is that which is predisposed to welcome the vulnerable other 
in all their difference. To be human, on this view, is to be responsible; and to be 
responsible is to be ethical. 
The production of ethics, thus, depends on a face-to-face relationship 
between the subject and the infinite other, who cannot be known. This encounter of 
close proximity also creates in the subject an awareness of additional dimensions of 
responsibility. This is the infinity of ethical responsibility, which will now be 
explained. 
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4.9 The infinity of ethical responsibility 
 Ethics are a result of demands made by others in close proximity. In 
this proximity, Levinas argues that individuals become aware of the potential 
demands of multiple others. He states that ‘[t]he third party looks at me in the eyes 
of the Other’. The other in immediate proximity, thus, indicates and serves all the 
others and alerts the subject to infinity of responsibility. Levinas remarks that ‘[t]he 
face in its nakedness as a face presents to me the destitution of the poor one and the 
stranger’, and ‘[t]he presence of the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, 
a presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity which looks at us)’.375  
Thus, an event of facing in close proximity is an event of facing not only the infinity of 
the unknowable other, but the infinity of responsibility for all others and the infinity 
of the ethical demand. On this basis, Levinas believes that responsible and dutiful 
people not only act ethically in relational encounters, but think ethically, knowing 
that there are always others to whom they owe the same ethical duty of 
responsibility. 
4.10 Levinas’ thoughts on human rights  
Levinas maintains that the natural right of man is the original, a priori fact of 
the uniqueness or the absolute of the person.376 Human rights express the 
uniqueness and incomparable nature of each individual human being and the other’s 
right to this status. For Levinas, human rights are the measure of all law and its 
ethics. Levinas believes his philosophy to be inclusive because it aims to 
accommodate profound difference. 
Levinas believes that the right to life, identity and equality are natural rights. 
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They are a priori: ‘independent of any power…’ or of individual merit. As such, 
human rights cannot be conferred. The very fact that human rights exist already 
acknowledges a pre-social interconnection in which the subject is aware of and 
responsive to the other.  
Regarding the development and implementation of a universalised system of 
legal justice, Levinas raises an important question which is answered by his ethics of 
alterity: 
Legal justice is required. There is need for a state. But it is 
very important to know whether the state, society, law and 
power are required because man is a beast to his neighbour 
or because I am responsible for my fellow. It is important to 
know whether the political order defines man’s responsibility 
or merely restricts his bestiality.377  
 
In terms of legal justice, Levinas suggests that the origin of the rule of law is 
not to permit individual egos to fight for individualised rights against one another. 
Rather, a ‘different ‘authority’’ from that established in the totality of reason is 
required.378 This is the higher authority that recognises compassionate goodness as a 
normative social principle. It is ‘the first language’, and it will reflect the pre-social a 
priori concern for the unique, absolutely different other, who is acknowledged in the 
face-to-face relation where, in the face of suffering, one is for the other.379 
The required conditions for practical rights are those that will emerge when 
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humanity has assumed the first right of absolute difference.380 This first right 
requires the ‘I’ to be freed from returning to the self. It requires the subject to regard 
the other; not simply to be aware of the other, but to Become in connection with the 
other. It is a relationship in which being concerned for the other – welcoming and 
caring for the other – is to facilitate one’s own ethical being. These conditions 
represent the prior peace of a higher authority in which goodness is the first 
language of freedom.381 Levinas insists that these conditions ground natural law and 
practical human rights. In a human rights based on the non-metaphysical face-to-
face relation, one and the other are responsible, endowed with duty and absolved in 
a peaceful unity with infinity.  
In Levinas’ system of human rights, one regards the other from the position 
of unity. It is a unity with infinite responsibility, as experienced through encounters 
with the face. In this system, the ‘I’ frees itself from the ego, ‘answers for the other’ 
and does not return to self.382 It is a process of natural justice which, for Levinas, also 
recognises responsibility as the ‘original goodness in which freedom is embedded’.383 
It is a way of relating in which non-indifference to the other represents a paramount 
aspect of human identity. It inspires and facilitates infinite responsibility. This is a 
liberating ‘freedom in fraternity, in which the responsibility of one-for-the-other is 
affirmed, and through which the rights of man manifest themselves concretely to 
consciousness as the right of the other, for which I am answerable’.384 On this view, 
each-for-all, rather than one-for-self, is the ethical becoming of humanity, the 
foundation of basic, moral rights and the principle to be established in the operation 
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of practical human rights.  
4.11 Responsibility in the face of difference 
Levinas’ ethics of alterity is a complex and provocative theory, which opposes 
the established orthodoxy of autonomy and the primacy of human reason. It offers 
an explanation of the essence of humanity and human identity. At the heart of this 
philosophy is the notion that human beings become ethical in encounters with 
others because being in the presence of another invokes the infinite question of 
‘what to do next’. It configures human identity as heterogeneous385 and 
heteronomous,386 and explains relational and infinite ethical responsibility.  
Despite developing an ethical theory of otherness in which duties to others 
are paramount and infinite, Levinas did not develop a comprehensive thesis or 
attempt a diligent application of his ethics of alterity to human rights. His notion of 
the legitimacy of fundamental rights is, though, very clear. There exists an original 
right. It is an original right that is pre-social, grounds the very notion of rights and has 
grounded this notion since the inception of time. It is the right to be recognised as 
different. 
Levinas’ thoughts on justice and human rights are, thus, not comprehensive. 
Though he does explain how they should be grounded by the principle of otherness, 
they do not indicate a set of normative principles that can be used to configure 
current human rights. What he does say is that human rights represent the fact of a 
priori sociability and original responsibility. He also maintains that this notion of 
human rights espouses a liberating principle, in which the subject can be released 
from the constraints of the totality of reason to live according to a true, innate 




 Subject to external influences that explain human Becoming and define identity. 
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characteristic of ethical responsibility for others.  
On the principles of Levinas’ philosophy, critical human rights scholars 
propose the ethics of alterity as a model for the existence and operation of human 
rights. Of particular significance is that Levinas’ theory promotes the a priori nature 
of human sociality and responsibility as indicative of an innate desire to respond to 
and accommodate difference, live in community and extend compassion to others. 
This critical discourse will now be considered in order to identify how Levinas’ 
philosophy is applied as the foundation of justice, to identify the scope for the 
inclusion of nonhumans and to ascertain its value to the vegan community. 
4.12 The application of the ethics of alterity in protest scholarship 
 The critical human rights scholarship that observes the utility of Levinas’ 
theory has been loosely categorised by Marie-Bénédicte Dembour as protest 
scholarship. In the application of Levinas’ ethics of alterity to human rights, protest 
scholarship develops an ethics of alterity for human rights, arguing that the existence 
of human rights recognises pre-social responsibility but entrenches a Western 
philosophical focus on individuality and the primacy of reason. As such, it is argued 
that it has become a system that falsely represents the individual and humanity.  
 The value of the ethics of alterity to protest scholarship is that they facilitate 
the practical opportunity to entrench and act out the primary condition of ethical 
responsibility. This primary condition of responsibility in the presence of others is 
also observed as human liberation because it facilitates human freedom. It facilitates 
intertwined Becoming in a community of others who embrace and deploy the innate 
characteristic of compassion for others.  
 To transform the unethical totality of reason and reclaim humanity, protest 
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scholarship aims to locate the encounter with the face of another as the non-
abstract, concrete ethical principle capable of rupturing the assumed immanence of 
ethics. Scholars want the primacy of reason to be replaced with the ethics of alterity 
and for relational encounters to be acknowledged as transcendent. In this paradigm 
for social relations, the absolute, inescapable, infinite duty to the other breaches the 
imposed order of unethical totality, and humanity realises its ethical destiny: to be 
primarily welcoming, caring and responsible for others, with the support of social 
institutions.387  
The following sections examine the utility of Levinas’ theory for realist 
Upendra Baxi, postmodernist Costas Douzinas and deconstructionist William Paul 
Simmons. These scholars are motivated by the work of Emmanuel Levinas in their 
search for guiding ethical principles for the existence and operation of human rights. 
Of particular significance will be how these authors interpret Levinas’ philosophy, 
and whether they develop specific normative principles for the practice of a suffering 
narrative of human rights that may offer assistance to vegans in their claims for 
nonhuman others. 
4.13 Upendra Baxi 
Suffering is central to Upendra Baxi’s understanding of human rights. He 
agrees with Klaus Gunther that ‘human rights are best understood as the result of 
the process of the loss and recovery of voice with regard to negative experiences like 
pain, fear, and suffering’.388 For Baxi, this should be the context for discourse. 
Baxi makes a distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘contemporary’ human rights. 
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He rejects the legitimacy of modern human rights that emerged from the 
Enlightenment. He claims that the definition of man as possessing reason and 
autonomous will was a powerful ‘peculiar ontological construction’ that excluded 
vast numbers of human beings.389 He argues that the emphasis on rationality was the 
‘justification of the unjustifiable: namely colonialism and imperialism’.390 For Baxi, 
the primacy of individual reason produced an ideology in which hierarchy could be 
used by the superior as an evil weapon to dominate the inferior: modern human 
rights encouraged oppression and suffering. 
Baxi puts forward the view that contemporary human rights emerged from a 
context of violence and that it is ‘axiomatic that the historic mission of contemporary 
human rights is to give voice to human suffering, to make it visible, and to ameliorate 
it’.391 He points out that human rights cannot function effectively and efficiently 
without sentiment or proper, compassionate consideration for others. For this 
reason, compassionate listening and hearing the voice of the other – to the extent 
that one is able to imagine with genuine concern the other’s lived reality in 
empathetic role reversal – is a crucial and basic requirement. Baxi urges humanity to 
adopt this process and listen patiently to suffering others: ‘[t]o give language to pain, 
to experience the pain of the Other inside you, remains the task, always, of the 
human rights narratology’.392 On this view, otherness is a core value in the ethics of 
human rights that ‘seems to command consensus’.393  
For Baxi, contemporary human rights are the mechanism through which 
humanity has formalised the fundamental, universal moral value of empathy and 
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compassion for the other in its endeavour to alleviate suffering. Regarding the 
meaning of otherness, Baxi concurs with Levinas: otherness is that which is 
absolutely different.394  
Baxi also draws on a point made by Levinas when he reiterates the 
importance of acknowledging that difference is the fundamental ethic of a project to 
furnish those who suffer with protective rights.395 When Levinas’ ethics of alterity is 
introduced into human rights, the point must be made that Levinas believed that 
rights are required to protect each individual in their difference as ‘absolutely 
dissimilar’ and possessing an identity that is ‘non-interchangeable, incomparable and 
unique’.396 Baxi applies this sentiment to human rights, upholding them as 
representing recognition, respect and protection of difference – not as entitlements 
for homogenising sameness.  
Baxi does not move beyond general terms about the importance of the ethics 
of alterity for human rights. Whilst grounding his ethics generally in Levinas’ 
philosophy, there is no attempt to translate Levinasian ethics of alterity into a 
workable political principle for social justice. He notes that scholarly work on legal 
theory and practice suffers a paucity of analysis from a Levinasian perspective, 397 but 
that the philosophy of Levinas is complex and that there is potential for ‘vulgar 
Levinasian’ theorising.398 Baxi himself, perhaps on this basis, does not develop his 
theory of human rights in the context of a deep analytical approach to Levinas, but 
does ground his thesis on the moral obligation to respond to human suffering.  
Baxi has faith in the human rights project. He believes it to be a culture of 
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cultures. By embracing plurality, human rights are dynamic and able to constitute 
new contexts as they evolve to eradicate all oppression. Further, he emphasises that 
what human rights can be – in the context of its dynamic nature and its ability to 
exist in new and unimagined paradigms – remains to be seen. 
Baxi urges a reform of human rights education as a ‘first step’ in 
implementing otherness in human rights.399 This reinvigorated human rights 
education would promote uniqueness rather than reduce human diversity to a 
‘common essence’. As such, it would advocate entrenching the ethics of alterity in a 
human ‘right to be different’.400 
In The Future of Human Rights, Baxi states a belief that the mission of human 
rights is threatened by a discourse that creates hierarchy and excludes marginalised 
voices. He observes the ‘ever new bases for reconceptualising human rights as 
ethical imperatives’401 but is similarly critical of some human rights discourse and 
activism. Baxi observes that animal rights activism expands human rights activism, 
but he also identifies an evangelicalism and romanticism in human rights that may 
verge on fanaticism and over-optimism. Nevertheless, noting the reality of pain and 
suffering, Baxi believes that the language of human rights should not disguise 
suffering and oppression and that human rights activism should target structural 
oppressive forces.  
Baxi identifies the endlessly inclusive potential of what he refers to as the 
contemporary human rights paradigm, and, in later work, seriously reflects on the 
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challenge of posthuman theory,402 noting the ‘immense significance’ for re-thinking 
human rights in terms of what Donna Haraway refers to as our ‘constitutive 
partners’.403 Baxi expresses support for a discourse that includes nonhuman others 
and understands that it ‘invites re-thinking human agency and responsibility (as well 
as human rights languages and logics) in a new key’.404 
Baxi remains a realist. Whilst he accepts the value of a variety of posthuman 
contributions for the invigoration of human rights discourse, suffering and 
emancipation remain central to his thinking. He believes in the possibility of 
structural forces of oppression405 and ‘above all’ in the right to interpret human 
rights.406 These sentiments express otherness and a commitment to emancipation 
from suffering, and it is within this context that Baxi can be regarded as being 
supportive of a discourse that identifies nonhuman suffering to be within the scope 
of a politics of and for human rights.407 
4.14 Costas Douzinas  
Douzinas is very negative about current human rights, but believes that 
Levinas’ philosophy may offer a postmodern principle of justice to save them from 
complete failure.408 Applying directly, and in more detail, the philosophy of 
Emmanuel Levinas, Douzinas emphasises that the existence of human rights both 
recognises and represents the a priori nature of obligation to the other. Stating that 
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human rights concretise duty and the rights of the other person, Douzinas claims that 
human rights are ‘the instruments of ethics’.409 Rights, he asserts, ‘are a formal 
recognition of the fact that before my (legal) subjectivity always and already has 
come another’.410  
Douzinas, thus, concurs with Levinas and believes that human rights are pre-
social. They ‘exist a priori, independently of any legislative conferred or state 
authorisation because the other is a priority… ’.411 As such, Douzinas regards the 
ethics of alterity to be the foundational principle of natural human rights. He believes 
that ‘[a]ll humanity and every right proceed from this primacy of ethics of being and 
of obligation over need or interest’.412 Douzinas believes that Levinas’ philosophy has 
‘changed the ontological, epistemological and moral assumptions of modernity’, and 
that human rights would benefit enormously from incorporating and promoting, 
specifically, Levinasian ethics of alterity.413 
For Douzinas, the obligation of human rights is to attend to suffering, 
empower oppressed victims and generally recognise and give priority consideration 
to unique, singular others. Douzinas identifies human rights, as did Levinas, as 
serving egoistic, same-for-self ideology rather than providing a means to eliminate 
suffering. For Douzinas, current human rights function as a mechanism of personal 
and social delusion because they encourage same-for-self claim rights and have 
resulted in atomistic human egos that are antithetical to the creation of a community 
of humanity. Douzinas argues that human rights have been derailed from their 
original purpose of entrenching responsibility and duty as primary principles upon 
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which others would be protected from domination and oppression. He claims that 
rights (unfortunately) now only give legitimacy to same-for-self morality, rather than 
facilitate or promote compassionate duty to others.414  
Douzinas argues that human rights ought to transcend the subject and 
reclaim their purpose as functional in a community of ‘unique others’.415 In 
consideration of one’s absolute duty to the other, Douzinas asserts that ‘before my 
right and before my identity as organised by rights, comes my obligation, my radical 
turn towards the claim to respect the dignity of the other’. Since rights have meaning 
only in relation to others whose rights are established a priori to mine, then ‘the right 
of the other always and already precedes mine’.416  
Douzinas agrees that the other generates an ‘ethical imperative’417 that 
motivates the self to action. The self becomes the agent of the other. Rather than 
autonomy forming the categorical imperative, the moral will is instead constituted, 
made available and made responsive only in the context of the ethical demand of the 
other. Thus, Douzinas concurs that the ego – the self – becomes ethically and 
morally empowered to access freedom through responsi-bility in the presence of the 
face of the other. This freedom espouses interconnection, community and 
compassionate relations. 
For Douzinas, a system of non-metaphysical human rights, imbued with the 
ethics of alterity, would entail a concept of humanity where the social bond is 
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changed ‘to the public recognition and protection of the becoming human with 
others…’.418 Douzinas explains that this would be a process of ‘righting’ which would 
‘open human identity to the new and unknown as a condition of its humanity’.419  
For Douzinas, ‘otherness is not just a moment in the dialectic of the same and 
the different, but the transcendence of the system’.420 In the absence of an ethics of 
alterity in human rights, they fail and perpetuate suffering because they contribute 
to a totalising system in which everyone is caught up in a totality that perpetuates 
self-delusion. Individuals are constructed to be isolated, autonomous beings with 
self-fulfilling endeavours to pursue. In this system, there is little scope for the 
development of a value for duties to others. Law assimilates each and the other into 
an objective totality421 by promoting an individualism that denies that we come ‘into 
existence in common with others, that we are all in community’.422  
Douzinas argues for a new non-metaphysical legal relation that does not 
depend on ‘the past or obedience to tradition’423 but on acceptance that selves 
flourish through relationships with others and that the essence of humanity is to be 
‘near Being and care for the human as well as the other entities in which Being 
discloses itself’.424 Such a new relation will utilise the benefits of relational ethics. He 
thus calls for an attack on the current defining concept of humanity to protect 
human beings and to facilitate a compassionate humanity which is yet to come.  
In Douzinas’ application of Levinas’ ethics of alterity, he argues that human 
rights will no longer function in the interests of the powerful at the expense of the 
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disempowered. In the radical, natural law of the ethics of alterity, the recognition of 
difference is paramount, and human rights will facilitate a ‘loving turn to the 
suffering and unique other that bestows on the individual her own singularity’.425  
Levinas’ ethics of alterity offers Douzinas a promising concept for a 
postmodern principle of justice.426 In this regard, he raises questions concerning who 
are legitimate others, owed duties and entitled to protective rights. Though Douzinas 
predominantly focuses his thesis on human others, he, nonetheless, advances the 
possibility for nonhuman otherness to feature in a suffering narrative of human 
rights by pointing out that: 
 
[t]he animal rights movement, from deep ecology and anti-
vivisection militancy to its gentler green versions, has placed 
the legal differentiation between human and animal firmly on 
the political agenda and has drafted a number of Bills of 
animal entitlements. Important philosophical and ontological 
questions are involved here... .427 
 
Douzinas identifies that in this postmodern principle of justice, the other can 
be ‘most strange and foreign’, ‘most alien’ and ‘incomparably unique’. It also entails 
a goodness that ‘does not exclude any other and does not try to impose the 
preference of the self upon the stranger’.428 It is a postmodern principle of justice 
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espousing a ‘radical sensitivity’ that can adapt to the ‘shifting boundaries of the 
social’ in relation to suffering.429 In Douzinas’ postmodern theory, the other is 
dynamic over time and space, but is, ultimately, always an entity that generates 
responsibility. 
Douzinas has illustrated how human rights can be grounded in suffering. In 
his thesis, a straightforward application of Levinas’ ethics of alterity offers a 
generalised principle of otherness upon which human rights could function. Douzinas 
does not attempt to develop a critical analysis of the limitations of the ethics of 
alterity, but he accepts the theory at face value as having a beneficial, emancipatory 
function for human rights.  
Douzinas applies the ethics of alterity to human rights according to his 
postmodern theoretical tendencies. He does not develop a discussion on the 
exclusion of nonhumans. This is surprising, given the opportunity within the 
postmodern tradition to deconstruct oppressive binaries. Nonetheless, his 
application of Levinas’ ethics of alterity, and the development of otherness as a 
postmodern principle of justice, implicitly and explicitly provoke debate about the 
exclusion of nonhumans.  
In his explanation of how suffering and the ethics of alterity could underpin 
human rights, Douzinas observes that they would reorient same-for-self claim rights. 
This is particularly revealing for the argument of this thesis, because the claims of 
vegans are not same-for-self. Unlike claims made by women, disabled people or 
same-sex couples, for example, the claims of vegans present a moral imperative to 
attend to the suffering of nonhuman others. In this regard, the legal recognition of 
                                                     
429
 Douzinas (2000) 355. 
 146 
 
veganism as the claims of those who seek to present the moral standing of 
nonhuman others alludes to the transcendental principle of justice he seeks. 
In explaining that human rights should serve a humanity whose essence is 
compassion, Douzinas identifies that the totality explained in Levinas’ philosophy 
includes an unjust administration of human rights that is entirely focused on 
individualism. In his application of the ethics of alterity, he envisages a process of 
‘righting’ that would construct a culture of becoming ethical in the context of co-
existing others. In the context of the observed problematic tradition of individualism 
that affects the claims of vegans, such a righting would pertain to a break of what he 
refers to as problematic past traditions – traditions on which the claims of those who 
represent animal suffering are assessed.  
Douzinas grounds human rights in suffering and applies the ethics of alterity 
to explain how human rights can function better. He explains that otherness will 
function as a positive postmodern principle of justice. In his vision, a protective rights 
enterprise would also care for an entity in which Being discloses itself. On this basis, 
the ethics of alterity, as a foundation for rights, have potential to include nonhuman 
animals.  
4.15 William Paul Simmons 
Simmons believes – as do Baxi and Douzinas – that the purpose of human 
rights is the alleviation of suffering and that human rights must prioritise the 
suffering other. He concurs with Baxi and Douzinas regarding the problems created 
by homogenising Western philosophy and its institutions. He singles out this specific 
characteristic of human rights as the most important to dismantle. What Simmons 
wants is for human rights to ‘create an anti-hegemonic discourse that will overturn 
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those invisible ideologies that undergird the system’.430  
Simmons is partly influenced by Derrida’s philosophy of human rights and the 
idea that they are founded on ‘an invisible ideology that conceals an original 
violence’.431 Simmons’ target is to highlight the ways in which homogeneity is 
entrenched in legal theory, process and practice, to apply the methods of 
postmodern deconstruction to identify oppressive relationships, and to develop a 
transformative, functional principle for a paradigm shift from entrenched 
homogeneity to a new system of law which is based on heteronomy. That principle is 
the Saturated Marginalised Other. 
Simmons cites Baxi as the authority for the importance of otherness in human 
rights. He agrees that appropriate human rights education is required and that a 
human rights of the other requires compassionate and patient listening to the voice 
of the suffering other. He does not discuss Douzinas’ view of human rights or 
Douzinas’ perspective on Levinas’ ethics of alterity. Adopting a more positive and 
optimistic view of human rights law than Douzinas, he agrees that human rights must 
be constantly deconstructed in the tradition of postmodernism, but notes that thus 
far, despite being exposed to Levinas’ ethics of alterity, postmodern thought has 
been unable to provide a concrete, universal principle for the just and ethical 
operation of human rights. Simmons develops the idea of the Saturated Marginalised 
Other as an exit route to current human rights limitations and conceptual difficulties 
in postmodern reasoning.  
In his endeavour to develop human rights, Simmons is attracted to Levinas’ 
ethics of alterity because it provides a non-abstract ethical theory from which a 
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political principle for heteronomy (and the subsequent inclusion of Marginalised 
Others) can be developed. Simmons retains the basis of Levinas’ ethics of alterity but 
explores the limitations of the original ethical theory in the context of a specific 
application of additional philosophy, political theory and literature in 
phenomenology. He firstly explains how human rights law, theory and practice 
marginalise and silence voiceless others before applying his principle to real human 
rights situations. In so doing, he illustrates the power of the concept of the Saturated 
Marginalised Other as a concrete universal principle to reinvigorate human rights 
and a transformational postmodern principle of justice. 
Simmons believes that homogeneity, as the original violence in human rights, 
‘cauterises’ the Marginalised Other.432 By this, he means that human rights are an 
institution which firstly, declares the other to be rightless; secondly, dismisses the 
voice of the other; and finally, powerfully portrays the voice of the other as 
unimportant, facilitating a functional dumbing-down of feelings associated with 
compassion for the other’s suffering.  
Whilst Simmons accepts that the transcendental experience of the face-to-
face relation is capable of grounding the call to question human rights and all 
typologies, he points out that Levinas’ original ethics are limited and constrained by a 
number of issues. Firstly, Simmons is critical of Levinas’ theological dimension.433 He 
points out that where deconstruction of human rights and all typologies relies on an 
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ethics of alterity that is created and sustained by God,434 God cannot be removed 
from ethics and, as such, cannot form the basis of either human rights or ethics, nor 
have any positive impact on the development of ethical politics. Secondly, Simmons 
draws attention to the equality of faces in Levinas’ theory. For Levinas, all faces 
generate an ethical response regardless of whose they are: the face of a cold-
blooded executioner and that of a homeless abused child equally call the observer to 
their duty to welcome and to protect. This is particularly limiting for Simmons 
because his objective is to secure an ethical principle to enhance the potential for 
emancipation of Marginalised Others. Simmons, therefore, adopts a 
phenomenological approach which allows him to establish a hierarchy of responses 
enabled by the face-to-face relation. 
Through the application of Dussel’s philosophy of otherness and the 
individualising phenomenology of Marion, Simmons is able to create a hierarchy of 
ethical responses by resituating the point at which the ethical transformation takes 
place. The phenomenology that appeals to Simmons locates and explains the ethical 
transformation more precisely in the observer, rather than as an inevitable, 
inescapable duty resulting from becoming a passive hostage through the Levinasian 
encounter with the face of the other. Whilst the face of the other still grounds the 
ethical transformation, the power producing the ethical response is subsequent to 
the overwhelmed ego of the observer: 
 
 The Saturated Other bedazzles the ego and 
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overwhelms the ontological categories that support it….The 
Other cannot be comprehended by the ego’s gaze, and when 
he or she draws near from outside the system, the ego’s 
entire frame of reference is shaken because such epiphanies 
“shake the very pillars of the system that exploits them”.435  
 
The experience of the face of the other remains solid, as in Levinas’ theory, 
and requires a positive response from the ego – but rather than being a result of an 
unknown hyper-presence related to theology, it is caused by ‘provocation from the 
person behind the ontological categories’. ‘The approach of the marginalised Other 
incessantly calls the ego and its system into question and thus calls the ego to a 
deeper or more saturated responsibility’.436 For Simmons, the Saturated Other 
presents the ego with information, more information and potentially a super-
abundance of information, and calls for an affirmative duty to distinguish between 
faces. It is upon this principle that he believes the injustice of current hegemonic 
human rights discourse can be shattered, giving way to a focus on bringing the 
marginalised to the centre. 
The deeply Saturated Other is the Marginalised Other who emerges from 
outside the hegemonic system, and it is this other to whom human rights owes the 
highest duty. This other – who transcends the system, its ontology and all typologies 
– must be given priority, because welcoming the other means not imposing existing, 
oppressive categories. Oppressed others ought not be ‘cauterised’: branded, 
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dismissed, ignored, silenced or required either to speak the language of the system – 
a system that by its nature excludes those who speak differently or, by extension, 
those who cannot speak the language of the system at all. Rather, a reversal of such 
cauterisation is the acknowledgement that the highest responsibility is owed to the 
Saturated Marginalised Other because there is clear transcendence of all categories 
and clear questions about the system. 
What Simmons wants is transcendence by those who suffer the most in the 
totality of the current exploitative system. He wants the other who saturates the ego 
of the subject with expressive presence to shake the foundations of human rights. 
Simmons recognises that the phenomenology of the Saturated Other must be 
universalised for it to be applicable to human rights. He firmly believes that it is the 
catalyst for the development of a new system of law based on a concrete universal 
principle that begins from the voice of the other. 
  Simmons considers neither the exclusion of nonhumans in human 
rights nor the situation of vegans. Despite a thought-provoking consideration of the 
existence and operation of human rights, conducted in the tradition of 
deconstruction, nonhumans are typically ignored. As such, his thesis raises additional 
questions about the notion of saturation, the idea of the original violence of human 
rights, and who, in the idea of human rights, is cauterised, ignored and dismissed. 
Nonetheless, Simmons explains how human rights can be more responsive to 
suffering by explaining how otherness, as a workable principle of justice, can be 
implemented. 
 
4.16 Analysis of protest scholarship 
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Protest scholarship rejects autonomous reason and focuses on the ethics of 
alterity as a compelling alternative philosophy for the ethical orientation of human 
rights. What is clear in the literature surveyed is the consensus that the ethical basis 
of human rights ought to emphasise the natural human predisposition to desire 
community, and it should recognise the significance of a cognitive and emotional 
interconnection with suffering others. Protest scholars believe that such a 
reorientation in the groundwork of human rights has significant potential. Baxi, 
particularly, notes the dynamic and evolving nature of human rights and the real 
possibility of such a transformation. Douzinas believes that a human rights of 
otherness is particularly important as a principle of justice for a critical postmodern 
era, and Simmons shows how the principle of otherness can work in practice to give 
a voice to seriously marginalised others.   
Building upon the idea of an innate desire for community underpinned by an 
appreciation of universal, unique suffering, protest scholars have, thus, explained 
how suffering and the ethics of alterity can justify protective rights. This discourse is 
not, however, one that includes nonhumans or considers the intertwined community 
of human and nonhumans. Despite this, Douzinas explicitly remarks that the animal 
rights movement has a legitimate and valid contribution to make to debates about 
the ontological foundations of exclusive human rights.  
What the protest school of human rights takes from Levinas is that suffering 
(and the human response to it) is a truism and that this is the non-abstract 
foundation of the ethics of alterity. A human rights which fails to accommodate this, 
as Douzinas argues, is denying humanity the opportunity to reach its full potential, 
because it creates the conditions in which egos become self-satisfying, atomistic and 
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ever more separated from their natural predisposition to live in community and 
extend compassion to others. 
The philosophy of ethics that protest scholarship advances is, thus, a theory 
of ethical subjectivity in which humanity is predisposed to a motivational force in the 
face of suffering. That force is responsibility, and it is generated by innate 
compassion. In other words, to be human is to be responsible and compassionate. 
On this view, responsibility and compassion are synonymous with humanity. This is 
true, whichever phenomenological theory one accepts. If the motivational force that 
moves one towards responsibility for the other – to welcome, to care, to empathise 
with the other – resides in the phenomenological, external realm (as in Levinas’ 
original ethics), one becomes compassionately engaged at the moment of the face-
to-face relation. If, as preferred by Simmons, the motivational force resides within 
the ego but is facilitated subsequent to the overwhelming category-denying, 
typology-denying phenomenological experience, then one is also moved to 
compassionate action at the same relational moment. On the basis of this notion of 
ethical subjectivity for a system of fundamental rights of the other, the question of 
responsibility in the face of nonhuman animal suffering is relevant and important. 
For the purposes of recognising the utility of protest scholarship for 
nonhuman others and veganism, it is not necessary to surmise the origin of the 
ethical force in metaphysical terms. As Simon Critchley notes, for the purposes of 
advancing a theory of ethical subjectivity, if the experience of a radical ethical 
demand is acknowledged and accepted, then it is not necessary to engage with the 
unknowability of that force.437  
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What is advanced in protest scholarship is that the radical demand of the 
other causes conscious awareness of, firstly, a perception of a concrete self (which 
can be named the ego), and an awareness of the concrete other (defined as that 
which cannot be known but which brings an infinite ethical demand which one is 
compelled to welcome). In this light, protest scholarship advances a theory of ethical 
subjectivity in which human beings are what Critchley regards as ‘hetero-
affectively’438 constituted. The ethical subject exists as a split subject whose 
autonomy is always appropriated by the infinite demands of infinite others but who 
‘is defined by commitment or fidelity to an unfulfillable demand, a demand that is 
internalized subjectively and which divides subjectivity’.439 For Critchley, this is the 
‘experience of conscience’.440 In this context, protest scholarship, in its 
acknowledgement of hetero-affective demand and the overwhelming desire to meet 
this demand with care and responsibility, locates human conscience as central to the 
development of its ethics. Central to this consciousness are interconnected and 
intertwined individuals in community and the extension of compassionate 
responsibility for the suffering other. Though this discourse does not consider 
compassion and responsibility in the face of nonhuman suffering, it holds promise for 
their inclusion.  
4.16.1 The significance of compassionate responsibility 
A consciousness of compassion and responsibility in the face of the suffering 
is under-developed in protest scholarship. For Baxi, Douzinas and Simmons, it is both 
implicit and explicit that compassionate responsibility in the face of suffering is 
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related in important ways to the existence, origin and ethics of human rights.441 
Compassion, in relation to suffering, is a long-established principle of consideration 
in ethical discourse, recognised in the early writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau442 as 
the ‘pure emotion of nature’, and in various other works as characteristic of moral 
sense theory. In contemporary theory on human rights and justice, the concept of 
compassion has secured its own discursive niche as the politics of compassion,443 
which ‘links the universal and the particular in that it assumes a shared humanity of 
interconnected, vulnerable people and requires emotions and practical, particular 
responses to different expressions of vulnerability’.444  
Whilst the concept of compassionate responsibility has for a long time been 
related to notions of justice,445 it also appears to suffer from an ambiguity which 
revolves around its related terms – sentiment, sympathy, pity and empathy – and 
their use by various authors to suit their purposes.446 Porter explains that the popular 
perception of compassion is a combination of feelings, empathy and co-suffering that 
espouses the capacity to feel and share suffering.447 Lynn Hunt uses ‘empathy’ to 
represent pro-active identification with others, preferring to avoid ‘sympathy’, which 
she feels often indicates pity, may imply condescension and may misrepresent true 
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feelings of equality.448 For Sylvester, ‘[E]mpathy taps the ability and willingness to 
enter into the feeling or spirit of something and appreciate it fully in a subjectivity-
moving way’.449  
By anchoring compassionate responsibility as an innate feature of 
consciousness, protest scholarship advances a view in which suffering is 
acknowledged by the subject, who is then able to imagine suffering and what is being 
suffered and is motivated to action. This is particularly the intention of Simmons in 
the creation of a phenomenological hierarchy of human rights for the Saturated 
Marginalised Other. In this context, compassion ‘helps us recognise our justice 
obligations to those most distant from us’.450 The limitation of Simmons for vegans is, 
of course, that nonhumans do not currently feature as beings in the category of 
those most distant from us. When considering compassion and those most distant, a 
significant point to be made from the position of Levinas’ ethics of alterity is that the 
influence of the other over the subject is a priori and must not be dismissed or 
reduced by categories and themes created by human reason. Nonetheless, the ideas 
of Simmons are a strong example of the way in which protest scholarship has 
potential for the claims of vegans with regard to nonhuman marginalisation and 
suffering. 
Levinas’ ethics of alterity have, thus, not been extensively developed and 
applied in a critical human rights discourse of compassion in the face of suffering. As 
Richard A Cohen remarks, on the basis that Levinas’ philosophy is a theory of human 
emancipation from an unethical totality of reason, his work ‘demands nothing less 
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than a fundamental reorientation of Western spirit – philosophy, logic, rhetoric, 
praxis, ontology, science, art, politics, religion – in the light of morality and justice’.451 
Levinas’ morality and justice involve a system of ethics in which one is for the other 
and in which others are defined as ‘incomparable ones’.452 In this regard, the utility 
of Levinas’ thesis for an emancipatory rights enterprise can be considered further in 
terms of whether it can be developed to accommodate compassionate responsibility 
for suffering nonhumans. 
The idea of responsibility in the face of difference has significant potential for 
a system of fundamental rights that can support the claims of vegans, because it 
offers the potential to extend the scope of responsibility to other-than-human 
vulnerability. Of significant appeal is, firstly, that Levinas’ ethics of alterity is a 
philosophy of ethical becoming in community. This is explained in terms of a pre-
social, innate desire to compassionately welcome the unique other. Secondly, in 
Levinas’ ethics of alterity, there must be no reduction of the other. What Levinas 
means is that the subject must not impose the products of their reason upon the 
other. They must not develop, through rational activity, any oppressive themes and 
categories that would reduce the other. This principle has the potential to construct 
a positive approach to other-than-human life. A final point is that Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity do not begin from a point of suffering, sentience, vulnerability or 
precariousness. These are concepts that facilitate understanding of the demand 
created in the original ethical encounter. They are terms created subsequently 
through reason. The ethical obligation to the other is, thus, not dependent on 
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whether we grant sentiency or vulnerability, but is grounded by the voiceless saying 
of the being that expresses its presence and demands to be included in calculations 
of justice. It is an event and a responsibility that makes sense in the context of an 
innate universal human desire to live in non-violent community with others who also 
experience life in the world.  
Taking into account the profound intertwined relationship of human and 
nonhuman beings, these principles have the potential to transcend the species 
boundary. They confirm that, in the context of a pre-social responsibility for the 
other, a constant and universal characteristic of humanity is the primacy of a 
compassionate welcome for others who are both vulnerable to mortality and who 
may be impacted further by the entry into and presence of the subject in their 
worlds – whether their suffering, sentience or precariousness is understood by the 
subject. This principle has the potential to ground broad rights for animals that 
would support the claims of vegans. 
4.17 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to ascertain whether human rights could be grounded in 
suffering. It has explained that Levinas’ ethics of alterity ground the origin of human 
rights in the right to exist as a unique entity. This idea is then supported by a concept 
of innate, compassionate responsibility that is extended by the subject to the other. 
It has observed that the value of Levinas’ thesis is that it challenges entrenched 
Western philosophy on the centrality of individual human autonomy and the 
ontological assumptions at the heart of human rights.453 It promotes the idea that 
the origin of basic rights is the observation that there are already others with whom I 
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The chapter has explained that critical human rights scholars argue that the 
mission and target of human rights are to acknowledge community and respond to 
the human desire to care about the suffering of others. The chapter has identified 
that this discourse does not develop a discussion of nonhuman suffering or the moral 
standing of nonhuman others and that the exclusion of other animals from the 
debate remains unexplained. As such, the development of an ethics of human rights 
that recognises compassionate responsibility in the face of the other, the human 
desire to live in community, and the human desire to respond to the unique other’s 
suffering require further examination. 
In his introduction to Totality and Infinity, John Wild notes that Levinas’ ideas 
about an alternative way of being were ‘not yet fully explored’; an observation which 
encourages debate and developmental scholarship.454 In this context, the ethics of 
alterity – as a philosophy that grounds moral standing on a non-abstract, concrete 
principle of intertwined, relational experiences – underpin an important debate 
regarding to whom we owe ethical duties.455 This is a particularly pertinent point 
given the exclusion of nonhumans from a critical rights discourse that intends to 
honour the weak, marginalised, suffering other. As Deborah Bird Rose notes, ‘[t]o ask 
to whom, or to what, does one come face-to-face is to ask to whom or to what am I 
responsible? This is the question of our time’.456 
Given that the ethics of alterity recognise the primacy of the unique suffering 
other, and that critical human rights discourse utilises this philosophy to consider the 
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ethics of human rights, the next chapter asks whether the ethics of alterity concern 
nonhuman animals. This examination will determine whether Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity can inspire and accommodate fundamental rights for nonhumans. If so, the 
fundamental rights of nonhuman animals will then provide the grounds for the moral 
imperative to feature in litigation of cases concerning the presentation of ethical 





Do the ethics of alterity concern nonhuman animals? 
Introduction 
 Despite Levinas’ claims that the other is ‘absolutely foreign’, ‘refractory to 
every typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification…’, it is 
significant that the face of the other is explicitly that of man. Levinas confirms that ‘… 
it is only man who could be absolutely foreign to me…’.457 This suggests that 
nonhuman others do not possess the required face and that their exclusion from the 
protective rights grounded by the ethics of alterity can be justified. 
 This chapter thus examines how Levinas explains the grounds on which one is 
in possession of face, and explores other literature that analyses and comments on 
Levinas’ philosophy. The primary objectives are to determine whether it can be 
argued that nonhumans are in possession of Levinasian face and whether they 
present their Being to humans, elicit responsibility and are owed ethical duties. This 
is necessary in order to determine whether Levinas’ ethics of alterity include 
nonhuman others and, thus, have utility for the claims of vegans in human rights. 
 The following section will give some background to existing literature before 
examining in some detail Levinas’ thoughts about nonhuman animals. The chapter 
will then discuss the work of other authors who have engaged with the debate on 
who or what can possess face and its relationship to ethical duty. 
5.1 Background 
 A review of the literature on Levinas’ ethics of alterity and nonhuman animals 
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reveals significant academic interest. Over the last few decades, academics working 
in the fields of philosophy, animal rights and environmental ethics have contributed 
to the development of a substantial discourse that has created areas of research 
revolving around different strands of Levinas’ thinking. Questions raised include the 
nature of ethics; the moral status of anything other than human; who, or what, 
generates ethical responsibility; how Levinas’ account of responsibility might 
influence environmental thought and politics; the importance of human language to 
his ethics; and his general notion of ‘man’ and ‘nature’ and how it corresponds to 
and differs from existing philosophical discourse.   
 Scholars ascertain the value of Levinas’ work in an attempt to explain the 
conditions under which nonhumans can be declared moral subjects.458 Within this 
body of literature, there is no reference to the relationship of the moral standing of 
nonhumans to that of humans in the context of explaining fundamental, natural 
rights; nor is there a critique of current human rights and the claims of vegans that 
present the moral standing of nonhuman others. There is, therefore, a need to 
examine whether Levinas’ ethics do indeed present an intersection of human and 
nonhuman moral standing for the purposes of assessing the scope of fundamental 
rights that recognise suffering others. 
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 An apparent consensus among early scholars of Levinas is that, though the 
compulsion to welcome the unique, singular, vulnerable other in Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity represents infinite responsibility, frees the subject from the domination of 
unethical totality and provides the rupture necessary for humanity to move to its 
ethical destiny, it does not apply to nonhuman, unique, singular others. Though the 
face is a living presence, it speaks and is already discourse, nonhuman others appear 
to be denied the expressive, ego-suspending presence that is the face of the other.459 
No infinite presence is seen to be expressed through an encounter with their being, 
and they cannot, thus, generate an ethical relationship. For Levinas, the face of the 
nonhuman is not a face ‘whose exceptional presence is inscribed in the ethical 
impossibility of killing him... ’.460 Early scholars of Levinas, thus, concluded that he 
ascribed to nonhumans a status of ‘things’ that are brought into presence only by 
humans.  
 The identification of a profound limitation in Levinas’ thesis concerns his idea 
that animals exist as things: human beings are unknowable but everything else is 
knowable as things. Things are not enigmas; they do not express a presence and they 
have no face. They do not, therefore, create ethical responsibility and are owed no 
ethical duties.  
 A consequence of this interpretation is that a direct application of Levinas’ 
ethics of alterity is not relevant or helpful for the nonhuman environment, nor for a 
philosophy of ethics that necessarily needs to disrupt humanism and avoid dogmatic 
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anthropocentrism.461 Nevertheless, through deeper contemporary analysis and 
interpretation, Levinas’ philosophy is also considered ‘one of the best equipped’462 to 
oppose the entrenched, dismissed status of nonhumans, to ground the case for 
moral inclusion and to articulate the undeniable, compassionate event that takes 
place in the presence of a suffering nonhuman other. 463 
 In addition to literature assessing Levinas’ original philosophy on ethical 
responsibility, there are two publications that stand out to scholars interested in the 
moral standing of nonhumans. One is a short essay which Levinas wrote in 1975, 
titled The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights.464 This essay concerns Levinas’ 
reflections on his encounter with a war camp dog during his incarceration as a 
prisoner of war in Nazi Germany. The second, The Paradox of Morality, is a publicised 
transcript of an interview with Levinas that took place in 1986 at Warwick University 
in the UK.465 In this interview, Levinas is asked specifically whether nonhumans are in 
possession of face. It was a question to which Levinas could not respond with a 
categorical answer. These two publications reveal areas of tension in Levinas’ original 
thesis on ethics that require analysis and evaluation. The next section will begin by 
outlining Levinas’ explanation of the difference between unknowable human beings 
and knowable things, before moving on to examine these two significant 
publications. 
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5.2 Things do not have face 
Levinas explains his rationale for the separation of man and things in Totality 
and Infinity.466 Things can be known because they do not present the idea of infinity. 
What Levinas means is that knowledge of things can be held in the consciousness as 
absolute and finite. Things are given meaning to humanity only in the context of their 
construction and function. They are constructed as meaningful, but they do not 
produce an ethical response. Things do not possess the required transformative 
power that ruptures the spontaneous will or autonomy of the individual. Levinas 
explains these relationships as ontological.467  
The difference between being in a relationship with the other and being in a 
relationship with a thing is that the other cannot be reduced to understanding; the 
relationship with the other is, therefore, a pre-ontological relationship – one which 
Levinas refers to as the ethical event.468 Levinas believes that humans have 
transferred the meaning of suffering onto animals through the creation and event of 
human ethics. 
This idea is problematic to a consideration of whether nonhumans are in 
possession of face. Levinas appears to overlook the idea that other animals may be 
more than things, explaining that nonhuman animals are things which are brought 
into meaning in current totality but which essentially have no value in themselves. 
Prompted to discuss the situation of other species in the interview of 1986, Levinas 
explains that the being of other animals is to struggle for survival in a Darwinian 
world without ethics. Levinas believes that animals function with total autonomy in 
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the natural world because they have to survive: ‘[i]t is a question of might’.469 In this 
negative world, ‘[a]n animal’s need are inseparable from struggle and fear…’.470 
There can, therefore, be no asymmetrical duty to others. The natural world is the 
enemy against which the self must exercise autonomous might for its own 
protection. The possession of face in this world could only disadvantage animals as 
they would be obliged to consider others before themselves. In the natural order, 
the self exists for itself, not for the other.  
It is on this understanding of the natural world of animals and of the world of 
humans that Levinas explains the emergence of ethics and ethical human beings. 
Humans have created ethics in their break from animality through an encounter with 
the face of the other. This elevates the subject beyond the simple being of species in 
nature. It is an event through which the human animal is released from the wild; it 
becomes ethical and capable of developing a dutiful, ethical humanity. 
That the face is ‘exceptional presence’,471 already discourse and expresses the 
first word and the commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ 472 is not a relevant element of 
an ethical subjectivity that speaks to responsibility to nonhumans. Though discourse 
is the ‘experience of something absolutely foreign’, Levinas insists that ‘it is only man 
who could be absolutely foreign to me’.473 In this light, nonhumans are things 
because things ‘exist for themselves’.474  
The expressive power of the face in Levinas’ thesis is, thus, not the face of a 
nonhuman. Levinas maintains a strict but inadequately explained boundary between 
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the autonomy of animals and the heteronomy of humans. This stance remains 
constant in Levinas’ original and later writing, but comes under intense scrutiny 
following his recollection of a personal encounter with a dog. In this encounter, 
Levinas appears to acknowledge responsibility through the affective presence of 
nonhumans.  
5.3 Levinas responds to the face of the nonhuman other 
Levinas’ commitment to distinguishing between responsibility to humans and 
to things in his original philosophy becomes intriguing in light of his later essay The 
Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights.475 In this essay, Levinas recounts his experiences 
with a dog named Bobby, which occurred while he was interned by the Germans in a 
World War Two prisoner of war camp. This essay has generated significant interest 
and is widely discussed in current literature. Though it appears an ambiguous, 
unclear account of Levinas’ intentions, it is claimed that the ‘chief dividing line 
between the human and the animal threatens to vanish’ in Levinas’ own ethical 
discourse as a result. 476  
In this essay, Levinas is thinking about his experiences as a Jew in a Nazi-
controlled war camp. His thinking combines the ideas of strong and weak species, 
the horrors of nature and the horrors of war. He sees ‘devouring within species’ as a 
sight which represents the ‘horrors of war’. He comments that such barbarism of 
nature is represented by the ‘plunge of your fork into your roast’ to the extent that 
one may wish to limit ‘the butchery that every day claims our mouths’ and become 
vegetarian. 477 Levinas states that the purpose of this essay is to reflect on the dog, 
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Bobby. For David L Clark478 and John Llewelyn,479 the combinations of Levinas’ 
reflections represent an ‘analogy between the unspeakable human Holocaust and 
the unspoken animal one’.480  
Clark argues that Levinas comes close to realising mutual oppression. He 
raises the possibility that Levinas brings into close proximity the suggestion of two 
forms of prejudice – one against the Jews and one against animals – and that Levinas 
may even identify that they ‘are in some way comparable’.481 At the same moment 
that Levinas considers prejudice, he reflects on his fond memories of Bobby, the stray 
war camp dog. 
Levinas explains that he was a soldier in the French army, captured by the 
Germans in World War Two and working in a forest as a prisoner of war. He 
expresses his feelings when passers-by ‘stripped us of our human skin. We were 
subhuman, a gang of apes’.482 Levinas explains that the prisoners were ‘thinking 
creatures’, but that they ‘were no longer part of the world’. They were ‘beings 
entrapped in their species; despite all their vocabulary, beings without language’. 
They wondered: ‘[h]ow can we deliver a message about our humanity which, from 
behind the bars of quotation marks, will come across as anything other than monkey 
talk?’.483 He then goes on to describe his encounter with Bobby. His description and 
choice of vocabulary give the reader the impression that he acknowledges the 
signification of the dog prior to the application of reason:  
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And then, about halfway through our long captivity, for a few 
short weeks, before the sentinels chased him away, a 
wandering dog entered our lives. One day he came to meet 
this rabble as we returned under guard from work. He 
survived in some wild patch in the region of the camp. But we 
called him Bobby, an exotic name, as one does with a 
cherished dog. He would appear at morning assembly and 
was waiting for us as we returned, jumping up and down and 
barking in delight. For him, there was no doubt that we were 
men. 484 
 
 In this passage, Levinas remarks that the dog ‘entered’ the lives of the 
prisoners. That he wanted to ‘meet’ them, that they gave him a name and that he 
waited to greet them, expressing his joy. These elements of Levinas’ reflections are 
inconsistent with the idea that animals could be things that do not ask for a 
response. 
Much attention has been given to Levinas’ essay about Bobby. It expresses 
the way Levinas felt about being degraded as less-than-human by the Nazis. Of 
relevance to critics is the way Levinas’ thought is influenced by unacknowledged, 
traditional assumptions about nonhuman life, and the lack of logic in his later 
thinking.  
5.4 Levinas’ denial of a nonhuman face 
Levinas’ essay arguably represents anthropocentric dominance. The essay 
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was a reflection written thirty years after the event, and many years after Levinas’ 
development of the ethics of alterity. Yet, Levinas insists on drawing an arbitrary 
distinction between himself and Bobby, despite acknowledging the unconditional, 
voluntary welcome of the nonhuman other and his personal extension of warmth 
whereby he proceeds to name ‘a cherished dog’.485  
Rather than consider any notion of mutual, intertwined oppression, or 
consider the ways in which Bobby may be expressing the presence that says ‘it is 
me’,486 Levinas, without further thought, displays a conventional, anthropocentric 
attitude in his dismissal of Bobby’s welcome. 
The dog’s response to the prisoners was, for Levinas, evidence that the Jews 
were animalised and trapped as a ‘species’ in a particularly abhorrent ideology. 
Reduced to a perceived condition of animality by the German soldiers, Levinas 
looked to the dog for affirmation that he was a subject (a man) of the human 
community. The dog, through his greeting, did not distinguish between soldiers and 
prisoners; which, for Levinas, affirmed his status as a man. It was a greeting that 
reminded him that he was a member of the human race. Bobby displayed 
indifference in his welcome to indistinguishable human beings, despite the Nazi 
hierarchy of valid and invalid others. 
What Levinas does not do is analyse the way in which the question ‘to whom 
am I responsible’ is raised in mutual oppressions. As Clark points out, ‘[t]he unstated 
analogy between the murder of Jews and the killing of animals in effect creates a 
rhetorical neighbourhood in which animals and humans dwell and summon each 
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other into responsibility’.487 Though Levinas denies Bobby a status of legitimate 
otherness, he, nonetheless, clearly believes in the response-enabling, expressive 
presence of nonhumans and that they communicate their Being.  
Clark provides a thorough, in-depth discussion and analysis of Levinas’ short 
essay. He claims that ‘Levinas’s experience of Bobby is informed by conventional 
assumptions about animality that make it impossible for him straightforwardly to 
attribute dutifulness to a creature that is not human’. He urges that the dog is an 
‘enigma’ for Levinas that presents an indeterminacy of ontological and moral status. 
As such, Bobby ‘triggers Levinas’s most dogmatic claims about nonhuman life and 
tests the limits of their coherence’.488  
5.5 Levinas’ incomplete philosophy 
Clark thus maintains that Levinas’ essay about Bobby essentially animalises 
animals. The essay is profoundly ‘[l]aden with animalistic rhetoric’.489 In – perhaps 
inadvertent – traditional, anthropocentric, exceptionalist style, Levinas reconfigures 
the animal to configure the human. Clark also believes that if Bobby spoke for the 
other without face, then it would also mean that Levinas regards other species as 
having some kind of transcendence.490 Further, if such speaking is possible and 
Bobby, without face, expresses presence, then Levinas’ ethics of alterity – in which 
unique, singular others are owed responsibilities and duties – form the foundation 
for the acknowledgement that encounters with other beings are indeed ethical 
encounters.491  
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In the interview at Warwick University in 1986, the integrity of Levinas’ 
philosophy is directly challenged. When prompted to consider the possibility that 
nonhuman (as well as human) beings may express the ethics-inducing presence, 
Levinas himself alludes to the possibility that his philosophy is essentially incomplete. 
The question posed was: ‘But is there something distinctive about the human face 
which, for example, sets it apart from that of an animal?’. Levinas replies: 
 
One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the 
face that one understands, for example, a dog. Yet the 
priority here is not found in the animal, but in the human 
face. We understand the animal, the face of an animal, in 
accordance with Dasein. The phenomenon of the face is not 
in its purest form in the dog. In the dog, in the animal, there 
are other phenomena. For example, the force of nature is 
pure vitality. It is more this which characterizes the dog. But it 
also has a face.492  
 
In response to another question about whether a nonhuman 
animal is the other who will be welcomed, Levinas replies: 
 
I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called 
face. The human face is completely different and only 
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afterwards do we discover the face of an animal. I don’t know 
if a snake has a face. I can’t answer that question. A more 
specific analysis is needed.493   
 
Levinas’ concept of face is, thus, regarded as ambiguous, unclear and 
confused. Despite representing a deeply committed approach to developing a 
philosophy of ethics which addresses vulnerability, scholars have identified 
inconsistencies in Levinas’ logic. In this confusion, conclusions cannot be drawn on 
whether Levinas recognised that vulnerable, mortal, suffering, nonhuman others 
experienced an ‘inner life’494 that ‘expresses itself’495 in a request for an ethical 
response. 
Scholars thus conclude that Levinas’ thesis is unfinished, incomplete and did 
not consider whether the Levinasian other can be nonhuman.  
On this view, Levinas’ restrictive ethics are controversial because it is clear, on 
an everyday common sense level, that people (generally) care and limit, as far as 
possible, any potential harm to nonhuman others and (to some extent) the natural 
environment by deploying a pro-active, conscious effort to limit the spontaneous, 
unrestricted ego. As such, and accepting an element of Levinasian 
phenomenology,496 the snake does indeed possess the Levinasian face because it can 
be argued to generate the ethical responsibility required that limits the pursuits of 
the ego.  
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5.6 Inconsistencies in Levinas’ logic 
On a very general level, it can safely be assumed that a consensus view would 
be that the snake asks for a response and ought not to be harmed.497 Further, the 
idea that a dog has some sort of ‘secondary’ face but that a more specific analysis is 
required to determine whether the snake has face would seem to indicate a, 
perhaps, inadvertent and unaddressed hierarchy of life forms and Being within 
Levinas’ thought,498 betraying the idea of a universal expressive ‘presentation which 
consists in saying ‘It's me’…’.499  
Peter Atterton emphasises the strength of evidence found in Levinas’ work 
for the conclusion that the mere presence of the unique other is revealed through 
the silent representation of the face. In his view, Levinas’ response to Bobby was 
thought and language that ‘presupposes the originality of the face…’.500 This, 
precisely, he argues, is the instrumental foundation of Levinasian ethics. 
Responsibility for the other is at the level of revealed presence.501 Atterton argues 
that:  
 
Levinas’s own arguments concerning the otherness of the 
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Other militates against interpreting ethics exclusively in terms 
of human interests and values, and, furthermore, that 
Levinas’s phenomenology of the face applies to all beings that 
can suffer and are capable of expressing that suffering to me. 
 
Consequently, where a nonhuman being’s expression is affective, ‘there is no 
justification for refusing to extend it moral consideration’.502 
Given that Levinas’ philosophy is written from a theological perspective and 
presents (what he believes to be) the destiny of humanity, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that he establishes human supremacy and hierarchy of being through a fusion of 
ethics with his theological values. His notion of otherness, from this perspective, is 
very restrictive. It is not certain, however, that a theological account of ethics must 
necessarily adhere to an anthropocentric hierarchy or exclude nonhumans. This is 
highlighted by Lucy Larkin’s consideration of theology and otherness.  
For Larkin, otherness is the context of relationships in a world where ‘God, 
humanity and nature are inextricably intertwined and interconnected’.503 Larkin 
argues that in the interconnected natural world, the face of the singular, unique 
other is a face representing God, and that such facing is not limited by human 
supremacy and hierarchy of being. When one faces nature, one faces God 
compassionately in a web of interconnected being. For Larkin, this theologically 
based facing requires nothing less than an acknowledgement that even in God’s 
world, nonhumans possess face. 
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Larkin thus retains a notion of God but rejects supremacy and hierarchy. In so 
doing, she interprets Levinas as the basis for a compassionate, ecotheological 
perspective and for a claim that loss of biodiversity is actually a diminishment of God.  
 Levinas’ humanism of the other, which explains the ‘disruption of egoism, of 
a life that centres on the self…’,504 does not adequately explain why it is that 
nonhumans are not in possession of face. For critic Peter Atterton, the precise basis 
of whose face has priority, what constitutes a pure face and the characteristics of 
being in possession of face are not made clear by Levinas. He consequently argues 
that Levinas’ remarks do not constitute the last word on whether nonhuman beings 
are owed the same moral consideration as human beings.  
Atterton maintains that Levinas’ theory is an insufficient basis upon which to 
withhold moral consideration from other beings, because compassion and 
consideration are secondary to the original encounter in which a subject 
acknowledges the presence of the others who seek a response. To apprehend, 
observe, encounter, to consider at all, or to extend a thought to a nonhuman means 
that the subject-hostage ethical encounter has already taken place. On this view, 
Atterton notes the limits of an ethics of alterity that is grounded by theological 
influences. 
For Atterton, Levinas’ hierarchy of Being and apparent difficulty in assigning a 
universal moral duty to all expressive life is a denial of the presence of face. This 
dilutes the ethical response the encounter requires. Thus, Levinas is accused of a 
form of anthropocentric, verbal violence against those (nonhumans) who reveal their 
living presence. On this point, Atterton insists that Levinas’ ethics would be better 
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developed in isolation from dogmatic, theological, anthropocentric theorising.505 In 
the absence of this, Levinas’ perspective can only result in the construction and 
maintenance of powerful, unethical, essentialist views, which Levinas already 
acknowledges as existing in the unethical totality of which he is critical. Derrida takes 
a similar view, claiming that in denying nonhumans face, Levinas puts the animal 
‘outside the ethical circuit’,506 which is surprising: 
 
… coming from a thinking that is so ‘obsessed’ (I am 
purposefully using Levinas’s word), so preoccupied by an 
obsession with the other and with his infinite alterity. If I am 
responsible for the other, and before the other, and in place 
of the other, on behalf of the other, isn’t the animal more 
other still, more radically other, if I might put it that way, than 
the other in whom I recognize my brother, than the other in 
whom I identify my fellow or my neighbour? If I have a duty 
[devoir] – something owed before any debt, before any right 
– toward the other, wouldn’t it then also be toward the 
animal, which is still more other than the other human, my 
brother or my neighbour?507 
 
Perhaps in the context of Levinas’ dire circumstances, it is unsurprising that, 
upon his encounter with Bobby, he may have wished to avoid theorising about the 
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possibility of a continuum of life.508 To have done this, and potentially acknowledge 
the limitations of his own thesis, may have revealed an unwelcome and 
uncomfortable logic in Nazi ideology: tying a knot in the Möbius strip509 of life is the 
‘greatest force of history and the inspiration for systematic violence’.510 
Nevertheless, the commandment ‘thou shalt not kill’ can be interpreted as ‘thou 
shall not put to death or thou shalt not take the life from that which lives and 
breathes’. If Levinas’ ethics take their impetus from such a commandment, then, 
surely, as Donna Haraway remarks, ‘[T]hou shalt not make killable’511 is a 
reinterpretation fundamental to the debate of who possesses face and ethical 
responsibility. As such, the concept warrants consideration within a much broader 
appreciation of the way a living being expresses its presence than Levinas allows. An 
important critic of Levinas in this regard is Jacques Derrida, who applies a 
deconstructionist approach to Levinas’ ethics of alterity to explain ethical 
responsibility to nonhumans. 
5.7 Derrida’s response to the status of animals in Levinas’ ethics of alterity 
Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction of Levinas’ early works512 drew significant 
scholarly interest in Levinas’ ethics of alterity and inspired much interdisciplinary 
scholarship on ‘the question of the animal’. Derrida is responsible for a 
comprehensive interrogation of Levinas’ work, including assessing the implications of 
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his philosophy for nonhuman others. In his critique, Derrida insists that Levinas’ 
philosophy of the other is fundamentally flawed because it does not take into 
account the concrete suffering of a vulnerable, nonhuman other.  Following an 
analysis of Levinas’ famous essay about Bobby, Derrida responds with a scathing 
attack on Levinas for retaining a Cartesian513 tradition and incorporating this into his 
ethics of alterity, in which difference is paramount and signified.514 He is 
dumbfounded by Levinas’ attempt to ascribe to the dog a status as nothing more 
than a something, capable of imitating a signifier but with nothing to signify. For 
Derrida, the dog clearly expressed the required presence in order for it to address a 
respondent by saying: ‘Here I am, it is me, a precarious being in my world’. Derrida 
asks: 
 
If I am responsible for the other, and before the other, and in 
place of the other, on behalf of the other, isn’t the animal 
other more other still, more radically other, if I might put it 
that way, than the other in whom I recognize my brother, 
than the other in whom I identify my fellow or my 
neighbour?515 
 
Derrida concludes that Levinas’ philosophy is insufficient for an ethics of the 
wholly different, unique other because it is not a philosophy that advocates ‘thou 
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shalt not kill’ in general, but a philosophy that retains the value for not killing 
(specifically human) beings. As such, Derrida accuses Levinas of failing to observe 
that the nonhuman other has an affective, disruptive force on human autonomy. For 
Derrida, this disruptive force occurs prior to any discourse on animal ethics. Whilst 
for Levinas the immortality of the precarious human condition was what spoke 
before all else, Derrida urges that the nonhuman other presents an enigma516 
regardless of whether it suffers, and that this fact should be paramount in 
responding holistically to ‘the animal question’.  
In a complex philosophy, Derrida suggests that violence is already done to 
nonhumans even before the possibility of an ethical encounter. This violence is in the 
very idea and naming of the heterogeneous group known as ‘animal’. Derrida is 
alluding to the oppressive themes and categories of ideology which Levinas would 
refer to as those emergent in the totality of reason. 
Derrida’s deconstruction, thus, raises questions about the construction of 
‘the animal’ in Levinas’ philosophy and, moreover, the construction of what it is to be 
human. He comments on the false homogenisation of groups and the disservice done 
to those excluded. He maintains that throughout history, nonhumans have been 
subjected to various negative, violent narratives. He takes it for granted that this is 
clear: ‘… no one can today deny this event – that is, the unprecedented proportions 
of this subjection of the animal’.517 This subjugation of nonhumans, he argues, is 
representative of other false ontologies, which function as negative, exclusionary 
narratives in the history of humanism. Arguing that the humanist tradition relies and 
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depends on multiple sacrifices, he thus observes that Levinas continues a tradition of 
profound humanism by failing to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’.518 Derrida postulates that the 
society of humanism is logocentric, phallocentric and, importantly, carno-
phallogocentric:519 an ideology in which carnivorous virility is falsely assumed to be 
intrinsic to human identity,520 the violence of which is dissimulated and made 
invisible by strategic mechanisms of humanity’s disavowal. Regarding the 
construction of the subject, he argues: 
 
Authority and autonomy … are, through this schema, 
attributed to the man (homo and vir) rather than the woman, 
and to the woman rather than to the animal. And of course to 
the adult rather than to the child. The virile strength of the 
adult male, the father husband, or brother … belongs to the 
schema that dominates the concept of subject. The subject 
does not want just to master and possess nature actively. In 
our cultures, he accepts sacrifice and eats flesh. I ask you who 
would stand any chance of becoming a chef d’Etat (a head of 
State), … declaring him- or herself to be a vegetarian?521 
 
5.8 Derrida: the face and suffering 
Derrida’s perspective highlights and addresses the limitations in Levinas’ 
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thinking which lead to his apparent uncertainty about whether a snake has face.522 
What interests Derrida is the way in which the suffering of nonhumans is a 
disruptive, ego-limiting and compassion-generating event. Derrida refers to the way 
in which even thinking about what humanity does to nonhumans generates a 
universal truth: 
 
Everybody knows what terrifying and intolerable pictures a 
realist painting could give to the industrial, mechanical, 
chemical, hormonal, and genetic violence to which man has 
been submitting animal life for the past two centuries. 
Everybody knows what the production, breeding, transport, 
and slaughter of these animals has become. Instead of 
thrusting these images in your faces or awakening them in 
your memory, something that would be both too easy and 
endless, let me simply say a word about this[:] ‘pathos.’ If 
these images are ‘pathetic,’ if they evoke sympathy, it is also 
because they ‘pathetically’ open the immense question of 
pathos and the pathological, precisely, that is, of suffering, 
pity, and compassion; and the place that has to be accorded 
to the interpretation of this compassion, to the sharing of this 
suffering among the living, to the law, ethics, and politics that 
must be brought to bear upon this experience of 
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It is at the level of compassion in the face of innate and universal suffering 
that Derrida believes nonhumans should be considered in any discourse which claims 
to advocate for the unique, wholly different other. In this regard, Derrida refers to 
the words of Jeremy Bentham to propose a protocol.524 Bentham had objected to the 
way a developing ontology of rights discourse excluded nonhumans in its emphasis 
on subjects being in possession of language and reason: archaic ideas, Derrida notes, 
‘from Aristotle to Heidegger, from Descartes to Kant, Levinas, and Lacan’.525 For 
Derrida, ‘[t]he first and decisive question would rather be to know whether animals 
can suffer’.526 This question concerns the real elements of, firstly, identity, secondly, 
powerlessness and thirdly, mortality: identity, as in being constituted by precarious 
vulnerability; powerlessness to avoid such vulnerability; and suffering and mortality 
as that which ‘belongs to the very finitude of life, to the experience of compassion, to 
the possibility of sharing the possibility of the nonpower … the anguish of this 
vulnerability, and the vulnerability of this anguish’. In this question, we put our trust 
not in Levinas’ face, but in ‘what is undeniable’.527 Derrida explains: 
 
No one can deny suffering, fear, or panic, the terror or fright 
that can seize certain animals and that we humans can 
witness … Some will try … to contest the right to call that 
suffering or anguish, words or concepts that would still have 
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to be reserved for man … ‘Can they suffer?’ leaves no room 
for doubt. In fact, it has never left any room for doubt; that is 
why the experience that we have of it is not even indubitable; 
it precedes the indubitable, it is older that it. No doubt either 
then, of there being within us the possibility of giving vent to 
a surge of compassion.528 
 
For Derrida, the response is undeniable: ‘yes they suffer, like us who suffer 
for them and with them’, and this response precedes all other questions.529  It is a 
question of sentiment and compassion, not pity. It is a question concerning human 
responsibility, obligation, necessity and constraint, from which there is no escape. 
‘The animal looks at us, and we are naked before it. Thinking perhaps begins 
there’.530  
5.9 Derrida and signification 
Although Derrida identifies the human sensitivity to suffering, his statement 
that thinking begins, perhaps, with the human perception that ‘animals look at us’, 
represents a deeper level of analysis that centres on the initial signification of 
nonhuman authenticity. The legitimate, authentic other in possession of face would, 
in Derrida’s view, certainly include nonhumans but would ultimately be ahuman531 
following a process of comprehensive, anti-anthropocentric deconstruction of the 
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influences leading to categorical distinctions between beings of the world.532 
Implicitly supportive to this extent, but also very critical of Levinas’s thesis, Derrida 
grounds the affective, disruptive force of nonhumans in their ability to signify their 
authenticity. Whereas for Levinas, ethics emerge in a human to human 
‘compassionate response to the vulnerable suffering other’,533  Derrida does not 
exclude the legitimate human apprehension of the authenticity and signification of 
nonhumans. As such, Derrida observes and argues for the universality of cross-
species vulnerability to which human beings are sensitive. Derrida thus concurs with 
other pro-animal scholars: nonhumans have undeniable Levinasian face through 
which they generate ethical responsibility. What is also consistent is that all scholars 
support the foundational idea that the other expresses their authenticity and 
presence through a signifying saying that requires a response before the said, 
created through reason, is deployed. 
A close reading of the distinction Levinas makes between the ‘saying and the 
said’534 reveals that the ‘saying’ is the primary expression of the other revealed 
through an encounter with the face. Levinas was clear, as observed above, about the 
way in which the original expression manifests itself: it is through ‘[t]he face, pre-
eminently expression’535 that presence is passed to the recipient. Spoken language is 
subsequent to and in the service of ethical responsibility. Levinas states: ‘Saying 
opens me to the other, before saying something said, before the said that is spoken 
in this sincerity forms a screen between me and the other. It is a saying without 
                                                     
532
 Agamben advocates a jamming of the anthropological machine to reorient humanity on a more ethical path. 
Gorgio Agamben, The Open Man and Animal (Kevin Attell tr, Stanford University Press 2004). 
533
 William Edelglass, ‘Levinas on Suffering and Compassion’ (2006) 45(2) Sophia 43. 
534
 This clarity was given by Levinas in Otherwise than Being, after his seminal ideas of the other were developed 
in Totality and Infinity: ‘… my exposure without reserve to the other, which is saying …’ 168. 
535
 Levinas (1969/2000) 178. 
 186 
 
words … silence speaks’.536 This confirms that the ethics of alterity do not begin from 
an appreciation of suffering. They begin when the unique other signifies their 
authentic presence to the subject. In this encounter, the subject is aware of 
precarious mortality and is created ethically responsible to the welfare of the other. 
Whether the other is actually suffering at that moment is irrelevant to obligatory, 
ethical responsibility. 
The consensus view, that Levinas’ original ethics of alterity cannot 
accommodate nonhumans, has, thus, both inspired and provoked a range of 
responses.537 For some scholars, nonhumans are authentic, based on a literal, 
analytical or deductive interpretation of Levinas. For others, such as Derrida, 
nonhumans are authentic others but on different grounds – in Derrida’s case, 
because it is undeniable that nonhumans signify themselves in the context of 
universally shared understanding of vulnerability and mortality.  
These responses to Levinas seek to locate the face in nonhumans and to 
establish their value as moral subjects to whom human beings owe ethical duties. On 
this basis, the discourse implicitly promotes the face itself as representing value. The 
value of the entity possessing face is that they have moral standing and are owed 
ethical duties. Commenting on the inconclusive nature of this discourse, Diane 
Perpich notes that in Levinas’ frustrating and difficult texts there seems to be 
‘neither an assurance that animals have a face nor the conviction that they do 
not’.538 Perpich suggests an alternative way to think about responsibility to animals: 
through a removal of the ethical value of the face itself. She suggests that the face 
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neither creates nor is the recognition of value and puts forward the idea that ‘the 
ethical mode in which the other faces me opens the possibility of valuing without 
itself existing as a value. Whatever does this work, I will suggest, can be or have a 
face’.539 
5.10 The basis for ethics 
Observing the scholarly debate on whether animals possess the required 
Levinasian face, Diane Perpich focuses on the idea that ethical responsibility emerges 
from ethical openings that are negotiated in the social realm. Perpich argues that ‘… 
it is simply not the case that without an animal face we will have no responsibility to 
or for animals’.540 Arguing that both consensus and positive Levinas scholars share a 
common misconception regarding Levinas’ thinking, Perpich suggests that questions 
about animals, in Levinas’ philosophy, are essentially questions about what humans 
value and how such valuing is socially negotiated.541  
What Perpich means is that in prioritising the human face, Levinas is not 
suggesting that the ethical does not extend to anything else. In fact, she observes 
that in the interview with the Warwick University students, Levinas states that ‘the 
ethical extends to all living beings’,542 and that not wanting to make animals suffer is 
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the ‘prototype’543 of human ethics. Perpich suggests that in stating that 
‘[V]egetarianism, for example, arises from the transference to animals of the idea of 
suffering…’,544 Levinas does not intend to subjugate nonhumans. Rather, Levinas is 
merely indicating that since it is humans who are subject to the miraculous break 
with animality, it is they who create the conditions in which ethics exist and they who 
subsequently create the categories. In the face-to-face encounter that ruptures pure 
Being (Perpich indicates that this can be anything that opens the subject to valuing), 
ethics then flow through the discursive negotiations intrinsic to the social and 
political community of humanity.545  
This open discourse is central to the evolution of ethical humanity in Levinas’ 
philosophy. Levinas speaks of the importance of accommodating difference, the 
individuality intrinsic to human being, and the need to confront subjective certainty 
by listening to the views of the other. It is this democratic, socially negotiated valuing 
aspect of Levinas’ philosophy that appeals to Perpich. Levinas states: 
 
The dawn of truth comes up, and the first gesture of 
universalization is made, when I become aware of the 
coherent discourses that are different from mine and stand 
alongside my own, and when I search for a common language 
… To respect the other is, before all else, to refer to the 
other’s opinions.546 
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What Levinas is suggesting is that from one-to-one communication to the 
multitude and plurality of social communications, a careful listening is required to 
negotiate and accommodate individual valuing that leads to consensus. Though each 
individual may have singular valuing, universal values will evolve. Perpich 
understands this and locates Levinas’ ethics in this context. What is subjectively 
valued will be registered through democratic discourse and socially negotiated in the 
interests of community.  
On Perpich’s reading of Levinas, ethics arise in the social context of human 
beings because it is they who make sense of compassionate relationships that 
emerge from the immediate proximity of the face of the other. An entity may be 
intrinsically valueless apart from in the way they are constructed by humans. They 
are, nonetheless, valued and this value is presented to the social order of society. 
The valued entity is, thus, registered and becomes a negotiated, ethical principle of 
humanity. In this way, the human appears as a priority because it is the only way 
through which humanity can justify and argue respective ethical positions. In 
Perpich’s reading of Levinas, though the human face necessarily takes priority as a 
vehicle for ethical discourse, it is certainly not the form of the ethical address. The 
form of the affective address is categorically the affective address that halts the 
spontaneous drive and brings the ego into question through its capacity to open 
valuing in the subject. 
Levinas’ argument is that humanity is essentially compassionate and responds 
to frailty, vulnerability and suffering. This, he points out, is evident in the face-to-face 
encounter and is the source of ethics. On Perpich’s thesis, ethics are a result of 
human communication but remain subsequent to an influencing, a priori affective 
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moment with the face.  
From the above accounts of how ethics emerge, whether in the face-to-face 
encounter or from social negotiation, it is clear that nonhumans have long been 
incorporated into the socio-political system of humankind. As such, they have 
constituted the affective ethical address and have subsequently been submitted to 
social negotiation as ethically valued entities.  
Levinas maintains that careful listening to ethical openings are the ‘dawn of 
truth … and the first gesture of universalization’.547 In this regard, the human 
response to nonhumans has long been an ethical matter of collective conscience and 
is a social truth that is not (or is no longer) a matter of personal and private 
conscience. 
5.11 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to establish whether the ethics of alterity concern 
nonhumans. It concludes that the logic of Levinas’ philosophy applies equally to 
humans and nonhumans, and that the ethical significance of nonhumans is widely 
socially registered.  
The chapter noted that Levinas distinguishes humans from nonhumans and 
designates them as ‘things’ that can be understood ontologically. Human beings, on 
the other hand, cannot be understood ontologically and express a presence that 
transcends the autonomy of the subject with a demand for a response. This 
transcendence, according to Levinas, suspends the ego of the subject and indicates 
the presence of a precarious, mortal and unique other whose wellbeing is in 
jeopardy. In the ethics of alterity, human beings experience the face of the other and 
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respond respectfully and compassionately.   
Of significance to the argument of this chapter is that Levinas could not clarify 
or confirm who or what is in possession of face. He suggested that his ideas needed 
further analysis. Moreover, in his essay about ‘Bobby’, it is clear that he found 
himself responding to animals in a way that did not denigrate them as mere ‘things’. 
This is observed by David Clark, who argues that the dog Levinas named Bobby 
signified his authentic presence, and that Levinas responded to this. Peter Atterton 
also argues that Levinas’ response to Bobby was thought and language that 
presuppose the originality of the face. 
The conclusion of this chapter is, thus, rooted in Levinas’ own admission that 
further analysis was required and in the arguments of other philosophers working in 
the domain of animal ethics. They recognise the value of Levinas’ thesis for the moral 
standing of nonhumans but are critical of some aspects of his philosophy. Peter 
Atterton puts forward the idea that Levinas’ thesis is limited by religious and 
anthropocentric dogma and is logically capable of grounding the moral standing of 
nonhumans. Scholars in this field argue for the authentic signification of nonhumans, 
emphasising that they are also unique, singular others who express the required 
precarious mortality that Levinas maintains is universally shared and understood and 
that creates ethical humanity. If, as Levinas maintains, ethics arise in the non-
abstract face-to-face encounter, then, based on an examination of existing literature 
in animal ethics, it cannot be concluded that only humans possess face. The 
obligation to respond to an a priori affective address that emanates from unique, 
singular, mortal others, suggests that the existing human concern with nonhumans is 
also in response to their prior signification.  
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The conclusion of this chapter also relies on Jacques Derrida’s scathing attack 
on Levinas for his failure to explicitly include animals as beneficiaries of his ethics of 
alterity. Derrida argues that the indisputable nature of the human concern with 
nonhumans is precisely because humans conceive of their real suffering. Noting the 
historical concern with animal suffering, this fact, he observes, is indisputable 
evidence of the authentic signification of animals, to which humans respond. 
 Considering the debate on whether the ethics of alterity concern 
nonhumans, Diane Perpich foregrounds the idea that philosophy does not need to 
establish whether nonhumans are in possession of the obligatory face as a 
precondition for the production of human ethics. On her reading of Levinas, Perpich 
puts forward the view that the obligation to the face itself is not the source of ethics. 
Ethics, she argues, are a human construct resulting from the function of the face, 
which is to create multiple ethical openings. These are then negotiated in a 
democracy. If the face cannot be categorically identified in the signification of 
nonhumans, it does not mean that humans have no obligation to treat animals 
ethically. Referring to the face as functioning to open the possibility of valuing, 
Perpich suggests that what is ethical is socially negotiated, following a priori ethical 
openings that create value in the other entity. On this view, humans are ethically 
opened by being aware of nonhuman subjection to the forces of mortality. Such 
ethical opening is also alluded to by Judith Butler: ‘[t]o respond to the face, to 
understand its meaning, means to be awake to what is precarious in another life or, 
rather, the precariousness of life itself’.548 On this account, the ethical treatment of 
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animals does not depend on a categorical affirmation that ethics emerge in the 
presence of the face, or that nonhumans are in possession of a specifically Levinasian 
face. It merely depends on whether the acknowledgment of ethical opening to the 
predicament of nonhumans is so pervasive that it has become a normative value. On 
the basis of an undisputed acknowledgement of other sentient beings that are 
intertwined with human society, it is empirically evident that humans recognise the 
authenticity and signification of nonhuman animals and have come to value and 
express a normative interest in their ethical treatment. 
The conclusion of the chapter is, thus, supported by wider literature that 
examines whether nonhuman others have moral standing in Levinas’ ethics of 
alterity. This scholarship seems to have reached a threshold where it is no longer 
contested that ethical facing concerns nonhumans. Nonhuman animals are included 
in the ethics of alterity because they have expressed their vulnerability and 
subjection to the forces of mortality, asked for a response and created ethical 
responsi-bility. This is so, whether or not they have specifically Levinasian face.  
This conclusion raises a particular question in consideration of a rights 
enterprise built upon the ethics of alterity: if nonhumans have moral standing in the 
ethics of alterity, and the ethics of alterity is suggested as an alternative model for 
the existence and operation of fundamental rights, do the human rights claims of 
vegans have gravity thus far unacknowledged? This question is especially relevant 
given that the entity that signifies its authenticity and facilitates ethical humanity 
transcends the totality that is the orthodoxy of autonomy and all its categories. This 
observation has profound implications for the idea and practice of exclusive human 




rights – and for litigation in claims that present ethical responsibility to nonhumans.  
The following chapter considers the ramifications of the conclusion outlined 
above. It assesses the implications of including the moral standing of nonhumans in a 
protective rights enterprise and explains the positive impact it has on claims 
presented by vegans. 
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Chapter 6  
What are the implications of including nonhumans in an ethics of alterity for the 
practice of human rights? 
 
Introduction 
 If, as concluded in the previous chapter, Levinas’ ethics of alterity can be 
applied to nonhumans, then we must understand the ethical obligation of humans to 
nonhumans in terms of a pre-social innate human desire to extend compassion to 
those we encounter that we know to be subject to the forces of mortality and to be 
vulnerable to oppression and additional, imposed suffering. Anything less is to deny 
the original, autonomy-suspending, ethical encounter with the unique other.549 Such 
a denial betrays authentic, non-abstract witnessing. It protects and perpetuates an 
anthropocentric totality of reason that reduces and subjugates the unique other’s 
expression of presence. This assertion does not offend humanity. Rather, it enhances 
the idea that a human being is fundamentally moral550 and that a declaration of 
protective rights articulates the ethical demands of others in community.551  
 This chapter assesses the implications for human rights of the conclusion that 
the ethics of alterity concern nonhuman animals. Of particular significance is how 
this conclusion impacts on the claims of vegans under Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In this regard, the chapter argues that the human 
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rights primacy of individual, personal and private reason and conscience should not 
be applied to claims that represent the moral standing of nonhuman others. This 
assertion is based on the fact that compassion and care for nonhuman animals are 
prevalent and should be recognised as within the domain of ethical imperatives, 
rather than as qualified, inessential, optional, secondary, unnecessary or voluntary 
modes of regard. This argument is grounded by the basic, normative principles that 
are explained in the ethics of alterity. These are that human beings observe 
legitimate alterity, deploy otherness and recognise moral standing through a priori 
responsibility to the transcendent other.  
This chapter firstly outlines how a system of protective rights, built upon the 
ethics of alterity, can be envisaged in abstract. It then explains and gives examples of 
how the principles of the ethics of alterity may inform a rights enterprise that 
accommodates the moral standing of nonhumans. These examples will illustrate how 
the ethics of alterity will benefit the human rights claims of vegans in their 
presentation of responsibility to nonhumans. The chapter concludes that in a system 
of protective rights built upon the ethics of alterity, the human rights claims of 
vegans are successful. A secondary conclusion of this chapter – and the thesis in 
general – is that the ethics of alterity offer nonhumans a stronger level of protection 
than is currently envisaged in contemporary moral theory on animal rights. This is 
based on the idea that transcendence by nonhumans also contests the oppressive 
themes and categories in the unethical totality of reason. 
6.1 The abstract development of a rights enterprise that includes nonhumans 
In an ethics of alterity that commits to the a priori apprehension of others, 
nonhuman animals are included on the basis that they are universally recognised as 
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vulnerable beings subject to the forces of mortality. They appeal through an affective 
address, require a response and create responsibility. For a concept of universal 
suffering to ground rights, a shift in the telos of the rights enterprise is required. This 
involves replacing the supremacy of human individuality that is justified in terms of 
the orthodoxy of autonomy, acknowledging the ‘otherness’ of humanity and 
conceding that the moral community already extends to the (inadequate) 
consideration of nonhuman others. 
Such a shift speaks to a human identity that is already aware and appreciates 
that unique, singular others have lives that are already precarious and will inevitably 
suffer from the pursuits of unrestrained egos. In this regard, the rejection of the 
primacy of a rational self as a priori in favour of an awareness of alterity facilitates 
acceptance of heterogeneity. This notion of human identity then promotes a 
foundational principle: that it is encounters with unique others that create an 
ethically responsible, social and political humanity.552  
In this reconstructed notion of human identity, responsibility to otherness is a 
paramount characteristic. It is born in the ‘compassion of being’.553 As a philosophy 
of the essence of human beings, the ethics of alterity credits humanity universally 
with unlimited compassion for others, on the basis that the life force presented 
reveals uniqueness and the presence of a subjective experience of being at the 
mercy of mortality. Alterity provokes a response which is, for Levinas, a response 
indicating Being-for-the-other before Being-for-the-self. The other transcends the 
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self of the subject, and such transcendence is, for Levinas, ‘conscience’.554 Being for-
the-other before being for-the-self is a consciousness brought about in the ‘event of 
ethics’.555  
Recognising the importance of otherness indicates an ethical requirement to 
‘do good’,556 but not a ‘doing good’ in which the ‘I’ assumes a positive557 value in 
recognition of others.558 Rather, as Levinas urges, it is a requirement for the 
recognition that otherness is ‘morality itself’.559 On this basis, the ‘I’ does not have a 
right, but it has duties for which limits may be sought through adjudication.  
Grounding rights on this idea of ethics requires an understanding of the 
‘naturalness’ of extending compassion to others. Rather than identifying compassion 
as indulging in egotistical acts of personal charity, individuals are aware of the 
formative, transcendental nature of an encounter with another.560 In this regard, the 
subject is responsible to individual, human and nonhuman others equally on the 
basis that their alterity is something they encounter; that it transcends their 
autonomy and any internalised, oppressive themes and categories that are created a 
posteriori to the original encounter.  
Through the development of the ethics of alterity, as a model for a reoriented 
system of protective rights that concerns nonhuman others, human identity is 
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reshaped. The paramount features of Levinas’ philosophy are: firstly, an emphasis on 
alterity; secondly, otherness; thirdly, a priori responsibility in community; and finally, 
the infinity of responsibility. Each of these four principles will be discussed in turn, in 
relation to an abstract remodelling of a rights enterprise that concerns nonhumans. 
Alterity, as a characteristic of human identity, will be discussed first. 
6.1.2 Nonhuman alterity in the abstract development of an ethics of alterity for 
human rights 
One of the first principles of the ethics of alterity is the acknowledgement of 
singular heterogeneity. It is paramount that homogeneity is deposed in an 
understanding that there are unique others whose experience of living and suffering 
may be entirely different from that of the subject. Unique others have always been 
present in the world of the subject and will continue to make their presence known. 
The singularity of the unique other is apprehended in the face-to-face relationship 
and is the origin of the ethical demand made in immediate proximity.561 It is in 
encounters with uniquely different others that humanity emerges as essentially 
sociable, compassionate, caring and welcoming.  
The extent of heterogeneity is unlimited and requires an appreciation of the 
alterity of the other. This is not limited by observable differences between the 
subject and the other,562 but through an appreciation of the uniqueness and 
singularity of the experience of being in the world. This means acknowledging and 
accepting other-than-human subjective experience of being in the world. It is 
accepted that being in the world and suffering are subjective in content. In the 
application of the ethics of alterity, ways of being and different elements or degrees 
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of suffering must not be dismissed in a process of reducing the other through 
oppressive categories or themes which would dismiss their subjective reality.563  It is 
through an acceptance of unique and different accounts of life experiences that the 
ethics of alterity aim to expand justice by observing difference. On this basis, the 
otherness, suffering and oppression of nonhumans enter the discourse on the ethics 
of exclusive human rights. At a basic level, if protective moral rights always and 
already recognise the other and their right to be unique, precarious and vulnerable 
to the subject who enters their world, then nonhumans also possess basic rights. 
A remodelled system of rights – based on the ethics of alterity and including 
nonhumans – upholds in its foundational philosophy a reference to the uniqueness 
of all life. This inclusive model not only recognises, acknowledges and accommodates 
difference between humans but also dissolves the false human-nonhuman boundary 
and promotes radical difference in recognition of the continuum of life and moral 
standing across species boundaries.  
A universal system of protective rights that acknowledges alterity would also 
depose the themes and categories of reason that subjugate others. This requires 
establishing non-oppressive and non-reductionist themes and categories that aim to 
emancipate rather than appropriate. This principle addresses, for example, the use of 
terms such as ‘vermin’, ‘pets’, ‘laboratory animals’, ‘circus animals’ and ‘farm 
animals’. It would do this through an a posteriori process of articulating the ethical 
implications of the non-abstract event of ethical responsibility to alterity. These 
implications certainly include an acknowledgement of alterity and a transformation 
of the way individual nonhuman others are addressed and referred to. Otherness, as 
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a characteristic of human identity, will be discussed next. 
6.1.3 Nonhuman otherness in the abstract development of an ethics of alterity for 
human rights 
 Otherness, in the ethics of alterity, expresses the essence of humanity as 
being composed of co-existing individuals that desire sociality and community. 
Otherness is utilising and extending the innate characteristic of compassion in 
recognition that others, whose experience of the world cannot be known, are always 
and already present in the world. Otherness is born in the a priori response of the 
subject to others and is ethics itself.  
Otherness is an innate characteristic of being human. Its practical 
manifestation is brought about by others, who signify their difference and mortal 
existence. While the alterity of the other is entirely different, in that they alone know 
the way in which they experience life, the subject, nevertheless, recognises the 
universality of precariousness and vulnerability to suffering. On the basis of 
awareness of the other’s unique inner perception of life and the acknowledgement 
that their experience and suffering may not be experienced as the same as theirs, the 
subject is opened to compassionate responsibility, and duty to the vulnerable other 
is paramount.  
In a reformed rights enterprise, the principle of otherness means that rights 
are conferred only in consideration of responsibility to others. This establishes, in the 
ethics of rights, the idea that before the rational autonomy of the subject, there was 
a relational experience of affectivity which has halted the spontaneous ego and 
created ethical responsibility. 
In a rights enterprise based on an ethics of alterity that concerns nonhuman 
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others, otherness is demonstrated by the enactment of a positive response to 
responsibility, rather than by action based on (unethical) reasoning that defines 
nonhuman others as means to anthropocentric ends. Otherness is demonstrated 
through acts of responsibility that are grounded by the human desire to offer a 
compassionate welcome to humans and nonhuman others alike, as unique beings of 
ethical concern. Otherness concerns conduct which demonstrates that the subject 
involved in an encounter with a unique nonhuman other does not harm or intend to 
harm, but does not pursue such conduct in recognition of a requirement to offer a 
degree of personal charity. Rather, by extending compassion to the unique 
nonhuman other, the subject asymmetrically and unconditionally accepts the unique 
alterity and subjective existence of nonhuman others, who must not be reduced to 
oppressive categories of convenience that are utilised to justify their appropriation. 
The a priori responsibility, intrinsic to otherness, will now be explained. 
6.1.4 A priori responsibility to nonhumans in the abstract development of an ethics 
of alterity for human rights 
In the application of the ethics of alterity to human rights, responsibility to 
otherness is asymmetrical and paramount. The a priori fact, explained in the 
philosophy of otherness, is the pre-ontological, pre-social responsi-bility that is 
created by the other. A response is demanded in the face-to-face relationship with 
the other, and it is in response to the signification of being that the subject becomes 
cognitively compelled to be engaged with the other, with a desire to extend 
compassion.  
A remodelling of rights would, therefore, recognise that in a community of 
unique others, a priori responsibility to the other is the foundation of ethics and 
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grounds the duty to be compassionate. The value of rights in this context is, thus, 
directed away from the notion explained by Douzinas and Simmons; that rights are 
the means by which self-governing, autonomous beings establish claims. Instead, 
rights are, as Levinas urges, rights of the other. They recognise difference, innate 
duty and responsibility.  
In a reoriented rights enterprise that recognises a priori responsibility, 
nonhumans are recognised as authentic beings of ethical concern because they 
signify their presence. As such, they generate ethical responsibility, either as entities 
with ethical value or, as Perpich prefers, entities whose ethical value is secured in the 
social domain of humanity.  
On this basis, the principle of a priori responsibility protects nonhumans in 
relationships of close proximity with humans. The human subject, who is 
commanded to respond to responsibility, recognises legitimate otherness, 
precariousness and vulnerability, and is ethically obliged to consider duty to 
nonhumans – as non-reduced and legitimate others with unqualified moral standing. 
A system of rights that recognises a priori responsibility to nonhumans 
simultaneously acknowledges that they are subject to the forces of mortality and are 
vulnerable to suffering. They, therefore, need to be acknowledged, represented and 
included in a system of human ethics and accommodated in the calculation for 
justice. Responsibility in close proximity does not limit the extent of general 
responsibility. Levinas maintains that such a responsibility is infinite. The infinity of 




6.1.5 Infinity of responsibility for nonhumans in the abstract development of an 
ethics of alterity for human rights 
In the development of an ethics of alterity for a system of protective rights, 
infinite, ethical duties are owed by humans to nonhumans. The infinite nature of 
responsibility in the ethics of alterity is particularly important to analyse in the 
context of a proposal for the philosophy of the ethics of alterity to ground moral 
rights.564 As such, it requires a more in-depth discussion to explain the scope of duty 
to nonhuman animals. 
The ethics of alterity promote absolute responsibility when a subject is 
engaged in an encounter with the face of another in close proximity. Levinas 
maintains that ‘[i]f I am alone with the Other, I owe him everything …’.565 Thus, any 
reduction of the other in close proximity dismisses and violates the principle of 
responsibility in the face of alterity.566 Levinas was clear that the face encountered in 
close proximity was, simultaneously, an event of infinite facing: 
 
The third party looks at me in the eyes of the Other … the 
epiphany of the face qua face opens humanity … the third 
party, [is] thus present at the encounter … The presence of 
the face, the infinity of the other, is a destituteness, a 
presence of the third party (that is, of the whole of humanity 
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which looks at us).567 
 
Levinas expounds further: 
It [proximity/responsibility] is the summoning of myself by 
the other, it is a responsibility toward those whom we do not 
even know. The relationship of proximity does not amount to 
any modality of distance or geometrical contiguity, nor the 
simple, ‘representation’ of the neighbour.568 
 
On the basis of Levinas’ explanation, Indaimo summarises proximity and its 
relationship to infinite responsibility to others as ‘not limited to a relationship 
measured by space or time, or a collectivity of similarity’. Infinite responsibility, as in 
responsibility for unknown and un-encountered others, is, for Indaimo, essentially a 
‘first person responsibility – the same responsibility as that which the self has toward 
the immediate other’.569 Thus, ethical duty in a personal encounter involves a 
simultaneous ethical encounter with multiple others.  
In his explanation of infinite responsibility, Levinas promotes the ethics of 
alterity as not merely essential to the social and political organisation of humanity, 
but as a philosophy of personal responsibility that is already inherently social and 
political.570 It is inherently so because it is the ‘fact of the multiplicity of men and the 
presence of someone else next to the Other, which conditions the laws and 
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establishes justice’.571 Levinas explains: ‘[t]he fact that the other, my neighbour, is 
also a third party with respect to another, who is also a neighbour, is the birth of 
thought, consciousness, justice and philosophy’.572 This birth of thought and 
consciousness does not preclude nor deny the existence of mortal, nonhuman 
others. 
A system of rights built upon the principle of alterity would utilise the 
personal, one-to-one origin of ethics as a foundational feature of justice in social and 
political organisation. In so doing, it would recognise and explicate that the 
difference acknowledged in the face-to-face relationship, while commanding an 
immediate ethical response, also indicates a simultaneous ethical awareness of 
multiple others. The infinity of responsibility, suggested by the ethics of alterity, 
requires that at all times, the ethical conduct of the subject needs to orient towards 
limiting the impact of the subject on the other and all the others that are recognised 
in an event of single facing. The justice of rights would demonstrate a politics in the 
service of such ethics, as observed by Simmons, Douzinas and Indaimo,573 because 
‘[j]ustice is the way I respond to the face that I am not alone in the world with the 
other’ and ‘ethics … is the foundation of justice’.574 It is in this regard that Levinas, 
Douzinas, Indaimo and Simmons concur that the current discourse of human rights 
can be invigorated through an approach which recognises infinite duty to the other, 
rather than retaining a rights-of-the-self tradition.575 
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In stating that the whole of humanity is represented in one single facing of 
the other, Levinas is presenting the infinite responsibility to allow, listen and respond 
to the valuing being done by all beings in their singular experience of its world. 576 It 
is an open listening in acknowledgment of the infinity of responsibility to listen to all 
others. Peperzak577 explains such facing. When facing the third person, they are not 
actually present, nor is the third person presenting a norm to entrench. The idea of 
infinite responsibility presented by the third person is the obligation to attend to the 
valuing being done in all humanity openly, responsibly and with the anticipation that 
listening will be infinite, along with corresponding responsibility to acknowledge and 
accommodate what is valued by unique others according to their dissimilarity. 
Levinas insists that in calculating ethical responsibility, the multiplicity of 
others must not be ignored. He argues that ‘… multiplicity does not allow the — let 
us say does not allow me — to forget the third party who pulls me away from the 
proximity of the other …’.578 It is in this regard that a human rights born of the ethics 
of alterity requires justice in the form of equal responsibility for infinite, 
incomparable individuals. Any limitation of this equality in the face of the moral 
standing of nonhumans would be to retain a totality of reason that subjugates 
nonhumans.  
A system of rights of the other that espouses the principle of infinite 
responsibility presents an obvious problem.579 Levinas himself was aware of the 
difficulty of transposing the demand of the face in close proximity to the infinity of 
the community. He speaks of the difficulty in deciding who has the first face and of 
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the possibility of the terrible task of being forced to compare.580 He notes that: 
 
Primary obedience is upset by the third person emerging next 
to the other, the third person is himself also a neighbour, and 
also falls within the purview of the I’s responsibility. Here, 
beginning with this third person, is the proximity of a human 
plurality. Who, in this plurality, comes first? This is the time 
and place of the birth of the question: of a demand for 
justice! This is the obligation to compare unique and 
incomparable others …581 
 
The problem of infinite competing demands on the subject will now be considered. 
6.1.5.1 Duty and limiting infinite duty to nonhumans 
In the face-to-face encounter, the other is owed everything,582 but in the 
practical and pragmatic accountability for one’s personal infinite responsibility, it is 
necessary to ‘weigh, to think, to judge, in comparing the incomparable’.583 Levinas 
contemplates that ‘[j]ustice is necessary, that is comparison, coexistence, 
contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility of faces and 
thus intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the 
intelligibility of a system …’.584 Justice is a remorseful system585 in which it is 
necessary to ‘moderate this privilege of the Other’. In this regard, Levinas asks ‘[w]ho 
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is my neighbour?’.586  
In the context of administering a system of protective rights that includes 
nonhumans, the ethics of alterity require a commitment to a principle of infinite 
responsibility that is remorsefully limited. Levinas describes the balancing required in 
ascertaining duty and responsibility as the ‘deep remorse of justice’ because it 
necessarily requires sacrifice.587 Levinasian justice is an apologetic justice in its 
recognition that an ethical response to one may dissolve an ethical response to 
many. Nevertheless, it is a justice derived from the first conscience-opening 
signification.588 As such, it must be continually ethically engaged and never espouse 
dogma, because it is only a justice such as this that does justice to the uniquely 
different other.589 For Levinas, the justice of legislation is in its unwavering 
endeavour to establish kindness in its foundations, remain always unfinished, aspire 
to ethical excellence and evolve according to a progress of reason. Such a justice 
offers the gift of inventing new forms of dutiful coexistence.590 
Where the ethics of alterity reorient and underpin a system of protective 
rights, the administration of justice must, therefore, ‘always be held in check by the 
initial interpersonal relation’.591 The reference to the initial relation indicates the 
importance, to Levinas, of justice being underpinned by the evolution of the ethics of 
law. He believes that this evolution will reveal an inclusive justice from emergent 
universal principles that are based on a compassionate response to vulnerable, 
mortal others who are currently marginalised or silenced. In this regard, a justice that 
                                                     
586
 Levinas (1985) 90. 
587
 Levinas (1998/2006) 229. 
588
 Levinas (1998/2011). 
589
 Cohen (1998/2011) xiii.  
590
 Levinas (1998/2006) 230. 
591
 Levinas (1985) 90. 
 210 
 
responds to an infinite ethical responsibility to nonhuman others is within the spirit 
of Levinas’ endeavour. In an ethics of alterity, it is not permissible to choose to 
disregard the ethical demand, and it is imperative to speak for vulnerable others who 
may be betrayed. Given that nonhumans are absolutely vulnerable and 
predominantly have no way of defending themselves, it is critical to establish ethical 
patterns of conduct that ground remorseful justice. Most notable are the principles 
of absolute duty in close proximity and infinite ethical forethought with regard to the 
many others that may be impacted by the pursuits of subjects.  
To address the difficulty infinite responsibility presents, Levinas explains the 
function of a remorseful system of justice as a practical solution. The ethical 
approach of such a system of justice must also entrench the expression of remorse 
for any limitation of responsibility and duty. In an ethics of alterity for protective 
rights, this principle also includes remorse for the dissolution of any responsibility 
and duty to nonhumans.  
On the basis of the above explanation of the principles of infinite 
responsibility, the abstract development of the argument from an ethics of alterity 
that concerns nonhuman others would regard infinity of responsibility as equally 
applicable to either human or nonhuman life. Although ethical responsibility and 
duty to others is bound to be limited by weighing, judging, comparing and balancing, 
it must be practised in a process of application that is forever in constant revision 
and subject to non-dogmatic reason with regard to the ethical standing of the other 
in the original encounter.592 In a system of justice in which dogma cannot prevail, the 
current, exclusive, anthropocentric human rights system gives way to the inclusion of 
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nonhumans to avoid diluting the original ethical demand. As Levinas explains, 
although justice requires and establishes the state, justice itself cannot make us 
forget the origin of the right or the uniqueness of the other.593 Despite a process of 
necessary (but remorseful) justice, multiplicity remains a context for ‘not ignoring the 
suffering of the other, who falls to my responsibility’.594 
In the creation of a practical and pragmatic justice of infinite responsibility 
that does not dilute the original ethical demand, intentional and willing violence 
toward nonhumans would not be promoted as acceptable in any circumstances. As 
instructed, in close proximity, the other is owed everything. The other creates the 
subject dutiful and responsible. Cruel acts of reduction and subjugation are to be 
prohibited. Any killings done in the name of categorisation pertain to an oppressive 
totality that ignores and dismisses the transcendental nature of the other. In the 
ethics of alterity, ‘[t]o be in relation with the other face-to-face – is to be unable to 
kill’.595 As such, the principle of infinite responsibility has the potential to dissolve 
anthropocentric supremacy. The themes and categories currently utilised to 
subjugate nonhumans become obsolete because they function to reduce the other 
and deny their moral standing as uniquely different, legitimate others.596  
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In the abstract development of an ethics of alterity that espouse an infinite 
responsibility to nonhumans, it is, thus, not for sure that human beings would take 
priority over nonhumans in all situations. In adjudication, the act of balancing, 
judging and comparing would necessarily need to be accomplished according to 
responsible and compassionate values. These values are intrinsic to an ethical and 
logical approach to the moral standing of a multiplicity of others. Legitimate, 
vulnerable, suffering and precarious others cannot and must not be intentionally 
harmed or killed on the basis of oppressive categories created in the totality of 
reason.597  
6.2 The moral standing of nonhumans in a human rights informed by the ethics of 
alterity 
The previous section considered the implications of an application of the 
ethics of alterity to nonhumans. It explained that difference, otherness and ethical 
responsibility cannot be reduced by the current oppressive themes of the totality of 
reason and that the transcendental presence of nonhumans must be acknowledged. 
For the ethics of alterity to undergird moral rights, there are four elements that must 
be entrenched. Firstly, it must uphold the idea of heterogeneous life. Secondly, it 
must acknowledge that the inner world of heterogeneous life cannot be known. 
Thirdly, it must accept that nonhumans present their being and ask for a response, 
and that this is a paramount, a priori event that must not be subsequently reduced 
by reason. Finally, it must accept that an encounter with another indicates the 
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infinity of ethical responsibility to all others. What this means for the moral and legal 
standing of nonhumans will now be examined. 
The moral standing of nonhumans in the ethics of alterity relies on an 
explanation of human reason being secondary to affectivity. The ability to generate 
autonomous thoughts is given an important value in the ethics of alterity, but only 
insofar as it recognises affectivity, sociability, interdependency and relational 
responsibility. This is the context for the system of protective, remorseful justice that 
limits infinite duty rather than permits competitive, individualistic gains. Protective 
rights, on this view, is a system through which the community of socially responsive, 
ethically aware beings formalise otherness as the foundation of a requirement to be 
responsible and dutiful to others who are always and already present, a priori 
reason.  
It is empirically clear that nonhumans, in all their difference, have expressed 
their presence to human beings and that they exist and are extensively considered in 
the socio-political domain. In so doing, they have impeded the autonomy of human 
reason and influenced thinking. On this view, the demand for responsibility has 
already been made, but ethical responsibility has not been acknowledged and 
entrenched.  
On the view presented, humans are ethically responsible to nonhumans who 
are brought into the realm of justice as legitimate others with five basic moral 
entitlements which can be viewed as falling into three groups. On the basis of 
otherness and the a priori ethical event, nonhumans have a right to life and to 
liberty. On the basis of otherness and alterity, they have the right to self-defined 
identity, and on the basis of the ethical duty in close proximity, they have the right to 
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care and to assistance.598 These three groups of basic rights will now be explained. 
6.2.1 A nonhuman entitlement to life and liberty 
In an inclusive system of justice, all nonhumans, without exception, have a 
right to be different without prejudice. They are owed a duty of responsibility, to the 
extent that they are entitled to life according to their own mode of existence. Their 
inclusion in the ethics of alterity strengthens their socio-legal status and encourages 
respect far beyond the call for the abolition of ownership of other species.599 
Nonhumans have the right to live out their natural lifespan, be supported by human 
intervention600 and be unimpeded by (intentional or inadvertent) oppressive human 
conduct that would cause their premature death. This entitlement prohibits a broad 
range of current practices, such as any form of ownership, killing for food, sport, or 
production of a commodified product. This is a non-anthropocentric threshold of 
justice, applied infinitely on the basis of responsibility to the material and corporeal 
existence of nonhuman others. It is grounded by the fact that they have been 
apprehended as beings that signify with a ‘saying’ before the imposition of an 
oppressive ‘said’, and the fact that they invite the subject to respond to their one and 
only precious life, asking: ‘What action will you take in the knowledge that my life is 
vulnerable and I am also at the mercy of mortality?’.  
Though the ethics of alterity do not explain the normative principles of a 
practical justice that follows its implementation, other scholars have considered how 
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 This is discussed in more detail below, under the ‘entitlement to care and assistance’. 
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their entitlements may be honoured. For example, Will Kymlicka and Sue Donaldson 
suggest that domesticated animals could become ‘citizens’, wild animals could 
become ‘sovereigns of territories’ and liminal animals could be granted basic 
rights.601  
The entitlements of nonhuman animals are as absolute and unlimited as 
those of humans and impose negative and positive duties.602 The administration of 
the principles of a remorseful system of justice adjudicates on a case by case basis, 
thinking the unthinkable and comparing the incomparable in an attempt to 
remorsefully limit the infinite duty human beings owe to others.  
The principle of remorseful justice may limit human responsibility in specific 
circumstances. For example, in a one-to-one encounter with a small insect that is 
attempting to find a way through a glass window pane, there is a negative duty not 
to cause harm to the vulnerable creature and a positive duty to open the window 
and assist in her endeavour to fly away.603 In some circumstances the duty to the 
small creature may be limited if there is a significant threat to the wider community, 
such as the alleged threat from the mosquito that causes the Zika virus.604 Though 
the value of the mosquito must be acknowledged, the duty owed to a multiplicity of 
others – including the other’s others - may take precedence in a balancing of primary 
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and infinite duty. In the context of the recognition of a general threat to a multiplicity 
of others, a remorseful system of justice can adjudicate that duty to the immediate 
other is limited, on the basis that the wider community of others requires protection. 
Though in principle killing remains prohibited,605 it may, nevertheless, be 
remorsefully justified in special and specific circumstances and contexts but this is 
not to be decided on utilitarian grounds or on the basis of oppressive reduction and 
thematization. In this way, respect for life and liberty, insofar as is ethically and 
practically possible, is acknowledged in the foundations of an anti-speciesist system 
of justice. 
6.2.2 A nonhuman entitlement to self-defined identity 
The third basic right of nonhumans is the right to self-defined identity. All 
nonhumans have the right to exist in the context of the sapient order of their 
species, free from human-imposed, oppressive themes and categories.  
The entitlement to self-defined identity would prohibit any reduction of 
nonhuman life to themes and categories that either intentionally or inadvertently 
cause oppression or permit arbitrary abuse. On this basis, current vocabulary that 
describes nonhumans in the reductive terms of oppressive categories would be 
redefined as vocabulary that reduces the other through themes of anthropocentric 
convenience. Categories such as ‘pets’, ‘farm animals’, ‘laboratory animals’, ‘vermin’, 
‘race-horses’ and ‘livestock’ would become obsolete because they pertain to the 
creation of an oppressive totality of reason. It would not be permissible to refer to 
nonhumans in a derogatory way because it would function to reduce and subjugate 
their being. This entitlement does not preclude interaction with nonhuman animals 
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and is likely to support a wide range of enhanced relationships, including 
cohabitation.  
6.2.3 A nonhuman entitlement to care and assistance 
Given that the ethics of alterity ground an absolute duty to the other in close 
proximity and an infinite duty of care, nonhumans have two further basic 
entitlements – to care and to assistance. This entitlement goes beyond the demands 
of total emancipation and is subsequent to the application of the ethics of alterity to 
an inclusive system of rights of the other. 
Such entitlements to care and assistance requires the extension of kind acts 
of compassion that would enable the other to pursue its life and to ensure it did not 
lose its life from neglect. For example, there is a positive duty to open a window to 
let out a fly that had accidentally entered an enclosed space, to stop and attend to 
nonhumans in road traffic accidents, and to respond kindly to assist all nonhumans 
encountered in close proximity. This entitlement implies both positive and negative 
duties and under no circumstances must the other be reduced by oppressive themes 
and categories that would justify arbitrary appropriation, abuse, relegation or 
dismissal.  
This entitlement is also in contrast to the idea put forward by Gary Francione 
that there is no requirement for human beings to intervene to prevent harm to other 
animals from other sources. Supporting the recent emergence of literature arguing 
that beneficial and positive interaction with nonhuman animals is imperative, the 
inclusion of nonhuman animals in the ethics of alterity requires intervention to 
protect the other from harm. In a system of protective rights informed by the ethics 
of alterity, the scope of duty changes from no legal duty for individuals to aid others 
 218 
 
to the primacy of the ethical duty, especially to those in close proximity. 
6.3 A practical example 
The five basic entitlements of nonhumans are the positive effects of including 
nonhumans in a system of justice that is built on the ethics of alterity. They clearly 
have broad ramifications that require tremendous shifts in thinking about law, rights 
and the ways in which nonhumans are treated by humans.606 An example of the shift 
in thinking required can be explained using a recent controversial incident involving a 
dog who was killed by police officers on a road in North Wales.607  
In this incident, armed police officers intentionally killed a dog on the road in 
the interests of public safety. The officers reported that the dog could not be caught. 
To avoid danger to the public, who would be travelling in cars at speed on the road, 
the officers made the decision to instigate a fatal collision with the dog, using their 
vehicle at high speed. Advocates for the rights of nonhumans (People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals) complained that ‘Law enforcement officers are entrusted with 
protecting the innocent and the vulnerable, and that does not include deliberately 
running them over with the intent to kill’.608 On the other hand, Chief Inspector 
Darren Wareing was reported as stating that: 
 
the ‘potential for a serious collision was present throughout’ 
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and there was ‘no alternative way’ for them [the officers] to 
minimise risks to motorists. ‘The only safe option was to run 
the dog over at sufficient speed to ensure that it was 
destroyed and would not suffer. Other methods of 
destruction were considered, but were ruled out on the 
grounds of public safety’.609 
 
The principles of the remorseful system of justice intrinsic to the ethics of 
alterity require that, at all times, the balancing and calculations involved in situations 
concerning ethical encounters with others must be from the point of view of the 
original encounter. This means observing that, in close proximity, the other is owed 
everything and that the prohibition on intentional harming and killing is the way in 
which the essence of human identity and duty to others is protected. It is on this 
view that the conduct of the police officers comes under scrutiny. 
The officers drove the police car at the dog at high speed to kill her following 
a review of other options, which were ruled out on the grounds of public safety. This 
course of action could be deemed disproportionate on the grounds that the dog was 
intentionally killed because it was an animal and not a human being. In failing to 
respond to otherness, reducing the value of the life of the dog and imposing 
inequality of ethical regard, it may be deemed that the officers failed in their duty of 
care and that the intervention was wholly unjustified and even criminal.  
In determining whether there was a fair and reasonable application of a 
remorseful system of justice, questions would be raised about the possible options 
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to protect the public and the dog from harm. Other options not considered in this 
case would be, for example, those used in other road traffic incidents and which are 
routinely implemented, such as stopping traffic, closing the road or using barriers. 
Although in a remorseful system of justice, killing may be necessary, these events 
turned on the fact that it was a dog in the road, not a person. The dog was reduced 
and denied ethical responsibility and – through a broad and widely used system of 
oppressive thematisation and dismissive categorisation – the action taken was not 
considered or conducted on the basis of the original ethical demand, in which the 
dog asked for an ethical response. 
 Protective rights for nonhumans are inspired by an inclusive ethics of alterity 
that explain entitlements in terms of foundational duties emerging from moral 
responsibility. Principles are general, and it is not possible to extract a set of 
normative practices that determine specific action required in all eventualities. The 
ethics of alterity serve as a foundation for establishing and outlining the general 
mode of conduct owed to nonhumans. This philosophy of otherness underpins a 
dynamic and non-dogmatic approach to animal ethics by transcending the 
oppressive totality that has secured their subjugation. In this regard, it is a platform 
on which models of practical justice for nonhumans can be evaluated and potentially 
supported.  
 Models of practical justice that would be supported by the philosophy of 
otherness are those that are able to contextualise ethical responsibility as 
fundamental to the moral and legal standing of nonhumans. They will facilitate a 
remorseful system of justice honestly and will not allow anthropocentric privilege to 
enter through the back door. Theories and models of inclusive justice – such as those 
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advocating nonhuman inherent value,610 sentiency,611 consciousness and interests,612 
capability,613  citizenship614 and ‘vulnerability’615 – may be useful to ascertain the way 
forward in an ethics-inspired, remorseful system of justice; but they must be 
scrutinised to ensure that no aspect pertains to an anthropocentric-motivated 
totality of reason. 
 The shift in thinking required to initiate equality of ethical regard for 
nonhumans is unlikely to reform socio-legal conditions in the near future. The 
general principles that grant entitlements to nonhumans can, though, be applied to 
the human rights claims of vegans brought under the right to freedom of conscience. 
How the entitlements of nonhumans impact positively on the legal claims of vegans 
will now be explained. 
6.4 A reconceptualisation of freedom of conscience 
A reconceptualisation of freedom of conscience is based on the 
understanding that human rights are grounded in otherness. They express 
responsibility and duty, and are the means through which humanity aims to deal 
with the suffering of others. On the argument presented in this thesis, nonhumans 
are also legitimate others to whom humanity is responsible. As such, veganism, as a 
culture in response to responsibility, is the embodiment of Levinasian ethics that is 
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enacted in and animated by human rights. These circumstances bring human rights 
to a threshold where otherness is most visible.616  
This idea of human rights is accessible and sensible. The human rights 
protection of veganism – as ethics in practice or as indistinction in practice – also 
makes sense in the context of the primacy of the right to live a worthwhile life and an 
Article 9 claim to the right to be free to live, unimpeded, according to an a priori 
ethical response to responsibility. 
As was seen in Chapter 3, the right to freedom of conscience is the principle 
upon which ethical responsibility to the moral standing of nonhumans has been 
accepted as coming within the scope of human rights. As such, the right to freedom 
of conscience, rather than existing primarily to accommodate the claims of self-
seeking, atomised individuals endowed with reason and conscience, can be 
reconceptualised. This reconceptualisation regards the Article 9 right to freedom of 
conscience to be the vehicle that permits human reason and conscience to transport 
ethical responsibility to human rights.  
The right to freedom of conscience, utilised in the claims of vegans, becomes 
the evolutionary, transformational mechanism that brings human rights to a 
transformative threshold at which the centrality of human autonomy is dissolved. 
The enterprise that was human rights observes and accommodates affectivity, 
facilitates otherness, supports the moral standing of nonhuman animals and 
illuminates and conveys their suffering. Under the right to freedom of conscience, 
the human rights claims of vegans communicate ethical responsibility to the system 
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of justice, whose mission it is to address and ameliorate suffering. It responds in the 
affirmative to the nonhumans as those to whom it is ethically obliged. 
On this view, nonhumans are subjects of justice because they invoke 
responsibility. They are not subjects of justice on the basis that joining the moral 
community imposes obligations and duties on them, but on the basis that their 
relational presence creates ethical responsibility that must be accommodated.  
Vegans have, thus, illuminated ethical responsibility to the moral standing of 
nonhumans as an issue that bears heavily upon the current concept of freedom of 
individual conscience and the speciesist prejudice intrinsic to human rights. In so 
doing, veganism highlights a threshold in human rights that is an interface of human 
and nonhuman moral standing.  
The affirmative response from human rights to the ethical claims of vegans 
injects this threshold with transformative value in the form of dissolution of the 
human-animal boundary. This is because a positive response from human rights to 
veganism implies that legal reasoning is, arguably, able to speak from a position of 
otherness rather than immanence. As such, it is a small step from accepting ethical 
veganism to applying the principle of otherness in litigation in order to facilitate 
better outcomes in cases presenting ethical responsibility to nonhuman others.  
6.5 Article 9 litigation and adjudication 
Currently, under Article 9 of the Convention, a vegan has an absolute right 
(under Part 1) to believe in ethical responsibility to the moral standing of nonhumans 
and has a qualified right to practically manifest their ethical convictions. The primacy 
of the right to freedom of belief is provided in the context of individualised human 
rights and an assumed, homogeneous, speciesist prejudice towards nonhumans. This 
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prejudice manifests a profound dismissal of ethical responsibility, approves and 
permits the appropriation and resource status of nonhuman animals, and 
perpetuates the use of oppressive categories and themes through which their 
commodification is justified. It is falsely assumed in this paradigm of human rights 
that the basic social conditions of prejudice towards nonhuman life represent the 
worthwhile life of autonomous human subjects. This denial of innate compassion for 
nonhuman others and our intertwined sociability with them manifests the view that 
living practically with moral indistinction is a matter of personal and private 
conscience. In these circumstances, the human right to live with ethical responsibility 
to nonhuman others requires the applicant to show that she has suffered a personal 
disadvantage: or, as was seen in the case of Vartic, suffers a significant 
disadvantage.617  
In this paradigm, vegans present intertwined human-animal social 
relationships and the worthwhile value, to human society, of inclusive, ethical 
responsibility. On this argument, the ethical obligation to nonhuman others and their 
original rights are ipso facto re-presented in vegan complaints of interference with 
ethical practice.  
In the absence of a complete reorientation of human rights grounded in the 
ethics of alterity, the Article 9 claims of vegans and cases that concern compassion 
for other animals can be litigated differently: in a way that takes into account the 
already acknowledged ethical nature of human relationships with nonhumans.  
In this different approach to litigating claims of freedom of conscience, the 
balancing calculation required concerns a remorseful justice that is designed to 
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address the problem of infinite, competing duties owed to the other by the subject. 
Such a calculation must be conducted in the context of the original, ethical facing, 
which essentially means – in the context of ethical responsibility – a commitment to 
the principle of not killing and not doing harm, and to extending a compassionate 
welcome as far as is possible. Litigation must not overlook the suffering of 
nonhumans in calculating the fate of the applicant, and there must be no resort to 
oppressive themes of convenience or any prioritisation of unevaluated practices that 
pertain to the current, subjugated status of nonhumans.618 
In this new approach, cases are judged as matters of ethical opening that re-
present ethical responsibility as the essence of human identity and the existing, 
widespread, compassionate regard for nonhumans. They are adjudicated on the 
basis of the principles that give rise to the moral and legal standing of others. As 
outlined in the discussion above, these are: innate human sociality; recognition of 
heterogeneity; existing, pre-social otherness; the obligation in the a priori, ethical 
demand; and the recognition of infinite responsibility.  
Legal reasoning would not, therefore, seek developments that limit state duty 
to vegans – such as raising the standard of disadvantage, or creating law built upon 
the oppressive thematisation intrinsic to the orthodoxy of reason. Instead, legal 
reasoning in litigation would focus on the applicant’s presentation of a priori ethical 
responsibility in the face of nonhuman suffering, and, with it, would shift the 
emphasis from human rights claims for self to human rights claims for the other.  
6.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to explain the implications of applying the 
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ethics of alterity that concerns animals to human rights discourse and the claims of 
vegans. It argues that in a reoriented system of protective rights that draws its 
principles from the ethics of alterity, nonhumans have moral and legal standing, 
based on their alterity, the principle of otherness, and the a priori and infinite 
responsibility that the relational encounter between a subject and another 
facilitates. It explains that, on these principles, nonhumans have basic entitlements: 
to life, liberty, self-defined identity and to care and assistance. 
Since the ethics of alterity promote infinity of responsibility, it has been 
observed that the system of remorseful justice must be employed to limit the infinite 
duty of every person. It has been noted that, in this justice, it may be necessary to 
thematise and categorise, but that this must not be pursued in the interests of the 
totality of reason that confers privilege to the human subject. In this regard, it was 
interpreted as a requirement to refrain from oppressive themes and categories that 
reduce and subjugate animals in the interests of anthropocentric privilege. 
The chapter has identified that the implications of including nonhuman 
animals in a rights enterprise built upon the ethics of alterity are positive and 
profound. Nonhuman animals are offered a degree of protection thus far not 
recognised in animal rights theory. As such, the application of the ethics of alterity to 
a rights enterprise has utility for existing animal rights discourse. In the absence of an 
existing, concrete, non-abstract, moral philosophy for the moral standing of 
nonhumans, it offers a platform on which to develop a body of discourse that does 
not relegate the lives of animals in the interests of anthropocentric privilege. 
The chapter identifies that the conclusion that nonhuman animals have moral 
and legal standing has implications for the human rights claims of vegans. As claims 
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that reflect a collective ethical conscience in which it is uncontested that nonhuman 
animals feature significantly in human ethics, it was argued that they can no longer 
be judged as claims of personal and private conscience in which personal 
disadvantage must be proven. Instead, the chapter argues for a reconceptualisation 
of the right to freedom of conscience to allow matters of collective conscience to be 
acknowledged as formative in the evolution of humanity, justice and law. Though 
this provision remains significant and must remain a primary value in other contexts, 
the evolution of humanity requires that when an ethical value becomes 
universalised, it must be recognised as such through normative, social conduct. As 
such, it has been argued that the human right to freedom of conscience should no 
longer adjudicate matters concerning ethical regard for nonhumans as a matter of 
the personal and private. In such a reformed system, the claims of vegans – claims of 








 This thesis has aimed to discover whether a different ethical theory, when 
applied to the right to freedom of conscience, would better accommodate the claims 
of vegans. By applying Levinas’ ethics of alterity to the status of nonhuman animals 
and promoting its use in the litigation of claims that present ethical responsibility to 
them, it has argued and concluded that this philosophy has enormous transformative 
potential. It has made the specific point that the inclusion of nonhumans in the ethics 
of alterity means that the ethical obligation to nonhumans must be understood in 
terms of the same ethical imperative that grounds the idea of human rights: that the 
nonhuman other exists, expresses authentic presence and creates the same ethical 
demands as human others. This conclusion impacts positively on the claims of 
vegans. 
 The thesis began, in Chapter 2, by considering the essence of veganism. It was 
found that veganism gives expression to the moral standing of nonhuman animals 
and can be regarded as the lived expression of ethical responsibility to them and 
their suffering. It was discovered that veganism has significance as a culture 
grounded by ethics that are in opposition to those that facilitate the dominant 
culture of the consumption of animals. In this regard, veganism has been described 
by Matthew Calarco as indistinction in practice, by Bob Torres as the daily lived 
expression of ethical commitment and protest, and by Gary Francione as a moral 
imperative for a humanity that cares about nonhumans. In sum, veganism is a matter 
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of justice because it re-presents the natural moral standing of nonhuman animals 
and their suffering to the legal system of a society that has entrenched prejudice 
against them.  
 Following an examination of the claims of vegans, Chapter 2 went on to 
identify that vegans experienced difficulties in various social contexts, and that some 
of these difficulties could be categorised as claims under human rights. It explained 
that veganism comes within the scope of the European system of human rights, but 
that it was subject to the principles of adjudication in the orthodoxy of autonomy. 
Legitimate aim and proportionality feature in claims presented under the human 
right to free conscience but do not take into account nonhuman suffering. 
 Chapter 3 thus assessed the centrality of the human individual in human 
rights. It found that there was a complex history to the idea of human rights and that 
they have emerged predominantly through the notion that human beings are born 
into a community of others but are regarded to be primarily rational. This primacy of 
reason appears to be historically rooted in natural law and became more entrenched 
during the Enlightenment, when secularism and Western philosophy emphasised the 
rational autonomy of the individual. These ideas were found to be emphasised in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, more strongly, in the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The idea that rights emerge in the context of 
community and duty to others appears to have lost significance, and the primacy of 
the autonomous individual now appears to shape the idea of human rights. 
 Noting the centrality of the human individual in the idea of human rights, it 
was found that the claims of vegans for the moral standing of nonhuman others will 
always submit to the theory of human autonomy. It was argued that claims of 
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conscience for nonhuman others challenge the notion of entrenched human identity 
and the ethical orientation of human rights. In this regard, Chapter 3 went on to 
suggest that a system of human rights based on Levinas’ ethics of alterity may have 
significant utility for the claims of vegans for suffering nonhuman others. This 
suggestion relied on the idea that Levinas’ philosophy supported a suffering narrative 
of human rights in which the subject recognises responsibility to others. 
 Chapter 4 explained an existing branch of critical human rights scholarship 
that utilised Levinas’ ethics of alterity. It observed that scholars such as Upendra Baxi 
and Costas Douzinas reject the individualism of human rights. The target of human 
rights, they argue, is to eradicate suffering. These scholars explain how human rights 
could function better if the same-for-self claim rights gave way to a paramount 
concern for duty to and responsibility for others. They argue that the idea of human 
rights emerged in recognition of the ethical demands of others and that caring and 
compassion are innate to human identity. They further argue that current human 
rights-for-the-self do not address suffering and that they restrain the ethical 
evolution of humanity.  
 Chapter 4 went on to explain that the ethics of human rights could be 
understood in terms of Levinas’ ethics of alterity. Levinas identifies that human 
beings live in, and desire, community. Human beings have never known isolation and 
can never escape the fact that the other is always and already present. In this 
context of being predisposed to an awareness of others, otherness (innate concern 
for the other), a priori responsibility (the fact that a response to the other cannot be 
avoided) and infinite duty (the awareness that there are always and already multiple 
others who issue the primary ethical demand) are paramount because they create 
 231 
 
ethics. For Levinas, at the moment a subject encounters another, the subject is 
forced to respond and, thus, is made responsi-ble by the other. The subject becomes 
aware that they have entered the world of a precarious other and is duty-bound to 
consider the impact they may have on the other’s vulnerability. The subject is not 
resistant to this universal unity. 
 On this basis, Chapter 5 asked whether the ethics of alterity concern 
nonhumans. It found that Levinas’ original, exclusive thesis did not correspond to his 
later publications, in which he expressed how he was motivated to respond to 
nonhumans. It was also noted that he explicitly stated that nonhuman others are 
owed ethical duties. Despite this, he never categorically confirmed that nonhumans 
generate ethical responsibility.  
 Chapter 5 went on to examine various contributions from scholars interested 
in the question of the animal. It found support for the argument that Levinas’ ethics 
of alterity logically concern ethical responsibility to nonhumans. Scholars have 
argued that nonhuman others are not ‘things’ – they have expressed their 
authenticity as mortal beings – and that human beings have long witnessed and 
concerned themselves with their suffering. They have identified that if ethical 
responsibility is grounded by an innate desire to respond ethically to difference, then 
the ethics of alterity do concern nonhuman others. The chapter concluded that if the 
ethics of alterity can be grounded in suffering, have utility for the basis of rights, and 
concern nonhuman others then the human ethical obligation to nonhumans must be 
understood in terms of our innate predisposition for compassion in an extended 
community of human and nonhuman others. This conclusion has implications for 
human rights theory and practice. 
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 Chapter 6 outlined the implications for nonhuman animals and vegans of a 
system of human rights based on the ethics of alterity. It explained that all animals 
have basic entitlements, such as the right to life and liberty, and the right to exist 
free from being categorised in terms of oppressive themes that emerge from the 
totality of anthropocentric reason. It explained that, in this system, the claims of 
vegans succeed because they are not judged on the basis of whether a personal 
disadvantage can be proven. Instead, they are judged in the context of the re-
presentation of nonhumans and their precarious mortality and of the ethical 
imperative to attend to their suffering. It was explained that accommodating 
nonhumans in a rights enterprise, as an ethical matter of justice, is complex, but that 
it would begin from the recognition of their basic rights and a non-anthropocentric 
administration of legal justice that would be known as remorseful justice.  
 Chapter 6 conceded that a transformative paradigm shift in protective rights 
is unlikely to take place in the near future. On this basis, it reasoned that the ethics of 
alterity could play a role in human rights by helping to litigate claims of conscience 
for nonhuman others differently. It argued that though the right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion is a significant value in human rights, it does not go 
far enough in facilitating evolution of the normative values that are no longer 
personal and private. It therefore concluded that in cases of conscience that concern 
the moral standing of nonhumans, adjudication should reorient to recognise the 
collective desire for an ethical response to responsibility. In this application of the 
ethics of alterity to the claims of conscience for nonhuman others, their suffering is 
acknowledged as a matter of ethical concern and the claims of vegans are 
considerably more likely to be successful. 
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7.1 The argument developed in this thesis and why it is important 
 In sum, the argument developed in this thesis is that veganism gives 
expression to the moral standing of nonhumans that is resisted by the orthodoxy of 
autonomy within human rights. This resistance impacts on the human rights claims 
of vegans to practice ethical responsibility. As such, Levinas’ ethics of alterity, which 
is already promoted as presenting sound logical reasoning for the origin of the idea 
of protective rights, is argued to offer more positive outcomes for the claims of 
vegans because it includes the moral standing of nonhuman others. 
 The conclusion that Levinas’ ethics of alterity concern nonhumans has been 
reached following a review of logic in Levinas’ own thesis and literature available in 
the domain of animal ethics. Existing scholarship on this subject identifies two 
positions that support the inclusion of nonhuman animals. The first is the recognition 
that both Levinas and social humanity in general are ethically motivated by 
nonhuman animals because a life force, vulnerable to the forces of mortality, is 
witnessed. Humans bestow care and compassion on nonhuman others, willingly, in 
response to the unspoken ‘saying’ that asks for compassion to be extended as a 
matter of natural social justice. In this relationship is the expression of ‘face’. It is an 
epiphany that animates ethics. The other halts the unrestrained ego of the self, 
facilitating innate responsibility. This first position promotes the idea that 
nonhumans have intrinsic value to generate ethics through an encounter and, thus, 
are owed ethical duties. 
 The second position is offered by Diane Perpich. This theory holds that 
Levinas’ priority of the human face does not exclude nonhumans from ethical 
concern. Levinas’ priority of the human face merely means that it is human beings 
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who create ethics by bringing ethical openings to be negotiated within the context of 
a democracy. This position supports the conclusion of this thesis because humans 
have long held nonhumans to be a matter of ethical justice. Evidence given for this 
view included both the recognition in various treaties and national constitutions of 
the sentient status of nonhumans and examples of case law that uphold their moral 
standing by denying others a right to exploit them. That nonhumans matter to 
humans is also recognised through the fact that veganism comes within the scope of 
human rights protection. 
 These conclusions are important for human rights discourse. Human rights, at 
a basic level, recognise the right of the other to live and to be free of arbitrary 
oppression. They aim to secure emancipation in the face of suffering and bring the 
suffering of the marginalised to the centre. Protest scholars explain that the idea of 
human rights could only ever have emerged in the context of acknowledging the 
ethical demand of others, and they argue that human rights have been derailed by a 
focus on claim rights-for-the-self. They further maintain that the idea of a 
homogeneous autonomous self is argued to be a most oppressive component of a 
protective rights enterprise whose target is the elimination of suffering. In this 
historical and contemporary discourse, even that of the postmodernist, the moral 
standing of nonhuman others and their suffering has been largely ignored.  
 Thus, these conclusions are important because the community of living 
beings on Planet Earth extends beyond human beings. The orthodoxy of autonomy, 
human exceptionalism and human supremacy are outdated ideas that are slowly 
giving way to a richer understanding of interconnected life and the need for systems 
of justice to recognise the impact of human activities on the planet and other life. 
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The idea of protection for life and liberty, for self-authorised identity and for care 
and support no longer concerns only human beings in a society that has already 
recognised the sentient status of other, mortal life and has acknowledged that 
human activities can (and do) cause further harm. In the case of nonhuman animals, 
the harms imposed and the suffering endured is not just accidentally off the scale. It 
is a direct result of both an entrenched denial that nonhuman others have lives that 
are lived according to their own modes of being and of their exclusion from the 
moral community. In this view, human rights are built upon a false ontology of 
species prejudice. They transmit a ‘said’ in denial of the ‘saying’ of nonhuman others. 
In this context, claims that re-present the suffering of nonhumans are always and 
already disadvantaged in a system that does not recognise the justice required in a 
co-existent community of mortal others. 
 Without regard for these circumstances, scholars seek the ethics of human 
rights on their own terms. Some, such as James Griffin, retain human exceptionalist 
positions to explain and make sense of human rights in a self-perpetuating 
anthropocentric body of theory that is difficult to break through. In this context, 
advocates for nonhumans attempt to assign human characteristics to nonhuman 
others to support their cause – but in the ethics of alterity, this is a reduction of the 
other to the same.  
 The argument presented in this thesis is important because it foregrounds the 
importance of ascertaining valid and legitimate ethical principles for the existence of 
basic rights. It contributes to a body of discourse that contests the orthodoxy of 
autonomy as the grounds for rights but goes much further. By questioning the 
centrality of the human individual in the existing rights enterprise, it brings to the 
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centre the most severely marginalised suffering others whose ethical demand not 
only asks for justice and mercy but also invokes reflection on the grounds for existing 
and enduring human privilege.  
 Foregrounding the ethics of exceptionalist basic rights, the conclusion of this 
thesis describes veganism as the re-presentation of the natural ethical demand of 
the other. In so doing, it not only grounds the inclusion of nonhuman others within a 
concrete, non-abstract ethical experience of them as authentic others – it also 
supports the call of protest scholars for otherness to operate as the inclusive 
postmodern principle of justice. In this regard, the universal principle to be 
established in a non-anthropocentric rights enterprise is not cognitive competence, 
suffering or sentience, because these are the a posteriori categories used to describe 
(ineffectively) the reasons for the meaning and significance of the relational 
encounter intrinsic to the idea of human rights.619 Rather, the first principle to be 
established is universal responsibility; but a specific kind of responsibility. It requires 
an acknowledgement that human beings are ethically responsive in the presence of 
the other who presents their mortal existence to us. It requires an understanding 
that human identity is co-constructed in relational experiences with others who are 
always and already present and constitutive of who we are. Reason, on the other 
hand, is merely subsequent, but instrumental, to an ethical humanity which is 
burdened with developing and implementing a system of justice that remorsefully 
limits competing ethical demands.  
 Ultimately, the importance of the conclusion of this thesis lies in its support 
for the idea that ethical duties are owed to others because it is in our nature to 
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 These remain important concepts of reason that undoubtedly play a significant role in the remorseful 
balancing required in the administration of legal justice. 
 237 
 
desire to live in community without killing, oppressing and harming authentic others. 
This is the bedrock of a protective rights enterprise that can only be conceived of 
from within the context of apprehending and being concerned with others. 
7.2 Implementing the ethics of alterity 
 The conclusion of this thesis has profound implications for humans and 
nonhumans alike. It requires a tremendous shift in thinking, from a prejudicial 
anthropocentrism to an inclusive non-anthropocentric form of reasoning that 
undoubtedly presents enormous challenges. These challenges include a fair and 
honest assessment of whether the current speciesist prejudice – exemplified most 
predominantly in the commodification of nonhuman animals – reflects human 
integrity, or whether it simply serves the totality of anthropocentric reason.  
 On a practical, daily level, the argument developed requires public authorities 
and social institutions to regard veganism as a manifestation of a much wider ethical 
regard for nonhumans, presenting a goal of consistency that eradicates random, 
arbitrary and illogical prejudicial themes and categories of oppression. With regard 
to human rights, the argument requires a reorientation of foundational values away 
from the primacy of reason and towards the primacy of the ethics-inducing other. In 
the absence of a paradigm shift in human rights, the ethics of alterity can be applied 
in cases concerning ethical responsibility to nonhuman others. The following explains 
how this could take place. 
7.3 Adjudication and the recognition of alterity 
In H v UK,620 the applicant was duty-bound to respond to the resource status 
of nonhuman animals. H’s claim presented the commodification of a life that had 
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been reduced to existing as a means for human ends. H’s claim presented the lives of 
others that had been appropriated as objects of biological apparatus on which dyes 
(that would eventually be made available to humans) could be tested for safety. 
From the perspective of the ethics of alterity, H presented an asymmetrical desire 
and duty to care. He re-presented and expressed the reduction of heterogeneous, 
mortal life, suffering and death. Though it was found that his vegan convictions were 
within the scope of the Convention, the finding was made only in relation to a system 
that prioritised and promoted his rational autonomy to believe in the seriousness of 
these matters, rather than on the basis that these matters of ethical responsibility, 
reduction, oppressive categorisation and killing were serious in themselves. 
When discussing the merits of this case according to the ethics of alterity, the 
heterogeneity of life that cannot be known and the paramount duty to be 
compassionate in the face of moral standing are paramount. Since any calculation for 
justice must be based on the original ethical opening – that is, the demand for 
responsibility as presented in an original face-to-face encounter – legal reasoning 
cannot rely on a principle of existing law if in doing so it overlooks the reduction of 
the legitimate other to commodity status and the dismissal of their suffering and 
death.  
H presented alterity to the extent that it is not limited by observable 
differences. In the application of the ethics of alterity, heterogeneous nonhumans 
are entitled to life and to a self-authored identity in which their sapience is 
recognised. On this basis, H would be allowed a request to be exempt from 
participating in the practice of the reduction of legitimate others to a status of 
commodified resource, their appropriation or their death.  
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Similarly, the alterity, precariousness and suffering of others were not 
considered in Jakóbski or in Vartic. Both cases re-presented the mortal suffering 
other, and in both, personal disadvantage was paramount. In Herrmann, Judge Pinto 
de Albuquerque took a novel approach in his partly dissenting judgment. In his 
dissent, he defended the presentation of the moral standing of nonhumans under 
Article 9. Though Pinto’s views do not correlate to the argument of this thesis in that 
he promotes their protection under the Convention in other ways – such as through 
their property status – his views, nonetheless, give credence to the need to develop 
a better process of litigation for claims that represent the moral standing of 
nonhumans. Moreover, Pinto’s ideas come close to recognising the operation of 
alterity in existing human rights. 
7.4 The existing possibility of alterity in human rights 
The right to present compassionate regard for nonhumans is most notable in 
the 2012 ECtHR Grand Chamber case of Herrmann v Germany.621 In this case, a 
landowner’s Article 9 ethical objection to an obligation to allow hunting to take place 
on his land was relegated by sixteen judges to one in favour of an apparently more 
important principle: the right to peaceful enjoyment of private property.622 In a 
partly dissenting statement, Judge Pinto raised a sustained and lengthy point to 
support his judgment that the applicant had suffered a breach of his Article 9 right to 
freedom of conscience. In this statement, Judge Pinto remarked on the creation of a 
developing interface of human and nonhuman interests at the ECtHR.  
                                                     
621
 Herrmann v Germany App No 9300/07 (ECtHR, 26
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 See Page 30 of the judgment: the Court ‘holds by sixteen votes to one that it is not necessary to examine 
separately the complaint under Article 9 of the Convention’. Instead, a Protocol 1 right to peaceful enjoyment of 
property took precedence. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 1.  
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In relation to the applicant’s conscientious objection to hunting, Judge Pinto 
commented on legal rules and on the importance of addressing higher ethical values, 
which he noted was ‘[m]ankind’s true moral test’.623 Judge Pinto remarked that this 
case was not only about property rights but also centred on the way in which the 
Convention protected animals.624 For Pinto, the presentation of animals under Article 
9 is an important constituent part of a clear and uncontested broad trend towards 
the acceptance of the moral standing of nonhumans and their protection; a trend 
that the Convention and the ECtHR recognise.  
Judge Pinto’s dissenting statement was in response to the Court’s 
prioritisation of property rights over an Article 9 claim to freedom of conscience. It 
supported the recognition of the moral standing of nonhumans by citing the works of 
philosophers who advocate positive changes in the human-animal relationship in 
recognition of a ‘shared nature’ of human and nonhuman animals. Supporting his 
dissent, Pinto noted the clear and uncontested burgeoning of international and 
national constitutional animal protection, the developing interface of human and 
nonhuman interests at the ECtHR, works of compassionate philosophy in favour of 
the moral standing of animals, and the undisputed, widespread, compassionate, 
public voice.  
7.5 Adjudication and the recognition of otherness 
From the perspective of the ethics of alterity, the claims of H, Jakóbski, Vartic 
and Herrmann can be reconceptualised as the recognition of ethical otherness. Each 
claim promoted ethical duty and responsibility to nonhuman others. They reflected 
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 Pinto observes protection of animals in the form of the property right of humans, as beings in themselves and 
in the context of environmental balance. 
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the fact of intertwined co-existence and human responsibility to precarious, mortal, 
nonhuman others.  
What H, Jakóbski, Vartic and Herrmann communicate to law is the fact that 
human beings consider relationships with nonhumans to be a matter of ethics. As a 
minimum, therefore, nonhumans have the right to be different included in the 
administration of justice. This requires, in the first instance, a respectful, non-
oppressive thematisation and categorisation and a pro-active endeavour to re-
present their legitimate value.625 Though adjudication in the remorseful justice of the 
ethics of alterity necessarily has to compare, judge and balance competing demands, 
it must do so from a position of the original, ethical encounter and an 
acknowledgment that the subject enters the world of the precarious other, who is 
already vulnerable. The recognition in litigation of affective otherness would ensure 
the dissolution of the primacy of personal and private conscience in human rights 
and counter the unethical totality of reason that facilitates and manifests convenient 
categories of oppressive anthropocentrism. This would ensure better outcomes for 
vegans.  
7.6 Adjudication and a priori responsibility to nonhumans 
The claims presented illustrate compassionate, ethical engagement with 
nonhuman others. As such, they demonstrate responsi-bility and re-present the 
authentic other that signifies their presence in a silent saying that precedes human 
language. This silent saying animates ethics, or, on Perpich’s view, opens valuing. It is 
the moment of intersection when the other ‘speaks’ to the subject: ‘It is me’, ‘I have 
a purpose’, ‘I will one day die’, ‘I am vulnerable and subject to mortality. How will 
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you respond?’ To ignore or reject this ethical event of absolute responsibility is to 
reside in the totality of reason. It stagnates human evolution, entrenches dogma and 
fails to facilitate human freedom. The totality prevents the subject from enacting 
responsibility for others. It is ipso facto unethical.  
Applying the principle of a priori responsibility to the cases referred to above 
requires the recognition of infinite responsibility to the a priori saying of the other 
and a commitment to responsibility as a constituent of human identity. This would 
then deal with the dismissal of nonhumans in the ‘said’ of the totality of reason that 
grounds and justifies lawful interference in the manifestation of ethical 
responsibility. The application of a priori responsibility in adjudication of the cases 
presented would ensure better outcomes.  
7.7 Adjudication and infinity of ethical responsibility to nonhumans 
H’s claim related to the commodification of nonhumans that are designated 
as apparatus for chemical testing. It thus spoke to the infinity of the ethical demand. 
In two of the other cases, the plaintiffs refused to eat the others they had not known 
or ever come into contact with. In one, the applicant objected to hunting others who 
were also not in close proximity. In recognition of infinite responsibility, these 
subjects presented the demand of the third party under the right to free conscience. 
The plaintiffs, in these cases, were practising ethical responsibility. They were looking 
to the justice of human rights to ensure that they would be permitted to manifest 
ethical practice and would not be required to rescind the ethical obligation.  
In the ethics of alterity, adjudication must calculate, balance and judge to 
limit one’s infinite duty to the other in circumstances of conflicting ethical dilemmas. 
The cases discussed above were not adjudicated in this context. They were, instead, 
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cases presented in the context of an anthropocentric system of protective rights that 
denies ethical responsibility to nonhuman others.  
Currently, the calculation and balancing conducted under the right to 
freedom of conscience are from within the totality Levinas explains. They concern 
only whether the individual self-of-the-ego suffers a disadvantage in circumstances 
of an entrenched totality of reason that has oppressed and commodified 
nonhumans. These conditions have created speciesism and what Melanie Joy has 
called the invisible belief system of carnism that protects, perpetuates and maintains 
the (false) natural, normal and necessary justification for the oppressive conditions 
for nonhumans defined as ‘food’.626 Resistant to these systems, veganism expresses 
the infinity of responsibility by re-presenting the suffering nonhuman other as the 
relational third party who is not in direct proximity. Keeping in mind that the 
principle of infinity requires that the third party is owed the same ethical 
consideration as those in close proximity, intentional reduction, harm or killing must 
be prohibited.627 In human rights cases that present ethical responsibility to 
nonhumans, the application of the principle of the infinity of ethical demand ensures 
that cases succeed because plaintiffs would not be required to participate in what 
would be deemed unethical human conduct.  
This approach to settling the human rights claims of vegans covers a range of 
situations that vegans currently find intolerable, such as requirements that school 
pupils dissect nonhumans in science classes. Under the ethics of alterity, rather than 
primarily assessing the degree of disadvantage to the applicant, the emphasis would 
be on the suffering and death of the nonhuman in question. In these reoriented 
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conditions, a school’s attempt to limit its duty towards nonhuman others would be 
rejected on the basis that the teaching objective sought is disproportionate to the 
suffering of nonhuman others – because it requires their reduction, commodification 
and death. 
The same considerations apply to cases presented by vegan police officers 
and firefighters, who are required to wear uniform items that are derived from the 
skin of nonhumans. In these cases, although rules and regulations exist for safety, 
the court would, under the ethics of alterity, have to consider the duty to 
nonhumans in line with the original ethical facing. Given that there are suitable 
alternative uniform items that meet the requirements of health and safety policies, 
the court would have no option but to conclude that the interference is 
disproportionate.628 
Similarly, a requirement to present this thesis according to university 
regulations may require that I accept printing and binding services that use products 
derived from nonhumans.629 In such circumstances, under current human rights 
law,630 a request can be made for alternatives to be sourced and used – but such a 
request will be considered only in relation to individual personal disadvantage rather 
than to the obligatory ethical demand to honour difference and respond to unique, 
nonhuman others with kind regard and respect.  
The potential of the ethics of alterity as a model for the reconfiguration of 
litigating claims re-presenting the moral standing of nonhumans presents enormous 
challenges regarding the human relationship with nonhumans. This challenge is most 
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prominent at the interface of human and nonhuman moral standing as illuminated 
by the human rights claims of vegans. Despite this, a specific application of the ethics 
of alterity to claims of conscience for the moral standing of nonhuman others 
reconfigures the nature of the claim, citing the primacy of ethical responsibility as 
the principle on which any interference must be justified.  
7.8 Implications for nonhumans 
 To be clear, the application of the ethics of alterity to human rights honours 
the unique individuality of each and every human and nonhuman animal. It 
acknowledges the transcendence of the subject by the other as the process by which 
human beings become ethical. On this basis, it honours the moral standing of all lives 
as unique ethics-inducing others who invoke responsibility and facilitate acts of duty. 
 In this system, responsibility and duty are inseparable from the awareness of 
a universally shared characteristic of precariousness and the understanding that all 
life is subject to the forces of mortality. A rights enterprise protects the world of the 
other from the actions of the subject, regardless of actual, observed suffering. As 
such, all nonhumans have moral and legal status on the basis that they are perceived 
as mortal. 
 In this theory, a system of remorseful justice will remorsefully limit duties 
owed. Though singularity cannot be overcomplicated to accommodate uniqueness of 
Being, any thematisation or categorisation must not be to automatically relegate the 
self-defined identity of the other.631 In an inclusive application of the ethics of 
alterity, there is a commitment to non-oppressive categorisations and themes that 
                                                     
631
 Derrida’s thoughts on singularity (see Derrida (2008)), in which he cites the story of the cat that looks, are too 
complex to help develop a universal system of protective rights because of the emphasis on absolute singularity. 
This is a position from which it is difficult to provide any ethical categories through which universal principles 
would be regarded ethical. 
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demonstrate an intention to acknowledge responsibility to the other in all situations. 
 Remorseful justice, unfortunately, requires that balance is brought to the 
infinite obligatory demand. Ethics of alterity theory offers general principles but does 
not prescribe a detailed set of normative categories to suit all circumstances. It is, 
though, a philosophy that is sensitive to the potential for a totality of reason to 
subjugate in the interests of the subject. In this regard, contemporary theory on 
animal rights may help to ascertain the (remorseful) principles of the way forward. In 
addition, the theory of the Saturated Marginalised Other, developed by Simmons, 
may also be helpful in developing principles for practice by introducing the idea of 
phenomenological saturation to the extent of subjugation and suffering.  
7.9 Implications for vegans 
 The claims of vegans in a human rights built upon the ethics of alterity are 
successful. Bringing the idea of a universal, infinite ethical responsibility to animals to 
bear upon human rights, this new way to litigate cases concerning compassion for 
nonhuman animals removes the requirement to prove personal disadvantage. 
Though the right to freedom of conscience remains significant to negotiating other 
matters, when it is used to present and re-present the others that are already 
considered as a matter of collective conscience, human rights practice will recognise 
that the provision has ‘done its job’ and has helped in the creation and evolution of 
the universal ethical categories that help humanity live according to the highest 
ethical values. In this system, litigation in cases such as H, Jakóbski, Vartic and 
Herrmann no longer submits to the centrality of the human individual and its 
associated primary concepts (such as personal disadvantage and significant 
disadvantage); nor does the judiciary override ethical regard for nonhumans in 
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favour of a different protocol, used also to uphold the primacy of individual claims. 
Instead, it acknowledges existing ethical regard for other-than-human animals and 
permits a justice based on ethical reasoning that is induced by the primacy of 
responsibility to the other. 
7.10 Recognising the complexities of Levinas’ philosophy 
Levinas’ philosophy on the ethics of alterity is complex, demanding and so 
‘blisteringly obscure’632 that interpretive accounts run the risk of representing 
nothing more than, as Desmond Manderson suggests, a simple understanding.633 It is 
true that there is much to be explored, reflected on and revisited in Levinas’ work: 
for example, the command not to kill that is issued in the ethical encounter, and the 
idea that a remorseful justice may (remorsefully) be required to implement violence 
in the protection of the self and the other’s other. In his development of an 
exceptionally dense and complex philosophy of the merits of such violence, Levinas 
offers a pre-social gracious humanity no practical guidance in its quest to create and 
maintain a social harmony that also permits the utility of violence.  
Moreover, reading and attempting to decipher Levinas’ philosophy involves 
many optimistic highs, twists and returns, but also intense lows that together 
culminate in the frustrating acknowledgement that it is a philosophy that does not 
easily lend itself to the formulation of exacting principles for the application of 
law.634 Apart from extracting the basic ground rules on which a case for the inclusion 
of nonhumans can be made, Levinas’ ethics of alterity and the creation of positive 
law are at odds: the first requires an acceptance of a priori affectivity and of notions 
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of singularity, unique otherness and infinity; the second provides for the reason of 
man and homogeneous themes and categories. What is required is a way to 
thematise and categorise that does not overcomplicate singularity but at the same 
time does not cause oppression through unjust and prejudicial themes and 
categories. 
With the exception of the developments for practical justice put forward by 
Simmons, existing critical human rights scholarship does not develop a workable 
system of justice from Levinas’ ethics of alterity. This is also characteristic of this 
thesis – save for utilising the foundational principles to argue for a reorientation in 
the foundations of human rights from individualism to a non-anthropocentric 
inclusive otherness.  
This thesis has explained an alternative model for litigating and adjudicating 
cases that could accommodate the human rights claims of vegans by presenting 
responsibility to nonhuman others. It is a starting point for the entry of the ethics of 
alterity to be incorporated into a framework for basic protective rights. It is a point of 
entry in recognition that the claims of conscience for suffering nonhumans re-
present to social justice, as a matter of ethical responsibility, the already present and 
legitimate other. With regard to a much more profound reorientation of the 
foundations of human rights, what is required is the development of discourse on 
the otherness of human identity and the creation of themes and categories that are 
anti-oppressive and necessarily anti-anthropocentric.  
These developments are directly related to the major principles in Levinas’ 
ethics of alterity that describe the normativity of the relational experience that 
invokes responsibility. It is on these principles, as Jill Stauffer suggests, that the ethics 
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of alterity may present the basis for an emancipatory justice that stems from a 
reconceptualised understanding of human subjectivity.635 Such a reconceptualisation 
of human subjectivity can accommodate an understanding of veganism being the re-
presentation of the nonhuman other that has been caught up in the totality of the 
orthodoxy of human autonomy. If, even at a basic level of understanding, Levinas’ 
ethics of alterity speak to the other to communicate the principles of justice that 
accommodate suffering others, veganism does this work at the foundation of the 
right to freedom of conscience and at the heart of human rights.  
7.11 Developing a vegan jurisprudence of human rights 
In the development of a theory of relational Becoming with other animals 
that can be used to underpin a vegan jurisprudence of human rights, the articulation 
of concrete principles for everyday practice remains a significant challenge.636 In an 
endeavour to ascribe moral and legal standing to nonhumans in terms of relational 
ethical responsibility, discourse must move beyond sentiency to consider the 
broader scope and complexity of otherness and the vegan manifestation of infinite 
ethical responsibility. This discourse should not centre on nonhuman animals but on 
human modes of thought: ‘change regarding the moral standing of animals is not 
necessarily about animals. It is about us. Facing animals is about facing ourselves and 
others.’637 As such, discourse must resist a return to ideas that perpetuate a 
hierarchy of moral standing.638 In an attempt to generate non-anthropocentric 
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thought, the idea of relational Becoming must not be limited to only the ‘embodied 
communication’639 that describes those in close proximity. It must be extended to 
consider a manifested responsibility that emanates from witnessing the infinity of 
ethical responsibility in the embodied communication of the other in close proximity. 
This concerted effort will help pave the way to detailing further what is at stake in 
the idea of human rights grounded by an ethics of alterity that does not explain how 
to live according to what it prescribes - but certainly concerns vegans and nonhuman 
others.  
The ethics of alterity is a philosophy that is able to move forward a vegan 
jurisprudence of human rights on the basis that, if nothing else, Levinas’ goal, as 
Robert Bernasconi remarks, was a ‘reorientation of thinking … [that] impacts on our 
approach to concrete situations so that we come to see them as ethical’.640  
Baxi cautioned about the potential for ‘Vulgar Levinasianism’. This was based 
on Alford’s reference to the ‘Levinas Effect’ in which scholars interpret Levinas to ‘say 
whatever [they] wanted to say in the first place’.641 With regard to the re-
presentation of nonhumans and their visibility in the claims of vegans, the idea of 
veganism as a response to a priori ethical responsibility is admittedly a moot point – 
but no more so than the idea of the immanence of ethical responsibility. 
If Levinas’ philosophy on the ethics of alterity is anything at all, it is a 
response to and in the service of the other. As such, even a simplistic understanding 
and application to justice and law is better than a deep, comprehensive 
understanding and application of an alternative that exalts the primacy of the self at 
                                                     
639
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640
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the expense of suffering others. In this regard, discourse could do much worse than 
to explore further the potential of the ethics of alterity to ground a protective rights 
enterprise that seeks universality and aims to attend to suffering, emancipate and 
liberate. This is especially so in the current era of scepticism about the institution 
that is human rights, the escalating urge to attend to the off-the-scale-suffering of 
nonhumans, and the interface of human and nonhuman moral standing currently 
observed in human rights theory and practice. Such an exploration is, after all, 
implicit in the existence of human rights and (as Levinas goes to great lengths to 
argue) is constitutive of a humanity that is always and already trying to work out how 
to respond to responsibility. 
The accommodation of veganism by the Convention not only acknowledges 
the significance of the ethical nature of human and nonhuman interaction, it also 
creates and imposes legal duties to accommodate vegans in different contexts in 
wider society. Either by ensuring the provision of appropriate food and synthetic 
uniform items, or by ensuring inclusion of veganism as a legitimate topic in 
educational curricula, human rights law is instrumental in upholding, honouring and 
promoting the moral standing of other animals. This is paradoxical to the idea of 
exclusive human rights and is a clear indication of the potential for a profound 
transformation of human rights to protect the moral standing of nonhuman animals.  
In view of these considerations, the argument presented in this thesis is not 
limited to a consideration of one system of human rights that seeks to comply with 
established, normative, universal principles. It extends to a critique of the false 
ontological assumptions entrenched in the idea of human rights that justify 
exclusion. The ontologically justified exclusion of other animals does not only 
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subjugate and deny them their basic rights, it denies the ethical obligation innate to a 
compassionate humanity that is restrained and sucked into a paradigm of violence 
and prejudice which it finds so objectionable.  
On this view, human rights discourse, law and legal process cannot escape 
the vegan re-presentation of the nonhuman other and the ethical imperative to 
acknowledge the authentic signification in the unspoken saying that precedes the 
oppressive said. As such, it must also acknowledge and honour the socio-political, 
intertwined nature of human and nonhuman life, the human-to-nonhuman 
sociability and the widespread compassion that transgresses speciesist prejudice.  
Ultimately, the human rights claims of vegans can only be accommodated by 
foregrounding the ethical nature of our relationship with nonhuman others. This 
requires an anti-oppressive, inclusive vegan jurisprudence of fundamental, basic 
moral rights that honours, rather than de-faces, the legitimate, authentic 
signification of nonhuman others and our ethical responsibility to them. In this 
regard, the application of Levinas’ ethics of alterity has significant value for the 
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